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Abstract
The relationship between government expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) 
has been subject to extensive research both in the field of public finance and 
macroeconomic modelling. More than one hundred years ago Adolph Wagner 
proposed a positive correlation between the level of gross domestic product growth 
and public spending. In this study six versions of Wagner's law were empirically 
tested employing aggregate and disaggregated annual time series data for the Libyan 
economy covering the period 1962-2005.
This thesis investigated the relationship between government expenditure and gross 
domestic product growth, in terms of total GDP and non-oil GDP. Engle and 
Granger's two-step cointegration analysis has been used to test the long-run 
relationship between government expenditure and total real GDP for Libya, whereas 
the short-run relationship is estimated using the error correction model (ECM). The 
causation between government expenditure and GDP growth is examined using the 
Granger causality test.
It was found that public expenditure and GDP variables in all six versions of Wagner's 
law are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences, that is, they are 
integrated of order one 1(1), in terms of total GDP and non-oil GDP and the six 
categories also. The cointegration tests indicated that there is mixed evidence of a 
long-run relationship between government expenditure and gross domestic product in 
terms of total GDP and non-oil GDP using aggregate data. Furthermore, a long-run 
equilibrium relationship with disaggregate data is also established. The results suggest 
mixed evidence in support of Wagner’s law for the period under review.
The results from the ECM equations reconfirmed the validity of Wagner’s law in the 
short-run for total real GDP and government expenditure, as well as the short-run 
relationship with disaggregate data. Also, the results indicate that the short-run 
relationship between government spending and total real non-oil GDP does not exist 
for the period under review, with the exceptions of versions two and three where 
dummies were used
Finally, the study used Granger causality testing procedure to determine the direction 
of causality. The results provide some evidence of a unidirectional causation running 
from gross domestic product to government expenditure in total real GDP, and mixed 
results with total real non-oil GDP. Also, this study has made contribution to 
knowledge. Specifically, it fills the gap in the public finance area of Libyan growth 
studies by testing Wagner's law on the Libyan economy. Also, this study has used the 
long-run and short-run relationship between government expenditure and total gross 
domestic product with GDP and non-oil GDP, as well as undertaking a causality 
analysis between the relevant variables.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Government expenditure is the amount that the government spends in order to 
maintain its functions as well as promoting the well being of society and the 
economy as a whole. However, the expenditure on government activities over time 
makes it more and more difficult to determine which part goes to recurrent 
expenditure and which goes to capital expenditure. Moreover, government 
spending to boost the economy and social well being takes two different forms. 
One way of spending is through public goods and services that the government 
provides to its people. For example, the expenditure on public education, public 
health, transfers, subsidies and sometimes even grants to its people, or to foreign 
countries.
The other form is spending on infrastructure that are more of an investment that 
have a rate of return, such as goods and services that are part of the country’s 
current output, private goods and services. When the government buys the services 
of the factors of production and uses them to produce goods and services in the 
public sector of the economy either as “free” or as “an investment”, these factors of 
production become unavailable for the private sector. In practice, most 
governments do undertake projects based on their social rate of return and their 
lack of provision by the private sector, because these kinds of goods and services 
are unprofitable to them either as public goods or because of externalities.
The size of government and more specifically the size of government expenditure 
have demonstrated an upward trend. In the last few decades considerable attention 
has focused on the growth of the size of the government sector, both in absolute 
terms and as percentages of GDP with many countries using either time-series data 
or cross-sectional data or both.
Wagner offered a model of the determination of public expenditure in which public 
expenditure growth was a natural consequence of the growth in national income. In 
other words it was endogenously determined. The most accepted interpretation of 
this law states that an increase in economic activities causes an increase in 
government activities, and in turn, increasing public expenditure. In addition, 
Wagner and others later found that, for almost all modem states, real government 
expenditure increases at a faster rate than that of national output.
This chapter consists of nine sections. Research background will be in section 1.2. 
Section 1.3 introduces the components of public expenditure, while section 1.4 
discusses the objectives of the research. Section 1.5 was on the study methodology. 
Section 1.6 introduces the research problem while section 1.7 discusses the 
significance of the study. Data set and computer software presented in section 1.8. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is described in section 1.9.
1.2 Research Background.
During the last four decades the Libyan economy has witnessed dramatic 
improvement as a result of the discovery and exploitation of oil, and the 
development of its political and socio-economic life. Since 1969, there has been a 
systematic change in the Libyan economy. These changes are reflective of changes
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in the Libyan economic framework; namely a shift from a capitalist economy to a 
socialist economy.
The macro-level planning in Libya has aimed at releasing the national economy 
from foreign entanglement and influence, and transforming it into a productive 
national economy before discover of oil. In so doing, a central economic planning 
model has been adopted as a means of developing and implementing a number of 
social and economic transformation strategies. As part of this process, the 
government acquired almost every Libyan company, and nationalised the entire 
private sector. This resulted in public sector control over most of the country 
economic activities.
The impact of oil revenues on economic and social development was clear and 
there were steady and systematic changes in the economy1. The Libyan economy 
became dependent upon an oil sector that contributed 98% to 100% of the country 
exports revenues2. This increase has provided the Libyan government with the 
opportunity to formulate and implement several agents of its social and economic 
transformation. These have been aimed at the non-oil sector to create a diversified 
economy and achieve self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Also, this revenue allows 
the Libyan government to make huge investments in the Libyan economic sectors. 
These investments in these sectors contribute to gross domestic product (GDP) 
increase and growth (Secretariat of General Committee, 2002)
1 See chapter tour for additional details.
2 See section (4.6.1.2) chapter four.
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In this study we can classify public expenditure into the six categories in the Figure
1.1. This figure shows the government expenditure classified by functional or 
economic categories (Chu and Hemming, 1991). The functional classification 
makes known the government priority in spending for social and economic sectors 
during development plans. These sectors reflect the objectives of government 
economic development see Figure 1.1 below. The study in this work focuses on 
the major categories in government functional expenditure like education, health, 
agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication3.
1.3 Components of Public Expenditure
3 Source: General Planning Council.
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Figure 1.1 Expenditure Classifications
1.3.1 The Functional Classification
The functional classification relates to government spending in the social and 
economic sectors. Government expenditure has been summarised into four major 
groups as follows:
1. Goods Producing Sectors
• Agriculture
• Industry
• energy
2. Economic Services Sectors
5
• Housing & Public Utilities
• Communication & Transportation
3. Social Services Sectors
• Education
• Health
• Justice
• Information & Culture & Tourism
4. Other Sectors
• Economy & Trade
• Planning & Finance
• Foreign Affairs
• And Others
This study examines the sectors that include government functional expenditure 
such as: education, health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, 
transportation and communication. This is because these functions accounted for 
the largest share of recurrent expenditure in the period covered by the 
development plans.
1.4 Objectives of the Study
The study aims to shed full light on the relationship between government 
expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) growth attained by Libya within 
the period 1962-2005. Accordingly, we would also like to examine whether the 
level of development itself added to the growth of government expenditure. This 
analysis takes the following form:
6
a. This research intends to investigate the existence o f  long-run and short- 
run relationship between the six versions o f  Wagner's law and the Libyan 
economy.
b. The study also investigates the long-run and short-run equilibrium  
between Libyan G D P  and six categories o f  government functional 
expenditure
c. To examine the Granger causality test between government expenditure 
and gross domestic product in Libya over the period 1962-2005 and six 
categories o f  government functional expenditure.
d. To investigate the Libyan economy, as to whether it supports Wagner’s 
law or not by testing Libyan data fo r  the period 1962-2005.
1.5 Study Methodology
Our methodology in this study employed four types of econometric tests namely: 
unit root tests, Cointegration test, error correction models and Granger causality 
test we used annual data for Libya over the period 1962-2005, and investigate the 
evidence of Wagner’s law over this period.
As a prerequisite of modem empirical analysis, unit root tests should be applied to 
the time series whose properties are required to be either stationary or integrated of 
order one 1(1). Specifically, the study will undertake both Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller (ADF) tests and Phillips-Perron (1989) tests.
Cointegration analysis, which has emerged as a recent econometric development, 
is utilised to examine the long-run relationship equilibrium between integrated 
time series. Our cointegration analysis using the residual based Engle and Granger
7
approach is evidently very easy to use, also we can use this method since there are 
only two variables in the system to test the cointegration relationship. But in other 
situations, if there are more variables, there could potentially be more than one 
linearly independent cointegration relationship. Thus, it is appropriate instead to 
examine the issue of cointegration within the Johansen framework (Brooks, 2008).
For short-run analysis the study uses the error correction model (ECM). The 
estimated error correction model coefficient should be negative and statistically 
significant in the short-run relationship. With respect to the Granger representation 
theorem, negative and statistical significant error correction coefficients are 
necessary conditions for the variables to be cointegrated (Peter. 1998).
The study also uses the Granger causality test to examine the validity of Wagner’s 
hypothesis for Libya. There are two reasons for choosing the Granger causality 
test. First, Wagner’s law postulates that the growth of government expenditure is a 
result of the growth of the economy. This implies that the growth of the economy 
causes the growth of government expenditure. Secondly, the choice of Granger 
causality is made to conform to some of the earlier studies that applied the same set 
of tools to examine the applicability of Wagner’s law.
The law hypothesises that the causality runs from gross domestic product (GDP), 
to the share of total government expenditure (TGX). In this methodology, the study 
investigates and examines at least six versions of this law with real (GDP), and 
with real non-oil (GDP) in Libya. Also, the study tests the relationship between the 
government functional expenditure and GDP.
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1.6 The Research Problem
The role of government expenditure in promoting economic growth remains a 
debatable subject in both developing and industrial countries (Chletsos and 
Kollias, 1997; Henrekson, 1992 and Hsieh and Lai, 1994). In studying the growth 
of the size of government, and more specifically government expenditure, history 
has shown that real government expenditure has increased continuously over time 
in almost every country. The role and size of government is thought to play a very 
important role in raising economic growth especially in developing countries, like 
Libya.
In Libya, until the mid-1980s, the public sector controlled major economic 
activities. Since then, the government has tried to reduce the economy’s 
dependence on public expenditure and has begun to open the door for more 
privatization of economic activities and put more effort in to maintaining a steady 
growth rate of Libya’s GDP, especially in non-oil GDP. The size of the 
government depends on the functions the government is controlling directly in the 
economy for productive and non- productive activities. The crucial questions in 
this study are:
1. Is there a long-run (equilibrium) relationship between economic growth and an
increase in government expenditure?
2. What is the direction of causation between economic growth and real
government expenditure?
These questions will be examined in this study.
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1.7 Significance of the Study
Since the Libyan economy is dominated, more or less, by the oil sector and a large 
central government, oil prices play an important role in determining the level of 
government expenditure. Libyan Policy makers have usually been unwilling to cut 
government expenditure because of concerns about the potential negative impact 
on non-oil growth and non-oil activity due to the volatility in oil prices.
In this study we will focus on estimating six versions of Wagner’s law, to test 
the relationship between GDP growth and government expenditure in the long-run 
and short-run. Also, this study examines the relationship between government 
functional expenditure and gross domestic product. The study used the causality 
theory to test this relation, and we expect one of three possible findings:
1- Wagner’s law holds, which means that there is unidirectional causality from
GDP to TGX: that is GDP causes TGX. In this case, the total real government 
expenditure (TGX) has no effect on economic growth and development 
including growth of non-oil real GDP.
2- The opposite holds which means that there is unidirectional causality from TGX
to GDP: that is, TGX causes GDP (Keynesian proposition)
3- Or there is bidirectional causality between GDP and TGX.
In all the above findings an objective of the study is to focus on the importance of 
the real growth in non-oil activities as a result of oil revenues.
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1.8 Data and Computer Software
The study will cover the time period for which the data is available for the Libyan 
economy from 1962-2005. The study will use annual data, because only annual 
data is available covering this period. This is the sample for all the variables in the 
model. The year 1962 is considered as the initial year because the year 1962 is the 
first complete year of oil exports, and secondly, it is the starting year of the 
systematic national accounts in Libya (Zarmouh, 1998:12). The data in this study 
consists of the following variables:
1- The variables used in Wagner's law
• Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
• Real Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product (Non- Oil GDP)
• Total Real Government Expenditure (TGX)
• Total Real Government Expenditure on Final Consumption (TGXC)
• Population (POP).
• Dummy variable 1 for the impact of discovery of oil on economic growth 
(Dum=l at 1969-2005, and Zero otherwise)
• Dummy variable 2 used for the effects of the UN sanctions on the Libyan 
economy (Dum=zero during no sanctions, and one from 1985-2003)
2- Six sectors of government functional expenditure as follows.
• TGXEDU= real government expenditure on education4
•  TGXHEA= real governm ent expenditure on health
•  TGXAGR= real governm ent expenditure on agriculture
4- All variables expressed in million LDs
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•  TGXH&P= real governm ent expenditure on housing and public u tilities
•  TG XM AN= real governm ent expenditure on m anufacturing
•  TGXT&C=real governm ent expenditure on transportation and 
com m unication
The estimation was calculated by using Eviews 4, (computer software), available 
in the Dundee Business School.
1.9 The Structure of the Study
As already stated, this study addresses estimation of the relationship between 
government expenditure and gross domestic product growth in Libya during 1962- 
2005. We will now briefly outline the structure of this thesis. This thesis is 
organised as follows:
Chapter Two focuses on the theoretical literature on the role of government in the 
economy from different perspectives. This chapter also reviews the relevant 
theories of government expenditure and economic growth. This chapter discusses 
six different formulations of Wagner’s law which the study used in the analysis of 
the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth.
Chapter Three is a description of the empirical literature on Wagner’s law. After 
the publication of English translations of Wagner's law in 1958, Wagner's law has 
become very popular in academic circles and it has been analysed and tested by 
many researchers. Some of these researchers have applied traditional regression 
analysis, whilst some others used causality testing, and more recently cointegration 
analysis has appeared in the literature. The empirical literature looks extensively at
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the studies done on Wagner’s law in developed and developing countries. In this 
chapter the study surveys empirical studies which test Wagner’s law.
Chapter Four is on the historical background of the growth of gross domestic 
product and government expenditure in Libya during the period 1962-2005. The 
aim of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the historical, political, social 
and economic aspects of Libyan society. Different issues will be highlighted in the 
chapter, including the geographic description and historical background of the 
country and the main changes in the political and economic systems since 
independence. Moreover, this chapter discusses and gives some information on the 
UN sanctions on Libya.
Chapter Five presents the methodology adopted for this study. We test Wagner’s 
law on the Libyan economy using annual data for the sample period 1962-2005. As 
we know Wagner’s law has been tested by many researchers for developed and 
developing countries. These studies have found strong evidence in favour of 
Wagner’s law, especially in a time series framework. The present chapter will 
adopt a Granger- causality test to examine the causal relationship between various 
measures of government expenditure and economic growth to test the relationship 
in the short-run. Also, the study uses cointegration analysis to test the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables using the two step test for 
cointegration proposed in Engle and Granger (1987). Before these tests, we used 
the Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Phillips and Perron (1988), to determine whether 
the series are integrated of order 1(1 ) against the alternative that they are integrated 
of order zero 1(0 ).
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Chapter Six examines the relationship between growth GDP and non-oil GDP and 
government expenditure from a long-run equilibrium perspective by employing 
cointegration techniques. In this chapter, by employing a recent advanced 
econometric technique (cointegration analysis), we examine the validity of 
Wagner's law to the Libyan economy using date for the period 1962-2005. Firstly, 
we start with ADF and PP tests to check whether the variables are cointegrated or 
not. Then we can run the analysis using residual based methods proposed by 
(Engle and Granger, 1987) to test for cointegration between GDP and other 
integrated variables including government expenditure.
Chapter Seven focuses on the short-run relationship to test the validity of Wagner's 
law in the case of the Libyan economy. We test the relationship between economic 
growth and government expenditure. As shown in chapter six we can test for the 
short-run for all variables that are cointegrated. Within this framework, we test 
whether there is any short-run relationship between GDP and public expenditure. 
Standard Granger causality tests were used and, also the error correction model test 
was employed.
Chapter Eight analyses the government functional expenditure in six sectors of the 
economy in which the government aims to satisfy the social needs of its people and 
to implement its long-term goal. The study uses data from 1962-2005 to estimate 
functional expenditure. To analyse the time series data used in this study we started 
to check whether the series are stationary or non stationary using the Dickey-Fuller 
test and as well as Phillips and Perron. Then, in this chapter the study involved 
testing for cointegration using Engle and Granger two steps to detect the existence 
of a long-run relationship between the variables included in this analysis. To
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investigate the short-run equilibrium relationship the study used an error correction 
model and Granger causality test to estimate if there is a short-run relationship.
Chapter Nine provides a summary and conclusion to the study. It offers a brief 
review of the main findings, and an explanation of the study’s contribution to 
knowledge in theory and practice. It also describes the policy implications of the 
study results. Finally, the limitations of the study are explained and suggestions for 
future research are made.
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Chapter Two
Theoretical Studies of the Wagner’s Hypothesis
2.1 Introduction
The role and the size of government expenditure in promoting economic growth 
has long been the concern of economists and policy makers in both industrialised 
and developing countries. Over the twentieth century, both the role and the size of 
government economic activity have expanded in most industrial countries. 
Economic research has taken two main approaches to this development. One has 
been to take the size of state activity as exogenous to the economic development 
process, and to ask what effect state activity has on economic growth. This 
approach has often been termed the 'Keynesian approach'. The line of research 
following this approach has studied the level of government activity at which the 
rate of economic growth is optimized, and this level is referred to as the "optimal 
size of government".
This approach has been adopted and tested extensively in the public choice 
economics literature. (Yavas, 1998) observed that the size and type of expansion of 
government expenditure in an economy differs according to the stage of 
development. He observed that in underdeveloped countries a significant portion of 
government expenditure is directed at developing economic infrastructure and 
there this type of government expenditure will have a stimulating effect on private 
sector production and, consequently, will stimulate the growth of the economy. In 
contrast to underdeveloped countries, Yavas’s study suggested that developed 
countries already have most of their infrastructure established and a major part of
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their government spending is on welfare programs and various social services. 
(Dar and AmirKhalkhali, 2002) predicted that there is an optimal size of 
government activity in the economy and if this optimal size exceeds a maximum 
then it causes a negative effect on economic growth.
Other scholars have adopted a similar approach by investigating the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth as a non-linear process; a 
proposition that was first empirically tested in endogenous growth models. 
(Heitger, 2001) for instance, hypothesized that government activity on public 
goods has a positive impact on economic growth, but this positive impact tends to 
decline, or even reverse, if government further increases its activity over some 
optimal size. In this sense, Heitger was hypothesizing that there is an optimal size 
of government activity in the economy.
In addition, some scholars have advocated the use of an allocated efficiency rule to 
establish the optimal size of government (Sanjeev, 2003) suggested that the size of 
government spending is optimal when the social marginal cost of public resources 
is equal to their social marginal benefit. It is not the intention here to cover the 
literature on these approaches to the relationship between government expenditure 
and economic growth. But the main concern of this thesis is with the approach 
which considers the expansion of government expenditure as endogenous and 
being driven by economic development. On one hand, government expenditure is 
seen as an exogenous factor which can be used as a policy instrument to influence 
growth (Keynes). On the other hand, government expenditure is seen as an 
endogenous factor or as an outcome, not the reason for growth (Wagner).
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Since at least the late nineteenth century, works in public economics literature have 
tried to establish criteria by which the revenue and activity policies of government 
should be evaluated. While other scholars had written on the topic before this time, 
they did so generally as part of a wider analysis of the determinants of economic 
growth, such as Smith (1776) in his “Wealth of Nations” and Mill (1848) the 
author of “Principles of Political Economy” . Smith and Mill intended to explain 
the principles by which revenue and expenditure policies could be determined as 
part of their investigation of the relationship between the state and economy.
The German economist, Adolph Wagner, was perhaps the first to propose a direct 
hypothesis that the expansion of government activity responds positively to 
changes in economic development, so that as a country’s income rises, the size of 
that country’s public sector, relative to the whole economy, rises too. Wagner 
observed a growing role of the state as a provider of social services in areas such as 
education, transportation and infrastructure. He also noted that technology, such as 
steam technology, was making it easier for the state to organize its own production 
plants more efficiently than the private sector and that the demand for public goods 
was growing faster than the demand for private goods.
Most of the nineteenth century literature was concerned with the appropriate "role" 
of government. Wagner directed his attention to the "size" of government by 
proposing a hypothesis which predicted that economic development would be 
accompanied by a relative growth of the public sector in the economy. In 
particular, Wagner suggested that during industrialization the size of government 
activity relative to the economy would grow at a rate greater than the rate of 
growth of income. That is, the Wagner's hypotheses (WH) which has also been
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referred to as Wagner's law. Wagner’s law has attracted a great deal of interest in 
the public economics literature and has been tested for different economies both 
over time and across countries. As with many hypotheses that are proposed in 
general terms, several interpretations of the Wagner’s law have been proposed and 
tested in the existing literature. Some of these studies have supported the WH as an 
explanation of the expansion of the size of government activity in the economy, 
and other studies have found evidence that does not support it, or contradicts the 
different interpretations and, also the existing testing procedures and results.
It is useful to make two brief notes at this moment. First, the study should note that 
the explanation of Wagner’s Law in this Chapter is very brief compared to the 
discussion on the Keynesian explanation. Wagner’s Law identifies the reasons why 
government expenditure grows. Keynes, on the other hand, treats government 
expenditure as a stimulus to the growth of the economy. In hypothesis testing, 
government expenditure in the Keynesian model is the independent variable. In 
contrast, in Wagner’s Law, government expenditure is the dependent variable. 
Wagner’s Law and Keynesian explanation are modeled in the following way:
Wagner’s Law
Keynesian explanation
Where, GDP=Gross Domestic Product, TGX = Government Expenditure, POP = 
Population.
Secondly, the reference to Keynesian economics in this study is made only with 
respect to the role of government expenditures on national income measured by 
way of GDP.
TGX
POP = /
GDP
POP
GDP
POP = /
TGX
POP
(2. 1)
( 2 .2)
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This thesis will focus on an empirical assessment of Wagner’s Law. The remainder 
of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 will give some explanation 
about the definition of government expenditure; Section 2.3 will discuss the 
economic theories of Government Expenditure and economic growth, Section 2.4 
discusses the different interpretations of the Wagner’s law and, finally, Section 2.5 
summarises the chapter.
2.2 The Definition of Government Expenditure
In defining government expenditure it is first necessary to decide which spending 
agencies to include and then which items of their expenditure to take into account. 
There are four possible spending agencies to consider: central government, local 
government, the national insurance fund and the nationalised industries. There is a 
consensus about the inclusion of the first two. There is also a strong case for 
including the national insurance fund because its disbursement is entirely 
determined by government policy and its income is derived partly from a general 
exchequer contribution (raised by taxation), and partly from levies on employers 
and employees of a largely compulsory nature and scarcely distinguishable from 
taxes more difficult question is the treatment of nationalised industries.
Public expenditure reflects the policy choices of government. Once government 
decides upon which goods and service to provide and the quantity and quality in 
which they will be produced, public expenditures represent the costs of carrying 
out these policies. This definition is broad to enable us to make two distinctions. 
First, there are the costs of providing goods and services through the public 
expenditure, i.e. the amount that appears in the public sector accounts. Secondly,
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For example, the passing of a law that requires a hotel to install minimum fire 
precautions will result in the hotel owner spending money. Another example would 
be the policy of ‘care in the community’ which is being pursued in the UK at 
present1. This wider definition of public expenditure is of interest when one is 
discussing the costs of government actions. However, for most purposes, a 
narrower definition of public expenditure is used (Brown and Jackson, 1990). In 
the national income accounts, public expenditures is represented by two broad 
categories of government activity. First, there is comprehensive public 
expenditure. These expenditures correspond to the government's purchases of 
current goods and services (i.e. labour, consumables etc.), and capital goods and 
services (i.e. public sector investment in roads, schools, hospitals etc.). Exhaustive 
public expenditures are purchases of inputs by the public sector and are calculated 
by multiplying the volume of inputs by the input prices. Exhaustive public 
expenditures are claims on the resources of the economy, so that their use by the 
public sector precludes their use by other sectors. The second category of public 
expenditures is transfer expenditures, such as public expenditures on pensions, 
subsidies, unemployment benefits.
In the public expenditure literature, there is still a big debate about transfers. While 
some claim that transfers payments should be included in an analysis of the growth 
of public expenditure, others exclude such expenditures. The study will discuss 
this point in detail below, because of its importance.
1 -Mentally ill patients are removed from public sector hospitals to their own or relative’s homes.
m ost rules, regu la tion s  and law s  in trodu ced  b y  g o v e rn m e n t  result in p riv ate  sector
exp en ditu re .
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As (Griffiths and Wall, 1991) mentions, the UK Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
offers at least ten measures of the size of public expenditure. However, no single 
measure of public expenditure has met with universal agreement, and even when 
one has been widely used for some time, it can be subject to change for a variety of 
reasons. The changes in the definition of public expenditure in Libya will be 
discussed in chapter 4. As mentioned before, government decisions are reflected in 
public and private sector expenditures. Almost every government action results in 
-expenditure changes in both sectors (Rice, 1983).
2.3 Public (Government) Expenditure Theories Approach
One can distinguish among four main different theories of government spending 
(expenditure) based on how each theory deals with both government expenditure 
and government revenue:
• Wagner's Law.
• The Displacement-Concentration (Effect) Hypotheses.
• The Theory of Bureaucracy.
• Keynesian Theory Approach.
2.3.1 The W agner Hypothesis
Since our main focus in this study is based on the relationship between the growth 
of government and the growth of the economy (GDP), as propounded by Wagner’s 
law, our emphasis from this point onward will be directed to this issue. This 
section will analyse the theoretical foundations of Wagner's law. For a long time 
there was no specific model to determine the role of public expenditure in 
promoting economic growth. Undoubtedly, some classical economists, e.g. Adam
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there was no attempt to translate such observations into a general theory (Tarschys,
1975). It is important to recognize that “Wagner was writing at a specific time and
place; when many scholars in Germany became filled with nationalism and the
desire for a strong state to heal the political and economic disorders affecting the
German society” (Getzler, 2000, p.13). Writing between 1877 and 1893, Adolph2
Wagner hypothesised that as an economy developed, the level of government
expenditure would increase. Wagner argued that public expenditure growth is
a natural consequence of the growth and development of the economy.
The “la w  o f  in c r e a s in g  e x p a n s io n  o f  p u b lic , a n d  p a r t ic u la r ly  s ta te , a c t i v i t i e s ” b e c o m e s  f o r  
th e  f i s c a l  e c o n o m y  th e  la w  o f  th e  in c r e a s in g  e x p a n s io n  o f  f i s c a l  r e q u ir e m e n ts  g r o w th  a n d , 
o ften  e v e n  m o r e  so , th o s e  o f  lo c a l  a u th o r itie s , w h en  a d m in is tr a t io n  is  d e c e n tr a l is e d  a n d  
lo c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  w e ll  o r g a n is e d . R e cen tly , th e r e  h a s  b e e n  a  m a r k e d  in c r e a s e  in G e r m a n y  
in th e  f i s c a l  r e q u ir e m e n t o f  m u n ic ip a li t ie s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  u rb a n  o n es . T h a t la w  is th e  r e s u lt  o f  
e m p ir ic a l  o b s e r v a t io n  in p r o g r e s s iv e  c o u n tr ie s , a t  l e a s t  in o u r  W e s te rn  E u ro p e a n  
c iv i l is a t io n :  i ts  e x p la n a tio n  ju s t if ic a t io n  a n d  c a u se  is  th e  p r e s s u r e  f o r  s o c ia l  p r o g r e s s  a n d  
p u b l ic  e c o n o m y , e s p e c ia l ly  c o m p u ls o r y  p u b l ic  e c o n o m y . F in a n c ia l s tr in g e n c y  m a y  h a m p e r  
th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  s ta te  a c t iv it ie s ,  c a u s in g  th e ir  e x te n t to  b e  c o n d i t io n e d  b y  re v e n u e  r a th e r  
th an  th e  o th e r  w a y  ro u n d , a s  is  m o r e  u su a l. B u t in th e  lo n g  ru n  th e  d e s ir e  f o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  
o f  a  p r o g r e s s iv e  p e o p le  w il l  a lw a y s  o v e r c o m e  th e se  f in a n c ia l  d if f ic u ltie s .
Wagner postulated that the expansion of government expenditure arises because of 
the expansion in the fiscal requirement of "public and particularly state activities". 
According to him, this expansion is due to the growth "of fiscal requirements" of 
the state and local authorities of the government of "progressive countries" as a 
result of the "pressure for social progress". Similarly, Wagner (1883), writing
Smith, paid attention to tendencies in the long-term trend in public expenditure, but
2- Most references on Wagner’s law established that Wagner’s writing dated between 1877 and 
1893. The main English translations, Three Extracts On Public Finance, which were translated by 
Nancy Cooke were taken from Finanzwissenschaft, Part 1, Third Edition, Leipzig 1883, pp.4-16, 
and 69-76. These were first published in the Classics in the Theory of Public Finance edited by 
R.A.Musgrave and A.T.Peacock, Macmillan, 1958.
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more than one hundred years ago, offered a model of the determination of public 
expenditure in which public expenditure growth was a natural consequence of 
economic growth. He was a leading German economist of the time. On the basis of 
his empirical findings, he "formulated a law of expanding state expenditure; which 
pointed to the growing importance of government activities and expenditure as an 
inevitable feature of the progressive state" (Bird, 1972). He was the first scholar to 
recognize the existence of a positive correlation between the level of economic 
development and the size of the public sector. He hypothesized a functional 
relationship between the growth of an economy and the growth of government 
activities such that the government sector grows faster than that of the economy. 
According, to (Henrekson, 1993), Wagner saw there are four main reasons for an 
increased governmental role:
1- First, industrialization and modernization would lead to a substitution of 
public for private activities. Expenditure on law and order as well as on 
contractual enforcement would have to be increased.
2- Second, the growth in real income would facilitate the relative expansion of 
the income elastic ‘cultural and welfare’ expenditure.
3- Education and culture are two areas in which the government could be a better 
provider than the private sector. Thus, the public sector would grow after 
basic needs of the people are satisfied and the consumption pattern of people 
expands towards activities such as education and culture.
4- Finally, natural monopolies such as the railroads had to be taken over by the 
government because private companies would be unable to run these 
undertakings efficiently because it would be impossible to raise the huge 
finances that are needed for the development of these natural monopolies.
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His views were formulated as a law and are often referred to as “Wagner’s Law”. 
His main contribution in this field was that he tried to establish generalisations 
about public expenditure, not from postulations about the logic of choice 
(deductively), but rather by direct inference from historical evidence (inductively). 
Wagner’s Law, stated simply, and proposes that there is a long-run tendency for 
public expenditure to grow relative to some national income aggregate such as 
GDP. After the publication of English translations of Wagner’s works in 1958, 
Wagner’s Law has become very popular in academic circles and it has been 
analysed and tested by many researchers, for example, (Gupta, 1967), (Goffman, 
1968), (Pryor, 1968), (Musgrave, 1969), (Peacock-Wiseman, 1980) and (Chletsos 
and Kollias, 1997). Some of these researchers have applied traditional regression 
analysis, whilst some others have used causality testing, and more recently 
cointegration analysis has appeared in the literature. Empirical tests of Wagner’s 
Law have yielded results that differ considerably from country to country and 
period to period (Safa Demirbas, 1999).
From the above discussion, Wagner’s Law can be interpreted as treating public 
expenditure as an outcome, or an endogenous factor. Wagner’s Law requires the 
causality to run from gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita to 
government expenditure in contrast to the Keynesian approach in which causality 
is seen to run from government expenditure to GDP (Keynes, 1936). Finally, there 
are at least six versions of Wagner’s Law which have been empirically 
investigated, and we are going to discuss each one of them in more detail in section
2.4.
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2.3.2 The Displacement Effect Hypothesis
The displacement (effect) hypothesis was propounded by Peacock and Wiseman, 
(1961). In the literature, it has been closely linked to Wagner's law although there 
are some differences between the two. Peacock and Wiseman (1961) reject 
Wagner’s historical determinism. Their own model is not restricted to simple 
economic phenomena but it encompasses social and political dimensions such as 
voting behaviour and group attitudes.
After examining whether there are any permanent influences, such as population, 
prices, and income on the size of public expenditures, they argue that there is still 
an unexplained part of public expenditure growth. When Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961) looked at the growth of public expenditure in the United Kingdom over the 
period from 1955 to 1980, they put forward two basic propositions. These are: (a) 
total public expenditure has risen faster than GDP over the period and so the public 
sector takes an increasing proportion of economic resources for its own use; and 
(b) there is a clear ‘displacement effect’ in the two world wars. According to them, 
although British public expenditure decreased after the wars, it did not return to its 
pre-war level, and a similar pattern was to be observed in other affected countries. 
At this point, it may be worth quoting Peacock and Wiseman’s own explanation of 
the displacement effect:
" W h en  s o c ie t ie s  a r e  n o t  b e in g  s u b je c te d  to  u n u su a l p r e s s u r e s ,  p e o p l e ’s  id e a s  a b o u t  
to le r a b le  b u r d e n s  o f  ta x a tio n , t r a n s la te d  in to  id e a s  o f  r e a s o n a b le  ta x  ra te s , te n d  a ls o  to  b e  
f a i r l y  s ta b le . T h ere  m a y  th u s b e  a p e r s is te n t  d iv e r g e n c e  b e tw e e n  id e a s  a b o u t  d e s ir a b le  
p u b l ic  sp e n d in g  a n d  id e a s  a b o u t  th e  lim its  o f  ta x a tio n . T h e d iv e r g e n c e  m a y  b e  n a r r o w e d  
b y  la r g e - s c a le  s o c ia l  d is tu r b a n c e s , su ch  a s  m a jo r  w a rs . S u ch  d is tu r b a n c e s  m a y  c r e a te  a  
d is p la c e m e n t  effec t, sh if tin g  p u b l ic  re v e n u e s  a n d  e x p e n d itu r e s  to  n e w  le v e ls .  A f te r  th e
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d is tu r b a n c e  is o v e r  n e w  id e a s  o f  to le r a b le  ta x  le v e ls  e m e rg e , a n d  a  n e w  p la te a u  o f  
e x p e n d i tu r e  m a y  b e  re a c h e d , w ith  p u b l ic  e x p e n d itu r e s  a g a in  ta k in g  a  b r o a d ly  c o n s ta n t  
s h a r e  o f  g r o s s  n a tio n a l  p r o d u c t ,  th o u gh  a  d if fe r e n t  s h a r e  f r o m  th e  f o r m e r  o n e  (P e a c o c k  
a n d  W isem a n , 1 9 61 : x x i v ”.
According to Nagarajan (1979), there are two versions of the displacement effect. 
The original version implies that ‘social disturbances’ would tend to increase the 
level of public expenditure in relation to national output, accompanied by a shift in 
the level of taxes. The second version does not stress shifts in the ratio of public 
spending to national output. It is likely that the ‘inspection process’ may generate a 
different kind of displacement which is an inter-functional shift without shifting 
the levels of aggregate spending and taxes (Nagarajan, 1979). Bird (1971), argues 
that such interfunctional shifts are not really related to the displacement effect. 
However, if the "interfunctional shift" is accompanied by a shift in the level of 
aggregate expenditure and taxes, then it would be a displacement effect 
(Nagarajan, 1979). According to Brown and Jackson (1990), the inspection effect 
arises from voters' keener awareness of social problems during the period of social 
upheaval. Inherently, wars or other social upheavals arouse the sentiments of 
community. Hence, government expands its provision of services in order to 
improve social conditions and the government is able to finance these higher levels 
of expenditure. These effects can lead to a shift in the level of public expenditure 
in relation to national output. So, public expenditures do not return to their former 
levels.
Peacock and Wiseman suggested the opportunity of considering the dependence of 
government upon revenues raised by taxation, and therefore the relevance of the
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constraints imposed on public expenditure by the electors, willingness to pay taxes, 
and encouraged further research on government growth, more focused on empirical 
data. In particular, from their analysis of the time-pattern of the British general 
government expenditure, Peacock and Wiseman elaborated their "displacement 
theory hypothesis". It is important to notice that they do not deny the importance of 
many of the characteristics of government expenditure to which Wagner's law 
draws attention, but they are more interested in yearly changes, rather than in the 
secular behaviour of the public sector size and the permanent influences on 
government expenditure.
2.3.3 The Theory of Bureaucracy
This theory is concerned with the role and influence of the self-interested 
bureaucracy in determining the level of public spending. The most important and 
pioneering work on the effect of bureaucratic behaviour were conducted by 
Niskanen (1971). Niskanen argued that bureaucrats derived their utility by the size 
of their bureau’s budget'1 *. This follows a “career centred motivation” with a desire 
“to move up, in the hierarchy” (Tullock, 1965). Niskanen (1971) introduced the 
concept of budget maximising bureaucrats. Budget maximising behaviour of 
bureaucrats, therefore, can be seen as a product of the utility maximisation game 
(Niskanen, 1971 Borcheding, 1977).4 This approach in analysing public 
expenditure growth considers that the over-expansion of the public sector is due to 
the existence of bureaucratic power (Tullock, 1976).The literature shows several
- Niskanen obviously, was referring to the United States bureaucrats. As rightly pointed out by
Jackson (1985), in the United States, the salary o f bureau's chief is related to the bureau's budget.
Jakson argued that this is not the case in Britain whereby the salary of the bureau's chief is not 
related to the size of the bureau nor its budget. Neither is it the case with Libya.
4- Borcherding argued that non-economic factors explain "more than one-third, and possibly, one 
half of the growth of the government spending" (1977b:56).
ways in which bureaucrats can contribute towards higher government expenditure. 
Primarily important in this analysis is that bureaucrats are self-interested 
individuals seeking personal gains. The utility derived by bureaucrats is the 
function of:
U  = F [ S , C , R , P , P c i , 0 , M C , M ]  (2.3)
Where S = salary, C = comfort or perquisites [of the office], R = public reputation, 
P = power, Pa = patronage, O = output of the bureau, MC = ease of making change 
and M = ease of managing the bureau. Niskanen argued that all except the last two 
-ease of making change and ease of managing -  could have a dramatic effect on 
the bureau’s budget being the “positive monotonic function of the total budget of 
the bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office”(Niskanen, 1971). In deciding 
on the bureau’s budget, the bureaucrat will ensure that “the budget must be equal 
to or greater than the minimum total costs of supplying the output expected by the 
bureau’s sponsor” (Niskanen, 1971).
Niskanen’s bureaucratic model was an extension of Down’s (1967). Down divides 
bureaucrats into five categories: climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates and 
statesman/ Down argued that the effect on bureau’s budgets is less from one 
category to another with climbers being the most budget maximising. Nevertheless 
(Margolis, 1975) argued that for the climbers the most self-interested seekers of all 
the categories, it is easier to make a career by changing from one bureau to
All these exhibit different goals. Climbers’ goals obviously lien self interest. Conservers will 
conserve their position. Zealots are devoted to the cause of the bureau. Advocates are loyal to the 
cause of the bureau. Lastly, statesmen are considered as an ideal public servant. If applied to 
Niskanen budget maximising behaviour, with this type of personality differences, except for the 
statesman, it is likely that others could contribute to the expansion in their bureau's budget.
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another. Therefore, if climbers can achieve a better position by changing from one 
bureau to another, it is unlikely that they will be budget maximizers.
Conservers, as defined by Down, will only conserve what they already have, which 
also means that they will not be budget- maximizers. The only likely ones are 
zealots and advocates. Down seems to accept that zealots and advocates will tend 
to create new bureau. The strength of bureaucratic theory depends much on the 
transparency of bureaucratic activities. Weber (1973), for example, argued that 
bureaucrats prefer poorly informed and powerless parliaments, not to expose 
themselves to the public, so as to keep their work secret from the public scrutiny 
and will fight any attempt to gain control over them. This is possible through the 
game they establish with politicians in the context of a principal-agent 
relationship6. Niskanen (1971), has points out that "one can expect that the 
interactions between executives and legislators, bureaucrats and politicians are 
subjected to the constraint of re-election" which shows the self-interest behaviour 
in both arms of the government.
Downsian and Niskanen theory of democracy rest mainly on the assumption of 
budget maximising behaviour of bureaucrats and Niskanen believed that 
bureaucrats succeeded in their budget-maximisers quest. The main problem with 
Niskanen’s theory is the assumption that all bureaucrats are budget maximisation. 
Dunleavy (1985) argued otherwise, that budget maximizers are not the maxim of 
the majority of bureaucrats. Nonetheless, Niskanen’s assumption itself lacks 
empirical evidence even though in a later writing Niskanen (1975) cited evidence
(> -  Brown and Jacson (1990) argued that the relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians can 
be viewed in the context of principal-agent relationship.
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in support of it. Among the ways bureaucrats can raise the level of government 
spending is by demanding better pay and better working conditions Klein (1990) 
which will also allow them what Peacock (1978) termed as on the job leisure. On 
the other hand, bureaucratic expansion may also arise because of a much more 
complex network of government functions (Jackson, 1990 Klein, 1976) due to 
industrialisation and development.
2.3.4 Keynesian Theory Approach
In contrast to Wagner’s approach, there is another approach mentioned earlier 
which is associated with Keynes. Keynesian theory was based on the role that the 
government plays in the cases when aggregate demand in the economy is declining 
or remains stagnant. Keynes (1933) noticed that many types of government 
expenditure could contribute to economic growth positively by directly increasing 
aggregate demand. Therefore, the government can step in and stimulate economic 
activity by increasing aggregate demand, increasing income and in turn reducing 
unemployment.
Keynes’s theory was simple, intuitive and practical— firms will hire more labour 
only if they believe they can sell the extra output. Consequently, if demand as a 
whole declines, they will cut back production and lay workers off. However, by 
laying workers off, the income of potential customer’s decreases and, thus, 
aggregate demand will be even lower. Then, as firms do not see demand rise again; 
they have no incentive to rehire. The economy, in short, is caught in a vicious 
circle of high unemployment and low demand. This is where an exogenous agency, 
such as a government, can step in and, by increasing demand, lead the economy
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into a virtuous cycle of high demand and high employment. Keynes (1936) 
developed the principle of effective demand: as government expenditure increases, 
the notional income increases too. Therefore, the causality, in the Keynesian 
approach, runs from government expenditure to national income and public 
expenditure is seen as an exogenous factor or instrument to be used to stimulate 
economic growth.
Keynesianism is generally a theory of economic stabilization, not a theory of 
government growth. It does not suggest that government, in fighting economic 
fluctuations, would necessarily increase or decrease its relative size. While budget 
imbalances, dictated by fiscal activism, are acceptable on a yearly basis, a 
Keynesian premise is that over a number of years the budget would be balanced. 
The size of government expenditure is viewed as an exogenous factor.
2.4 - Interpretations of the Wagner Hypothesis
After the publication of English translations of Wagner’s hypothesis, his 
hypothesis has provided scope for a range of different interpretations in the 
existing literature. It is possible to identify at least six of these interpretations, 
Peacock and Wiseman (1967), Gupta, S.P. (1967), Goffman (1968), Pryor (1968), 
Musgrave (1969) and Mann (1980).The discussion in the following subsections 
will critically review the interpretations of the WH.
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2.4.1 Peacock and Wiseman (1967)
Peacock and Wiseman (P&W) interpret the WH as:
“ The proportion o f  public expenditures to gross national product that must be 
expected to rise over the foreseeable future  ”  (Peacock and Wiseman, 1 9 6 1 , p, 10). 
The P&W interpretation of the WH envisages that public expenditure should 
increase easily and consistently at a rate higher than the rate of increase in national 
income, and they assumed that the growth of public expenditure is associated with 
changes in the demand for public services. Those changes in demand are mainly 
due to the growth in income per capita and population. However, Wagner 
considered other factors, such as a steadily developing division of labour, 
technology and scientific progress, as well as the increasing complexity of 
transport and communication, which would lead to a higher level of government 
expenditure. This is a function of national income and can be represented in the 
general relationship shown in equation (2.4).
TGX -  f  '(GDP) (2.4)
Where TGX represents total government expenditure and GDP represents Gross 
Domestic Product. A few comments can be made on the P&W interpretation. First, 
it can be considered to be the first modern analysis to revive the WH, and began 
the modem measurement of the state as a fiscal activity vie TGX. Second, it 
rejected both the organic theory of the state explicit in Wagner, and also rejected 
the mechanism by which any expansion would take place.
The problem they suggested was that state activities may increase, but not for the 
reason or in the way that Wagner hypothesised. However, they adopted Wagner's
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historical approach to study the behaviour of British public expenditure by looking 
at the relevant time-series and historical facts. In rejecting the theoretical 
foundations of the WH, its organic view of the state and its alleged demand-side 
focus and the validity of the WH in explaining the pattern of state activity growth.
They found that state activity displayed a step-wise, rather than gradual, pattern of 
government growth. Third, Wagner did not suggest a precise functional form of the 
relationship between the size of public expenditure and economic development. 
However, the P&W interpretation of the WH still proposes a linear relationship 
between the two economic variables as depicted in equation (2.5).
TGX  = a  + j3{GDP) (2.5)
P&W were concerned primarily with the time-pattern of public expenditure 
growth, and in so doing proposed their own stepwise process of public expenditure 
growth, where they stress the importance of supply side crises such as wars and 
depressions. They argued that the greater role of government during these times 
leads to increases in the tolerable burden of taxation, rather than the smooth 
'organic' demand-led growth that they argued was proposed by Wagner. According 
to P&W, the crisis level of taxation tends to remain high after the crisis has passed 
because the expanded bureaucracy will act to ensure its continued new levels of 
funding, albeit for a different suite of post-crisis expenditure.
They further argued that crises, especially war, can concentrate power at the 
national level. They called their hypothesis the "displacement" effect and it is 
typified by public expenditure, which is rapidly flexible upwards during crises, but
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is inflexible downwards after the crises. However, the P&W displacement 
hypothesis was unable to explain the sustained large rise in the role of the public 
sector after World War II in the United Kingdom or in other countries (Bird, 
1972).
This ensures an elasticity of TGX with respect to GDP greater than 1, so that, in 
some range of GDP, the share of government in GDP is increasing. Further, it also 
ensures that as GDP increases, the elasticity falls to 1 and that TGX grows in equal 
proportion to GDP and the share TGX/GDP reaches a maximum. However, there 
is still an important issue; the asymptote value could be greater than 1. Further, 
very importantly, negative values of TGX do not make economic sense. This 
would indicate that perhaps a better direction would be to directly model the 
relationship of the share of TGX/GDP with some measure of the level of the 
economy such as GDP or GNP per capita. P&W functional form could suffer from 
an endogenous problem. This problem may happen in P&W model if both Keynes 
and Wagner are right. That is, TGX causes GDP and GDP causes TGX.
However, it should be pointed out that all models which test the WH and have 
TGX or any measure in levels of government expenditure on the left hand side of 
the equation could suffer from an endogenous repressor problem, (Verbeek 2000, 
p. 122). In time-series, a clear way to overcome this problem would be to introduce 
the lagged variable income, or the lagged variable income per capita, as an 
instrumental variable in the two stage least square model, (Greene, 2003,p.74).
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2.4.2 Gupta, S.P. (1967)
Gupta (1967) interpreted the WH by considering the relationship between state 
activity and national income as:
“ G o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  m u s t  i n c r e a s e  a t  a  r a t e  f a s t e r  th a n  t h a t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  
i n c o m e ” Gupta, (1967, p. 426).
Gupta measured the size of government by TGX per capita, and economic 
development by GDP per capita, as shown in the general relationship depicted in 
equation (2 .6 ):
T G X
P O P = f
G D P
P O P
( 2 .6 )
Where (POP) represents population and the other variables are as defined 
previously. Gupta examined the time-pattern of public expenditure growth for a 
group of countries. The countries he tested were: the UK, Germany, U.S.A., 
Canada, and Sweden. Gupta suggested that the P&W version of the WH refers 
only to the shift in the level of government expenditure in relation to national 
output.
He suggested that P&W were looking for the association between social upheaval, 
economic growth and the level of government expenditure. Gupta argued that the 
concept of a tolerable burden of taxation adopted by P&W could explain shifts in 
the level of public expenditure during wars and crises, but cannot explain the shift 
in the level of public expenditure during a depression since taxes are reduced in 
this period. Gupta explained further that including other methods of financing in
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addition to taxes, such as deficit financing, in the P&W concept of a tolerable 
burden, might provide a better explanation. Gupta may be the first to devise 
rigorous statistical tests for a displacement effect, separately testing for a shift in 
the government expenditure level and whether social upheaval is associated with 
the change in the income elasticity of government expenditure in relation to 
economic growth.
To test for the WH and the ‘displacement’ effect, Gupta adopted a double 
logarithmic functional form, which is depicted in equation (2.7)
In
r T G X  ' 
K~POPj = a  + /3 In
' G D P '  
K~POPj
(2.7)
Gupta's logarithmic form gives a constant elasticity score on the left hand side 
variable of the equation (TGX/POP) with respect to the right hand side variable 
(GDP/POP). Gupta's model of the WH is different from that of P&W in a way that 
the left and right hand side variables are now represented as ratios to population. 
Gupta also tested for the WH using a log-linear function form whilst P&W 
functional work implies a simple linear form. Because TGX and GDP exhibit 
strong simultaneity, Gupta's log-linear functional form suffers from an 
identification problem, as did P&W functional form.
The test results suggested that a shift in the level of TGX per capita was associated 
with the great depression in the United States and Canada, which could not be 
explained by P&W displacement effect hypothesis. Gupta justified this on the 
grounds that the shift associated with the great depression occurred because much 
new expenditure, such as welfare services and subsidies and assistance generated
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by the great depression, were mostly deficit financed. The results also suggested 
that a significant change in the income elasticity of the level of TGX per capita 
with respect to per capita GDP is associated with each major social upheaval but 
with no generalisation of its direction. In the case of Sweden, where there were no 
social upheavals, the income elasticity of the level of TGX per capita also changed 
positively after the Second World War, which presented some support for the WH 
in Sweden during that period.
The results of the tests in Gupta’s study suggested a limited acceptance of the WH 
in most of the countries included in the tests. Gupta (1967) introduced a non-linear 
model of the WH and suggested that modelling the WH this way might give a 
better understanding of the behaviour of public expenditure in relation to national 
income over time and across countries. His results did not contradict the WH but 
he did not develop his non-linear model further to a sensible form that places 
boundaries on the level of government expenditure. However, Gupta’s non-linear 
interpretation marked a significant step in the development of the interpretations of 
the WH, since he was the first to recognise that the growth of government relative 
to national income would follow a non-linear process.
Gupta’s (1967) linear interpretation has been adopted and tested for different 
economies by many scholars in the existing literature. Michas (1974) tested 
Gupta’s version of the WH for Canada during the period from 1950 to 1961 and he 
found support for the WH during that period. Nomura (1995) tested Gupta’s 
version of the WH for Japan during the period from 1960 to 1991 and found 
support for it, whereas Singh and Sahni (1984) tested Gupta’s version for India 
during the period from 1950 to 1980 and they found no support. Other studies have
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been carried out and tested Gupta’s version of the WH such as Chletsos and 
Kollias (1997) for Greece, and Ansari, et al. (1997) for three African countries.
2.4.3 Pryor (1968)
Pryor analysed the growth of public expenditure in market and centrally planned 
economies. The market economies included were the USA, West Germany, 
Austria, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia7. The centralised economies 
included were Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the USSR, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria. Unlike the two previous works, Pryor (1968) interpreted 
the WH such that in growing economies, public consumption expenditure became 
an increasingly larger component of the national income. His interpretation is 
different from both the Gupta and P&W interpretations in that Pryor narrowed the 
definition of government. His interpretation of the WH as depicted in equation 
( 2 .8 )
T G X C
G D P f
f  G D P '  
< P O P  j
(2 .8)
Where TGXC denotes total government expenditure on consumption, and other 
variables as presented previously. Pryor tested the WH using a log-linear 
functional form as depicted in equation (2.9)
T G X C
G D P
a  + (5 In
f  G D P '  
GPOPj
(2.9)
7 The inclusion of Yugoslavia as a market economy is based upon Pryor’s classification of 
economies.
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Pryor modelled the WH with the dependent variable being the ratio of TGXC to 
GDP. Pryor's study aimed at comparing market and centrally planned economies, 
focusing the study on 'Comparative Economic Systems'. Wagner applied his 
hypothesis to market economies where free competition prevailed in the market, 
and democracy is an important driver of the government expenditure process. 
However, Pryor's analysis is differentiated from other previous analyses in that it 
attempted to examine the effects of different types of conditions and variables on 
the forms of the WH. For instance, he examined the effect of economic 
development on TGXC for different economic systems instead of a group of 
countries which do not seem to fit his interpretation of the WH for the highly 
underdeveloped and the highly developed economies.
Pryor employed both cross-section and time-series data to test the WH and found 
that Wagner's generalization seems applicable on both bases for countries that are 
in the process of transforming their economies from rural agricultural to urban 
industrialization. He thought that this stage might be described as the beginning of 
an industrial economy. Pryor also disaggregated TGXC to observe the behaviour 
of the different components of TGXC over time along with the development of the 
economy.
Pryor found mixed results when he disaggregated TGXC into different components 
and tested with cross-sectional data. On the one hand, he found that empirical tests 
using the internal security, foreign aid, and research and development categories 
did not contradict the WH. On the other hand, he found that economic 
development seemed to have little explanatory power for the military, welfare,
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education and health expenditure categories. However, in almost all time-series 
samples, per capita income significantly affected TGXC.
Pryor’s inteipretation of the WH has been used and tested by a number of scholars 
in the existing literature. (Abizadeh and Yousefi, 1988) tested Pryor’s version of 
the WH for the USA during the period from 1950 to 1984. Their results support the 
WH for the USA during that period. (Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou, 1995) tested 
Pryor’s version of the WH for Greece during the period from 1951 to 1992.Their 
results suggested no support for the hypothesis. (Iyare and Lorde, 2004) tested 
Pryor’s version for nine Caribbean countries. They found mixed results for the 
WH.
2.4.4 Goffman (1968) and Goffman and Mahar (1971)
Goffman (1968), and Goffman and Mahar (1971), interpreted the WH in the 
following way:
"The public sector's share o f  the community's output increases with economic 
developm ent” Goffman ( 1 9 6 8 , p .5 9 ).
"As a nation experiences econom ic development and growth, an increase must 
occur in the activity o f  the public sector and the ratio o f  increase, when converted 
into expenditure terms, would exceed the rate o f  increase in output per capita  ” 
(Goffman 1 9 6 8 ,p .3 5 9 )
Goffman (1968) and Goffman and Mahar (1971), interpretations involve a 
relationship of the WH as in the following functional form:
f  G D P^
TGX  =  /
[ P O P )
( 2 . 10)
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Where variables are as defined previously. In the general form the dependent 
variable is the level of government expenditure and the measure of development is 
the level of GDP per capita. Goffman, and Goffman and Mahar; did not use 
standard econometric methods, such as the linear stochastic model; rather they 
used simple ratios between the dependent and independent variables. Based on 
these ratios they calculated the elasticity of government expenditure with respect to 
GDP per capita over points in TGX/GDP space. One can only presume that they 
must have envisaged a linear relationship:
TGX  =  a  + p
G D P  
P O P ,
( 2. 11)
Following P&W (1961, p. 10), Goffman measured government growth in absolute 
levels and suggested that Wagner provided little reason for measuring the rise of 
public expenditure as proportional to income. Gupta suggested that Wagner’s 
proportional rise relies on Wagner’s typically Germanic view of the state. In other 
words, Goffman suggested that Wagner thought that it was desirable for the state 
to grow at a rate that would increase the share of state functions in output.
Goffman criticized previous studies of the WH in that they presented their results 
in terms of the rising or falling of the ratios of public expenditures relative to 
income instead of in terms of the values of the elasticity. Goffman's view of the 
elasticity of demand in the WH proposes that the percentage change in income 
leads to a greater percentage change in expenditures. Goffman did not actually test 
for the WH; instead, he relied on simple ratios of percentage changes in 
government spending and GDP, and interpreted the resulting ratios as elasticity.
42
Whilst Goffman, and Goffman and Mahar, are critical of some previous studies, 
there are two issues with their work. First, they ignored the potential for an 
endogenous regressor brought about by potential simultaneity between TGX and 
GDP/POP. Second, even though they argue for analysis couched in terms of the 
elasticity of TGX with respect to GDP per capita in favour of the ratio TGX/GDP, 
they appear to ignore some elasticity issues. For the elasticity of TGX with respect 
to GDP/POP to be greater than unity, the linear form of their interpretation requires 
a negative intercept for TGX, implying negative TGX scores for low levels of 
GDP/POP. Furthermore, the linear form must mean that the limit to the measure of 
elasticity described here must approach one. Thus, as GDP/POP grows larger, 
TGX growth approaches GDP/POP growth so that TGX/GDP reaches the same 
maximum level. However, there is no guarantee that this maximum is less than 
one.
Some studies have tested the Goffman and Goffman and Maher version of the WH. 
(Wagner and Weber, 1977) tested the version for 34 countries during the period 
1950 to 1972 and they found no support for the WH. (Courakis, et al. 1993), tested 
the version for Greece and Portugal during the period 1958-1985 and also found no 
support for the WH. (Bohl, 1996), tested the version for the G78 countries during 
the different time periods and he found mixed results for the hypothesis.
s Germany (1850-1913), the UK (1870-1995), Canada (1950-1994), France (1972-1995), Italy 
(1950-1991), Japan (1955-1993), and the USA (1959-1995).
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2.4.5 Musgrave (1969)
During 1969, he interpreted the WH as follows:
“ The preposition o f  expanding scale, obviously, must be interpreted as postulating 
a rising share o f  the public sector in the economy. Absolute increases in the size o f  
the budget can hardly fa il to result as the economy expands” (Musgrave, 1 9 6 9 , 
P - 74)
Musgrave’s interpretation of the WH assumes a functional relationship between 
the ratio of total public expenditure to GNP and per capita income as depicted in 
equation (2.12):
TGX _ ( G D P '  
G D P  v P O P  j
(2. 12)
This functional relationship proposes that, with the development process 
represented by per capita income (GDP/POP), the share of government expenditure 
in national income (TGX/GDP) will increase at a higher rate than that of per capita 
income. Musgrave tested for the WH using the linear functional form as depicted 
in equation (2.13).
( T G X \  n (G D P \  
=  a  + p
G D P P O P )
(2 .1 3 )
This linear form requires that (TGX/GDP) is a positive function of (GDP/POP) if 
economic development is to lead to a relative increase in government expenditure 
as posited by Wagner. Clearly, there must be an upper limit to this expansion and 
the linear form will not control this limit. Unfortunately, the specific functional 
form adopted by Musgrave in equation (2.10), is the simple linear form. There are
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clear problems with this form because it does not place lower and upper limits of 
zero and one respectively on the share variable (TGX/GDP). This issue is very 
well recognized in modem micro econometrics with the use of logistics and logic 
regressions (Greene, 2003). It could well be that the estimation methods 
Musgrave’s work produced such linear models. Nevertheless, it may be that his 
result could be explained by using a more appropriate functional form.
Musgrave examined economic factors that might support the hypothesis of a rising 
share of public expenditure in GDP by studying the development of a country from 
low to high per capita income in the course of economic growth. Musgrave's 
version is differentiated from other versions of the WH in several ways. First, his 
interpretation considers shares instead of absolute levels and so is less likely to 
suffer from the endogenous problem. Second, following Wagner, Musgrave 
considered the cause of particular types of public expenditure. He accepted the 
distinction between defence and civilian functions, but his choice did not conform 
to Wagner's choice of expenditure categories: protection, general administration, 
economic administration, and education. Instead, Musgrave asserted that civilian 
expenditures might be better examined in economic categories such as public 
capital formation, public consumption, and transfers.
Musgrave expected that the rise of the public share in total capital formation will 
be relatively high in the early stages of development, but with less predictable 
change thereafter, and that the ratio of transfers will tend to decline with rising 
income. His foundation was that the facilities for private capital formation are 
limited in the early stages of development, and public production of certain capital 
goods might therefore be necessary. However, at a later stage of development, the
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institutions for private capital formation become more developed and the provision 
of such capital goods may be left to the private sector.
Musgrave suggests that the WH covers only the earlier to middle stages of 
economic development and does not apply to the post-industrialised states. 
However, Musgrave suggests that changing private consumption patterns might 
call for complementary private investment, so that the net effect on the public 
share depends on each particular case.
While this might have motivated Musgrave to a non-linear version of the WH, he 
retains the linear form of earlier interpretations. Musgrave's version has been 
adopted and tested in many studies in the existing literature where most of these 
studies have generally obtained results supporting the WH. (Murthy, 1994), tested 
the Musgrave version for Mexico during the period 1950 to 1980 and found 
support for the hypothesis. (Lin, 1995), tested Musgrave's version for Mexico 
during two different periods 1950 to 1980 and 1950 to 1990 and found support for 
the WH. (Islam, 2001) tested the Musgrave version for the USA during the period 
1929 to 1996 and obtain results that support the WH. (Alleyne, 1999), tested 
Musgrave's version for 4 Caribbean countries9 and obtained results that did not 
support the WH in those countries.
l ) Jamaica (1953-1991), Guyana (1950-1990), Barbados 91960-1997), and Trinidad and Tobago 
(1950-1991).
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2.4.6 Mann (1980)
Mann (1980) tested all earlier interpretations of the WH for Mexico over the period 
from 1925 to 1976. His results suggested that P&W, Goffman and Mahar, and 
Gupta's versions support the WH in Mexico since the elasticity coefficients exceed 
unity. Opposites are obtained with the share versions of the WH when compared to 
Musgrave and Pryor.
Mann modified the P&W interpretation into a structural share version of the WH. 
Mann interpreted the WH by considering the share of public expenditure in income 
should increase at a rate higher than the rate of increase in national income. Mann's 
formulation of the WH translates into the functional relationship:
TGX  
G D P
Where GDP represents national income and the other variables are as defined 
previously. Man used a log-linear functional form as depicted in equation (2.15) to 
test his general relationship for Mexican data:
\n(TGX /GDP) = a  +/3 \n(GDP) ( 2 . 1 5 )
This form, developed by Mann’s is different in that it measures fiscal expenditure 
to the level of GDP, as did Pryor and Musgrave but, unlike those authors; Mann 
relates this share to the level of GDP rather than GDP per capita. Mann's results 
suggested that the WH is supported only by the proportional levels of spending in 
the overall public sector and the changing industrial and demographic structure in 
terms of urbanization of Mexico.
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2.5 Summary
From the last three theories we can conclude: first, unreasonable definitions of 
upheavals reduce the displacement-concentration hypothesis into a variation of 
Wagner’s law and second, the rather un-testable theory of bureaucracy 
complements at best other explanations of government growth. Since the 
Keynesian Theory is more appropriately a theory of economic stabilization, not a 
theory of government growth, this study prefers a focus on Wagner’s Hypothesis.
Therefore, this study will focus on testing six versions of Wagner’s law for the 
Libyan economy in Section 2.4 the different interpretations of the Wagner's 
hypothesis that have been produced in the existing literature were reviewed. All of 
these interpretations have related the growth in public expenditure to economic 
development which was seen to determine that expenditure. All existing 
interpretations of the WH have measured the state as a fiscal entity and they have 
not considered the regulatory aspects of the state in their analysis. In the next 
chapter, we will be discussing the empirical literature on Wagner’s hypothesis.
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Chapter Three
Empirical Studies of Wagner’s Hypothesis
3.1 Introduction
In this study we investigate the impact of government expenditure on economic 
growth using time series data for Libya. In this chapter we conduct a brief survey 
of empirical studies. In recent decades economic researchers have shown interest 
in verifying and understanding the linkage between total government expenditure, 
fiscal policy and economic growth. Neoclassical economics in modelling economic 
growth was developed by Robert Solow (1956) neoclassical growth model 
suggested that fiscal variables such as the level of taxation and the level of 
government expenditure can affect the level of income in the short run, but will 
have no effect on the rate of economic growth in the long-run. On the other hand, it 
suggests that some economies may be wealthier than others, in the long-run.
This neoclassical growth model of Solow has been challenged in recent years on 
both the expenditure side as well as the revenue side. Here we would like to 
summarize some results of these critiques from both sides. On the expenditure 
side, there are many instruments of fiscal policy known to have or to have long-run 
growth effects.
(Robert Lucas, 1988) discussed the idea that the investment in human capital 
through education increases the stock of human capital and that human capital is an 
important factor in determining the economic growth rate of a country. Thus, if 
returns to education exhibit non-decreasing return to scale in producible factors of 
production then this increase in education expenditure can be seen as a major
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source of long-run economic growth. In addition, there are also other examples of 
the influence of government expenditure on economic growth in the long run, such 
as the effect of government expenditure on infrastructure when it exhibits the 
character of a public good.
In regard to Solow’s suggestion that all countries in the long-run should grow at 
the same rate, most of the recent studies in this matter suggested that there are 
substantial differences in the economic growth rates of countries over long time 
periods (Quah, 1996; Gwartney and Lawson, 1997).
Moreover, there are now good theoretical reasons for which different countries 
could have, and maintain, different economic growth rates (Lucas 1988; Romer
1997). The impacts of government expenditure on economic growth in the long run 
have been empirically studied since the early 1980s. In this regard two different 
views have been presented.
The first view (Ram, 1986; Bhat, Nirmala and Kannabiran, 1994) is that large 
government size is likely to be an impediment to economic growth on account of 
(a) government operations are often conducted inefficiently, (b) the regulatory 
process imposes excessive burdens and costs on an economic system, (c) fiscal and 
monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lower the productivity of 
the system and (d) government taxation may produce a mi sal location of resources 
as well as disincentives. The second view (Ram, 1986; Lin, 1994), is that large 
government size supports economic growth because (a) the government can play a 
role in mediating the conflicts between private and social interests, (b) there is a 
prevention of exploitation of the country by foreigners, (c) productive investment 
will be high and will provide a socially optimal direction for growth and
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development, (d) the government can provide the economic infrastructure to 
facilitate economic growth and improve resource allocation, (e) government 
transfer payments can help maintain social harmony, (f) government expenditure 
on health and education can improve the quality of the labour force and 
productivity and (h) subsidies to targeted export industries can improve the trade 
balance and accelerate economic growth.
In this framework (Libya is not included in any of these studies) empirical 
investigations, have yielded contradictory results. Some of them found a negative 
relationship between the two variables, which supports the hypothesis that rising 
government expenditure is connected with a decline in economic growth, and some 
studies found a positive relationship between the two variables which supports the 
hypothesis that government expenditure is associated positively with economic 
growth, and other studies do not find any evidence of a significant relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth in the long-run.
The remainder of this chapter discusses as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the 
empirical studies on government expenditure and economic growth in general. 
Section 3.3 is a survey of empirical studies testing Wagner’s hypothesis. Section
3.4 reviews the different econometric procedures followed in the time-series 
analyses of the Wagner hypothesis. Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter.
3.2 Empirical Studies of Government Expenditure and Economic Growth
The link between government expenditure and economic growth has attracted 
considerable interest on the part of economic researchers both at the theoretical and 
the empirical level. This section will survey a number of studies.
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Landau (1983) examines the relationship between the share of government 
consumption expenditure in GDP and the rate of growth of real per capita GDP. He 
uses data from ninety-six countries, both less-developed countries (LDCs) and 
developed countries, for the period 1961- 1976, based on a basic regression model. 
The findings of the study suggested a negative relationship between the share of 
government consumption expenditure in GDP and the rate of growth of per capita 
GDP.
Another study by Ram (1986) which used cross section and time series data over 
115 countries, through the period 1960-1980 found a positive and significant effect 
of government expenditure on economic growth. This could well be stronger in 
lower income countries.
Another study by Easterly and Rebelo (1993), investigated data from one-hundred 
developed countries as well as most of the third world countries, for the period 
1970-1988. They found a positive correlation between the shares of expenditures 
on education in total government expenditure and economic growth. This provides 
evidence that this type of government expenditure is important for growth.
Lin (1994) used the rate of change in the share of government consumption in 
GDP as a proxy for government size, for a sample of 62 countries (20 were 
advanced developed countries and 42 developing countries). He found that non­
productive government expenditure had a negative but insignificant impact on 
developed countries economic growth in the short and medium term, while it had a 
positive but insignificant impact on developing countries in the short run and 
negative but insignificant impact on them in the medium term.
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Another study is from Gwartney et al (1998); they investigated data for the period 
1960-1996 for the members of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and data for the period 1980-1995 for a larger set of 60 
countries around the world1. Both are cross-sectional studies using long time based 
on a basic regression model. The findings of these studies showed a strong and 
persistent negative relationship between government expenditure and growth of 
GDP, for both the developed economies of the OECD and for a larger set of 60 
nations around the world.
Therefore, they concluded that when government expenditure is too high, 
economic growth will be retarded. Such findings are reasonable because more 
rapid growth is possible, but the higher potential growth can only be achieved if 
countries are willing to reduce the relative size of government. Also, they 
concluded that there are a number of available data series that have not been 
exploited, among them date on government debt, taxation, interest rate and trade 
balance. On the other hand, there are some studies that found a positive effect of 
government expenditure on economic growth in developing countries which at the 
same time indicated no impact on economic growth in developed countries.
Fasano and Wang (2001), used cointegration and an error correction model to 
investigate and examine the relationship between government expenditure 
disaggregated into current and capital spending, and the economic growth of real 
non-oil GDP in some of the GCC countries for the period 1980-1999 (Kuwait was
1 The study did not include any nation of the former Soviet Union, China or former communist 
nations from Eastern Europe.
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excluded from their examination due to missing information regarding the years 
1990 and 1991 as a result of the Iraqi invasion).
The results obtained from the study showed no significant relation between 
disaggregated government expenditure and growth in non-oil economic growth. In 
other words, their conclusion did not support the assertion that government 
expenditure tends to affect non-oil GDP growth in these countries or vice versa. 
One of the problems with this study is that the data used are not publicly available 
and, hence, it is difficult to judge the reliability of the results.
Satter (1993) investigated data for 24 OECD countries (developed industrial 
market economies), and a group of 31 low income developing economies for the 
period 1950-1984 and found that there is a positive relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth in the low income developing 
countries, while there is a negative impact between government expenditure and 
economic growth in OECD countries.
He concluded that the role of government in these OECD economies is largely 
indirect, leaving the private sector with enough freedom to operate the different 
kinds of productive activities, while the role of government in the low income 
developing economies in almost all of productive activities. The conclusion that 
the author derives from this study is very reasonable and realistic in our world 
today. A number of leading economists have argued that the government size has 
no impact, one way or another, on economic performance of industrial market 
economies. For the low-income economies the evidence, though mixed, points 
more towards a positive overall impact of government on growth performance.
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Al-Yousif (2000) used a framework similar to Ram’s (1986), as built on a two
sector production function (government sector and non-government sector). 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to investigate the effect of government 
expenditure on economic growth using the two different models with annual data 
for Saudi Arabia for the period 1963-1992.
He concludes that each model has a different result. However, one of the models 
shows a positive relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth which suggests that government expenditure has a positive effect on 
economic growth.
The result of this study indicates that the nature of the impact of government 
spending on economic growth significantly depends on the way of measuring 
government size. Therefore, the government sector in Saudi Arabia, with its large 
oil revenue, largely dominated the economy. It sounds reasonable and acceptable 
to say that Ram's model with its supportive evidence for the role of government in 
Saudi economy is a good model to be utilized.
3.3 A Survey of Empirical Studies which test Wagner's Hypothesis
A number of researchers have focused on Wagner’s Hypothesis for specific 
countries, as well as for groups of countries using both time-series and cross- 
sectional data sets. Wagner’s law postulates that when economic activity grows 
there is a tendency for government activities to increase not only in line with the 
growth in the economic activity but more than proportionately. In this section we 
will divide the studies which test Wagner's Hypothesis as follows.
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3.3.1 Studies Supporting Wagner's Hypothesis
For the purposes of this analysis, this section classifies these studies into 
supporting studies, with results that suggest a tendency for government 
expenditure to increase along with economic development, which is consistent 
with Wagner's hypothesis. A more detailed review of these studies as follows.
Musgrave (1969), examines the course of public expenditure using time series 
data for the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, covering the period 
from 1890-1960. Over this period, per capita real income and total public 
expenditures as a percentage of GNP increased sharply in all three countries. His 
result in this study supports the Wagner's hypothesis.
Ram (1986), tests Wagner's hypothesis for 63 developed and developing countries 
for the period from 1950-1980 he has another study (1987), which covered the 
same time period but this time for a group of 115 countries. He found limited 
support for Wagner's hypothesis. The results, in both studies, indicated that while 
there is support for the proposition in some time-series data, such support is 
lacking in most cross-sectional estimates.
Therefore, much of the support for Wagner’s hypothesis reported in some other 
cross-section studies was probably due to either use of limited samples or 
inadequate data when comparing across the other studies. In addition, they did not 
take into account the enormous cross-national diversity in economic and political 
structure. Therefore, much caution is needed in either proposing or expecting a 
common pattern in all countries.
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Henrekson (1992), tests Wagner's hypothesis using time series data for the period 
from 1861-1988 for Sweden. This study used cointegration techniques. Although 
very few time-series studies have failed to find strong support for Wagner's 
hypothesis, he claims that previous studies of Wagner's hypothesis suffer from 
various methodological shortcomings that make their results highly questionable. 
For example, he shows that these findings are likely to be spurious because they 
have been performed on non-stationary variables that are not cointegrated 
Henrekson (1992). He applied cointegration analysis to Swedish data on Wagner's 
hypothesis. He was unable to find any long-run relationship between public 
expenditure as a share of GDP and GDP per capita.
Murthy (1993), investigates what determines the presence of a long-run link 
between the share of government expenditure in real GDP and real GDP per capita 
in the case of the Mexican economy for the period from 1950-1980. The findings 
show that the share of government in real GDP and real GDP per capita are 
cointegrated and thus there is a positive long-run relationship between the variables 
under investigation. However, this study looked only at one part of Wagner's 
hypothesis, which is the long-run relationship between the two variables, but did 
not employ the Granger-Causality procedure to determine the direction of this 
relationship. The Granger-Causality test is an important procedure to determine 
whether Wagner's hypothesis is suitable or not.
Islam (2001), tests Wagner's hypothesis on the relationship between the 
government sector and development of the economy for the USA using annual 
time-series data for the period from 1929-1996. The study used econometric 
techniques such as cointegration and exogeneity to test this relationship. The
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empirical results found strong support for the hypothesis for the USA, and the 
results found strong evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between per 
capita real income and the relative size of government.
Al-Faris (2002), investigated the relationship between government expenditure 
and economic growth for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries2, using 
data from the period 1970-1979. This article investigated this relationship 
empirically within the framework of the Wagner and Keynes hypotheses. He used 
cointegration and unit root tests for testing Wagner’s hypothesis. The analysis gave 
evidence which supporting Wagner’s hypothesis in the majority of these countries.
Chang (2002), examines five different versions of Wagner’s hypothesis by 
employing annual time-series data on six countries, three of which are part of the 
emerging industrialized countries (South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) and three 
industrialized countries (USA, Japan and United Kingdom), for the period 1951- 
1996. The results of this study supported the existence of a long-run relationship 
between income and government expenditure for all countries studied with the 
exception of Thailand.
Al-Obaid (2004), investigated the long-run relationship between total government 
expenditure and real gross domestic product and its direction using time-series data 
for the period from 1970- 2001 for Saudi Arabia. The findings show that the share 
of government expenditure in real GDP and real GDP per capita are cointegrated 
and thus there is a positive long-run relationship between the variables under
2 GCC refers to Gulf cooperation council countries. These are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.
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investigation this confirms the validity of Wagner's hypothesis in the case of the 
Saudi Arabian economy during the period under investigation. This study is a very 
good example of applying the recent econometric methods, the co-integration 
technique and the Granger-Causality procedure, to detect the long-run relationship 
between the variables under investigation and to determine the causality that runs 
from GDP to TGX as Wagner hypothesised. We will apply this in this study.
Yuk (2005), investigated the long-run relationship between economic growth and 
government spending by examining interactions among GDP. The study used the 
data for the share of government expenditure to GDP and the share of exports to 
GDP for the United Kingdom over the period from 1830-1993. The Granger- 
Causality procedure was used to analyse data in this relationship and the results of 
the study supported Wagner's hypothesis.
Quijano and Garcia (2005), investigated a long-run relationship between 
government expenditure and real gross domestic product for the Philippines 
covering the period from 1980-2004 to test Wagner's hypothesis for the 
Philippines. Their study used Johansen's co-integration and the Granger causality 
test to analyse the relationship between government spending and economic 
growth. The results of this study found support for Wagner's hypothesis in the 
short-run and long-run in the Philippines over this test period.
3.3.2 Studies which do not Support W agner’s Hypothesis
The second section has results that mainly found no relationship between 
government expenditure and economic development and, therefore, do not support 
the Wagner hypothesis.
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Mann (1980) conducts a test using time series data for two periods for Mexico 
1925-1976 and 1941-1976. He included the proportion of GDP generated in 
manufacturing, the proportion of GDP generated in agriculture and the proportion 
of the population in urban areas as explanatory variables in order to capture 
Wagner's Hypothesis. Mann tested the six versions of Wagner's Hypothesis and his 
results did not support Wagner's hypothesis for Mexico.
Afxention and Serletis (1996) tested Wagner's hypothesis for six countries3 for the 
period from 1961- 1991. They found no evidence supporting Wagner's hypothesis 
that there was a long-run relationship between total government expenditure and 
GDP, and also between the three categories of government expenditures 
(consumption, transfer, and subsidies). In this study, Germany, as the strongest 
economic power, was used as a model for the rest of the EU countries in this study 
on which they were expected to converge.
Another study by Ansari et al (1997), examined Wagner’s hypothesis for three 
African countries, Ghana from the period 1963-1988, Kenya from 1964-1989, and 
South Africa from 1957-1990, there results gave no evidence supporting the 
existence of a long-run relationship between government expenditure and national 
income for Wagner's hypothesis.
Another study by Courakis et al (1993), examined the relationship between 
aggregate income and public expenditures in Greece and Portugal during the 
period from 1958 -  1985. Their analysis found that permanent income, relative 
prices, stabilisation policy and socio-political factors are the main determinants of 3
3 France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
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public expenditures, but the results reveal significant differences in responses to 
these determinants across components of expenditures between the two countries. 
They found no support for the per capita formulation of Wagner's hypothesis in the 
case of Portugal and Greece.
Gemmell (1990), points to the importance of relative prices in explaining public 
expenditure growth. He argues that (tests of Wagner's hypothesis using current 
price data are liable to produce biased outcomes). He used the revised data set 
produced by summers and Heston (1988), for the period from 1960 -  1985 for 117 
countries. The measure of government used in his study is government real 
consumption expenditure. His study found almost no support for Wagner's 
hypothesis using the conventional, but narrow, interpretations of income elasticity 
as government real output (expenditure) in excess of unity.
Burney (2002) investigated the relationship between public expenditure and a 
number of socioeconomic variables in Kuwait, including the level of income. He 
used time series econometrics, including unit roots and co- integration test, and an 
error correction model. This paper analysed the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between public expenditure and the relevant socioeconomic variables, for an oil­
exporting developing economy, based on time-series data covering the period 
1969-1995. The results in this paper showed little support for the existence of a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between public expenditure and the 
socioeconomic variables, and the evidence does not support Wagner's hypothesis 
in Kuwait.
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Halicioglu (2003) used cointegration in his study to test Wagner's hypothesis in the 
case of Turkey over the period 1960-2000 the study tested the empirical effect of 
government expenditure on economic development. The empirical evidence 
provided for Turkey in this study using modern time-series econometric techniques 
does not support Wagner's hypothesis in the case of Turkey for this period.
Huang (2006) estimated the long-run relationship between government 
expenditure and output. The study empirically tested Wagner's law for China and 
Taiwan, using annual time-series data covering the period from 1979-2002. This 
study used Granger non-causality tests for estimating this relationship. His results 
do not support Wagner's law for China and Taiwan over this test period.
3.3.3 Studies with Mixed Results for W agner’s Hypothesis:
The third section describes tests, of which are of mixed results; these studies have 
estimated the relationship between government expenditure and GDP. The results 
in this section were mixed, showing a positive relationship between government 
expenditure and GDP for some economies and negative relationship for others.
Abizadeh and Gray (1985) test the hypothesis for 53 countries grouped into poor, 
developing and developed groups for the period 1963-1979. The hypothesised 
relationship between economic development and the growth of government 
expenditure was supported for the developing countries group, but not for the poor 
or for the developed countries groups. It was observed that for the developed 
countries group there is a decline in the ratio of government expenditure with 
increased economic development.
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Comparing between time series and cross-section data for the elasticity of the ratio 
of government expenditure to GDP with respect to GDP per capita, (Ram, 1987) 
concluded that cross-section results did not support Wagner's hypothesis but that 
the time series data supported it in 60% of the 115 countries covered in his study. 
Problems in the data forced Ram (1987) to analyse the data for two periods 1950- 
1980 and 1960-1980. He found that in the period 1950- 1980, when using shares of 
government expenditure to national income, the elasticity was positive in 36 of the 
63 countries. And for the period 1960 -1980 the elasticity is positive in 70 of the 
115 countries.
In another study of the State of United Arab Emirates by Ghali and AL-Shamsi
(1997) used cointegration and an error correction model for the period 1973-1995 
and tested for a causal relationship between both current and capital government 
expenditures on the growth rate of the real GDP. Their analysis provides evidence 
that government investment in capital supports the existence of a long-run positive 
effect on economic growth, at the same time, the effect of government 
consumption was found to be insignificant.
Singh (1998) investigated the evidence of Wagner's hypothesis in a case study of 
Malaysia using time-series data for the period from 1950-1992. Two types of 
analysis were performed. The first one examined the long-run relationship between 
GDP and government expenditure. The second one applied a Granger causality test 
between the growth rates of the two sets of variables. His conclusion for this study 
was as follows: in the first analysis there was a positive long-run relationship 
between GDP and government expenditure, in the second analysis, there was no 
evidence that the growth of GDP caused growth of government expenditure and
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vice versa. It is worth mentioning here that causality tests indicate the absence of a 
short-run relationship whereas the presence of cointegration indicates the presence 
of a long-run relationship.
Biswal et al (1999), test Wagner's hypothesis versus Keynesian hypothesis by 
examining the relationship between national income and total public expenditure 
for Canada during the period from 1950-1995. To test these hypotheses, this study 
used Engle and Granger’s (1987), two-step co-integration and error correction 
model. This study gave mixed results for both Wagner’s hypothesis and the 
Keynesian hypothesis. When the study examined aggregate expenditure it found 
support for the two hypotheses, but not supported either hypothesis when 
disaggregated public expenditure date was used.
Halicioglu (2003) analysed Wagner’s hypothesis in the case of Turkey over the 
period from 1960-2000. This paper used modem time-series econometric 
techniques to test the validity of WH for Turkey. His results were mixed for the 
validity of Wagner’s hypothesis. A positive long run relationship was found 
between the share of government in GDP and real per capita income growth which 
supports the Wagner’s hypothesis. However, the Granger causality test revealed 
that Wagner’s hypothesis does not hold for Turkey.
Wahab (2004) tested Wagner’s hypothesis using the annual data for the 
government and GDP time series for the period 1950-2000, for the OECD 
countries4. His study obtained mixed results for Wagner’s hypothesis, and the
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Czech Republic.
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results suggest that government expenditure increases less than proportionately 
with accelerating economic growth and decreases more than proportionately with 
decelerating economic growth. However, one can note that this is a long time- 
series pooled across few countries. That is, it is a long, narrow pooled sample.
Iyare and Lorde (2004) test Wagner's hypothesis for the nine Caribbean countries. 
The study employed aggregate annual time-series data and different periods to all 
of these countries. The study examined the stationary properties of the data 
available, and applied the two step Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration and 
error correction procedure. The results were mixed for Wagner's hypothesis. The 
results indicate that a long-run equilibrium relationship between income and 
government expenditure does not exist for the countries studied apart from the 
exceptions of Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica. However, the direction of causality 
runs from income to government expenditure only for Guyana.
3.4 Models of the Wagner Hypothesis
The different interpretations of Wagner's hypothesis discussed in chapter two have 
formed the basis for six different general forms of Wagner's relationship. These 
general forms are expressed in the following general equations, where the 
distinction is in terms of variables used rather than their functional form:
TG X = f ( G D P ) Peacock and Wiseman (1961) (3.1)
T G X / P O P  = f  (GDP /POP ) Gupta (1967) (3.2)
T G X C / G D P  = f  (GDP/POP) Pryor(1968) (3.3)
T G X / G D P  = f  (GD P/P OP ) Musgrave (1969) (3.4)
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TGX = f  (G D P/ PO P ) Goffman (1968) (3.5)
T G X / G D P  = f ( G D P ) Mann (1980) (3.6)
The interpretations of these variables are mentioned in chapter two. These general 
specifications have formed the basis for at least 12 models of the Wagner's 
hypothesis in existing studies:
ra x  = a  + P G D P  + e 
In TGX = a  + /3\nGDP + e
Peacock and Wiseman (3.7)
TGX / P O P  = a  + j3(G D P /P O P )+ £
1 n (TGX / P O P  ) = a  + 0  In (G D P / P O P ) + £
Gupta (3.8)
(TG XC /G D P) = a  + /HODP/POP)  + e  
In {TGXC/GDP)  = a  + /3\n(GDP/POP) + £ Pryor (3.9)
(T GX /G D P) = a  + J 3( GD P/ PO P) +e  
\n(TGX/GDP) = a  + j3\n(GDP/POP)+ e
Musgrave (3.10)
TGX  = a  + j3 ( G D P / P O P ) + e  
In TGX = a  + /3\n(GDP/P)+ e
Goffman (3.11)
T G X  / G D P  =  a  +  / 3 G D P  + £
In ( T G X / G D P )  =  a  +  / 3 \ n ( G D P ) + £ Mann (3.12)
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The first equation in each pair represents a linear specification of Wagner’s 
hypothesis of that particular version. The second equation represents a log-linear 
model of the Wagner’s hypothesis of that particular version. Log-linear models are 
linear in their parameters, but, not in their variables. It is notable that the left hand 
side of the equation is either modelled in shares (3.9), (3.10) and (3.12) or 
modelled in per capita in (3.7), (3.8) and (3.11).
3.5 Summary.
Wagner's hypothesis was confirmed for some empirical studies, or for some of the 
countries tested, but in others it is either rejected or cannot be confirmed. This 
chapter has reviewed the testing methodologies followed in the existing studies of 
Wagner's hypothesis and tried to determine whether there is a patterns to the 
results in terms of the methods used. However, Libya is not included in the 
previous studies because we did not find any study that tested Wagner's hypothesis 
for Libya.
This chapter distinguished between the different types of econometric analyses 
followed in the existing studies of Wagner's hypothesis. These types of analysis 
varied between time series data and cross-sectional data. Time series data have 
been mostly used for empirical studies that have tested Wagner's hypothesis. Most 
of these studies have been applied to developed and industrial countries. Cross- 
sectional data have been primarily used for developing countries to test for 
Wagner’s hypothesis.
This chapter also reviewed studies that measured the economic variables in 
Wagner's hypothesis namely: government size and economic growth. The majority
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of these studies measured government expenditure at the aggregate level where all 
expenditures are included and they have measured economic development using 
income growth.
A significant development in time-series tests of Wagner's hypothesis is the 
application of modern co-integration regression. This thesis focused on those 
studies that used OLS regression and studies that used modem time-series 
techniques to test for Wagner's hypothesis.
An overview of the Libyan economic environment will be provided in the 
following chapter (Chapter Four).
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CHAPTER FOUR
A Review of the Libyan Economy
4.1 Introduction
The Libyan economy prior to the discovery of oil in 1959, and its commercial 
production in 1962, was classified as one of the poorest countries in the world1. Libya 
needed Aid from international organisations and foreign countries (Vandewalle, 1998) 
because it had no significant economic resources to begin the development process, nor 
did it have suitable funds to finance economic development plans and overcome the 
severe economic conditions existing in Libya at the time of independence. Three United 
Nations technical assistance teams made study-tours of Libya in 1950-1951 (Wright, 
1981). One of these was headed by Benjamin Higgins who noted the poor conditions 
existing at the time:
When Libya became an independent nation under United Nations auspices at the 
end of 1951, the prospects for Libyan economic and social development were 
discouraging to Libyans and foreigner’s alike (Higgins, 1968, p.819). Libya has 
been great merit as a case study as a prototype of a poor country. We need not 
construct an abstract model of an economy when the bulk of the people live on a 
subsistence level, where per capital income is well below $40 per year, where there 
are no sources of power and no mineral resources, where agricultural expansion is 
severely limited by climatic conditions, where capital formation is zero or less, 
where there is no skilled labour supply and no indigenous entrepreneurship 
(Higgins, 1959, p.26).
1 Higgins (1959) also noted that Libya combines within the borders of one country virtually all the 
obstacles to development that can be found anywhere: geographic, economic, political, sociological, and 
technological. Higgins believed that if Libya could be brought to a stage of sustained growth there would 
be hope for every country in the world.
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The purpose of this chapter is to show the characteristics of the Libyan economy prior 
to the discovery of oil and to discuss the financial and economic development of the 
economy after the discovery of oil. The remainder of the chapter is divided into eight 
main sections. Section 4.2 discusses the Libyan environment and provides information 
about the State's geography and population. Section 4.3 focuses on the political. Section
4.4 discusses the development plans before and after the discovery of oil. Section 4.5 is 
on the State's budget. The changes of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are discussed in 
section 4.6. Section 4.7 analyses the impact of US and UN sanctions on Libya. The final 
section provides a summary.
4.2 General Information on Libya
Libya (officially named the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) is located in the 
north of Africa and is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea. To its north it borders Tunisia 
and Algeria to its west and Egypt and Sudan to its east. Its southern border meets Chad 
and the Niger Republic. The total land area of Libya is approximately 1,759,540 square 
kilometres and is considered to be the fourth largest country in Africa, but about 42% of 
the land is desert. Only 10% of the remaining 58% of the area is populated and the rest 
is a dry, barren, uninhabited region (Farley, 1971, p. 25). The population of Libya in 
1911 was approximately 750,000. In 1942 it was about 500,000. This loss was due to 
death in war and to Allied and Axis campaigns. According to the 1973 census, Libya 
had a population of slightly more than two million. However, by 1993 it was estimated 
to have risen to more than four million (National Authority for Information and 
Documentation, 1994) and in 2001 it was 5,500,000. The population average growth
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rate is 2.02%. The majority of the population live in or around the coastal cities, 
especially in Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya has a long coastline; it is around 1,900 km. 
However, the vast majority of the land of Libya is desert, as shown in the map below
Figure 4.1 Libya’s Map
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4.3 Political Environment.
As already mentioned, the year 1962 signalled a turning point in the history of Libya, 
clearly representing the dividing line between the oil and the pre-oil eras, because it was 
in this year that the first shipment of oil from the country took place . Since then Libya’s 
economy has undergone, and is still undergoing, major structural changes. Change has 
taken place in all fields: economic and political considerations are the primary influence 
and the major determinants of the investment climate. A country’s level of
development, the state of the balance of payments, inflation rates and currency stability 
are very important factors in the investment climate. Infrastructure facilities, 
international transportation and communication networks are vital influences on the 
investment climate as well.
This section presents a brief description of the political background and reviews the 
Libyan economy through three main stages and considers the main changes in Libyan 
politics and economy. The first stage is the period before 1952, known as the colonial 
era, the second stage is the period between 1952 and 1969, known as the independence 
era, and the third stage covers the period 1969 to date, known as the revolution era.
4.3.1 The Period Before 1952 (the Colonial Era)
The Italian era started when Italian troops occupied Libya 1911 in after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. There followed a period of warfare which damaged the Libyan 
economy. Living conditions were difficult because of the lack of infrastructure, poor 
health services, and education. The Libyan people continued to fight the Italians for 
more than twenty years until 1931, by which time Italy controlled most of the Libya.
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During the Second World War, the country suffered once again. In 1943 Tripoli (the 
capital of Libya) fell under Allied administration, while many Italian citizens remained 
in Libya. However, the Libyan economy did not improve. The Libyan people during 
that time were generally involved in subsistence agriculture and were breeding animals 
as a source of living. The problems of poverty, lack of education and health services 
continued.
4.3.2 The Period between 1952 and 1969 (The Independence Era)
In 1949, the United Nations voted in favour of Libyan independent, and in 1951 Libya 
became independent as the United Kingdom of Libya. However, political independence 
was not accompanied by any sort of economic development. The Libyan people were 
not convinced that Libya had attained real independence and they used to call it “false 
independence” because Libyan people were still suffering from poverty and hard living 
conditions. In 1958 oil was discovered in Libya, bringing hope that this would help the 
Libyan economy flourish. Unfortunately, the domination of the west’s oil companies 
over the exploration, production and export of oil meant that the discovery of oil did not 
bring any sort of improvement to the Libyan economy but preventing the Libyan people 
from enjoying the benefits of oil income.
In this period government did not undertake any significant efforts to improve Libyans’ 
living standards or way of life, which remained much the same as during the era of 
Italian colonisation. The Libyan people continued to depend on subsistence agriculture 
and livestock as they had done before independence. Moreover, that era witnessed 
widespread corruption and bribery, favouritism and personal relations carried more
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weight than rules and regulations. These problems and others had lage impact on the 
country’s economy.
4.3.3 The Period after 1969 (Revolutionary Era)
On lsl September 1969, the era of the Al-fateh Revolution started (Anderson, 1987). 
Freeing the country from the domination of foreign countries, the Revolution’s primary 
objectives were to improve the Libyan people’s lives by returning to them the country’s 
economic resources, such as oil and other natural resources, the industrial sector, the 
commercial sector and so on, and freeing them from the domination of western 
companies.
The Revolutionary regime issued a number of legislations concerning the exploration, 
production and exportation of oil and other economic activities. In the field of 
education, a number of schools, colleges, higher institutions, and universities 
established. As far as the health sector was concerned, the revolutionary regime built a 
number of hospitals, health centres, and dispensaries which covered all areas of the 
country. In the field of transportation, a good network of roads was established, 
connecting the country’s cities and production areas.
Regarding the industrial sector, the revolution established a considerable number of 
factories in different fields such as food industries, petroleum industries, tractors, textile 
industries and some other industries needed for the Libyan economy. In addition, the 
government gave the Libyan people short and long-term loans to build their own homes 
and to improve their standard of living. On 2nd March 1977, the revolution declared that
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the Republic of Libya would henceforth be known as the “Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya” . This marked a significant change in Libya’s politics.
Unfortunately, in 1982 and 1986, the United States of America imposed economic 
sanctions on Libya, which prohibited U.S companies or citizens from engaging in any 
unauthorised financial transactions with Libya. These sanctions included the export and 
import of all goods to or from Libya. Also, the sanctions forbade any sort of exchange 
of services or technology between Libya and the U.S.A. In 1992, the United Nations 
imposed economic sanctions, claiming that Libya was involved in terrorist actions 
against western countries. These economic sanctions badly affected the Libyan 
economy.
Libya suffered greatly from those sanctions for more than fifteen years, and they still 
affected the daily lives of the people. For example, the people had difficulty meeting 
their health, education and transport needs. The detrimental effects of these sanctions 
can be clearly seen in economic indicators. GDP declined from 82.2 billion U. S. 
Dollars in 1980 to 34.5 in 1995, and per-capita income declined as well, from 29.800 in 
1980 to 6.570 in 1995.
In 1997, Libya introduced significant economic legislation. The most important law is 
the law No. 5 of 1997 concerning encouragement of foreign investors to invest in Libya. 
Also, the government adopted a policy which gave the private sector more opportunities 
to establish share companies. In 1999, the UN lifted the economic sanctions on Libya 
which returned Libya to the international stage. In addition, the rise in the price of oil in 
the last five years has enabled Libya to improve its economy, resulting in its GDP
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growing by 2% in 2000, from 34.5 billion U. S. Dollars in 1995 to 45.5 billion U. S. 
Dollars in 2000.
In recent years, the ruling regime has paid great attention to the oil sector. Libya's oil 
industry is run by the state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC), along with smaller 
subsidiary companies. Several international oil companies are engaged in 
exploration/production agreements with the NOC. The leading foreign oil producer in 
Libya is Italy's Agip-ENI, which has been operating in the country since 1959. Two 
U.S. oil companies (Exxon and Mobil) withdrew from Libya in 1982, following a U.S. 
trade embargo which begun in 1981. Five other U.S. companies (Amarada Hess, 
Conoco, Grace Petroleum, Marathon, and Occidental) remained active in Libya until 
1986 when President Reagan ordered them all to cease activities there. In December 
1999. U.S. oil company executives from these five companies (except for Grace) 
travelled to Libya, with U.S. government approval, to visit their old oil facilities in the 
country.
4.4 Development Plans for the Libyan Economy
Since independence, a number of development plans have been introduced in order to 
build up the national economy by: (1 ) reducing the economic dependence on the oil 
industry in favour of agriculture and manufacturing sectors, (2 ) achieving a greater 
degree of self-sufficiency in a wide range of agricultural and industrial products, and (3) 
building industries based on oil and natural gas and minimising foreign manpower in 
favour of national manpower (Gzema, 1999).
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During this period Libya had its first five-year economic and social development plan
(1963-1968). The plan was drafted in 1963 and represented the beginning of Libya’s
formal development planning attempt. The objectives of the first five-year plan (1963-
1968) were;
• To ensure the early improvement of the standard of living of the people.
• To give special consideration to the agricultural sector: this being the source of
supply of most of essential consumer goods, besides being the source of income 
and employment for the majority of the people.
• To permit the public sector to continue its investments in such services as 
Education, Health, Communication and Housing and with other sectors as 
required consolidating the basic elements for rapid economic growth.
• To develop rural areas by establishing productive and public projects.
• To take such monetary, financial and commercial measures all in a co-ordinated
effort, as may be necessary to ensure increased revenue and to enforce tight 
control on expenditure.
• To take steps to overcome the need for information and statistical data which are 
necessary for planning by strengthening the existing statistical organs and by 
carrying out studies and research work
4.4.1 The first Five Year Development Plan 1963-1968
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Figure 4.2 shows the planned and real development spending of the economic 
sectors for the first five year plan2. Analyses of the data in this table yield the 
following information: the plan spent only 12.9% of the total expenditure on directly 
productive sectors like agriculture, industry and trade (Ministry of Planning, 1964). 
The main results of the plan were apparent in expanded, infrastructure, road 
construction, schools, and hospitals construction and an increase in electrical power. 
The performance of agriculture and industry was much reduced at 1962-1967. The 
average annual growth rate of the agricultural and industrial sectors was only 4.5% 
and 9.6% respectively.
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The second Five-Year development Plan 1969-1974 was designed to allocate more than 
three times the actual expenditure of the first five-year plan for the period from April 
1969 to March 1974. This plan provided continuity with the first plan in the fields of 
transportation, agriculture, public services and housing. In addition, it provided for an 
industrialisation programme with emphasis on petroleum refining and light industries.
However, this plan was abandoned because with the advent of the new revolutionary 
government in 1969 (Elmaihud, 1981) and was replaced by annual development plans 
until 1973. During the period 1970-1972, the state spent 7913 million LD on economic 
and social development. The highest amount was allocated to housing (30.5% of actual 
expenditure 241 million), then the agricultural sector and industrial sector (17.1% and 
13.8% respectively 135.1, and 109.1 million LD). From 1973 to 1985 the State 
approved and implemented three economic and social development plans (1973-1975 
plan, 1976-1980 plans and 1981-1985 plans). However, from 1985 until now, there were 
many attempts to prepare development plans but some of were not implemented.
4.4.2 The Second Five-Year Development Plan 1969-1974
' The currency unit in Libya is the Libyan Dinar (LD) and the average exchange rates between the LD and the USA 
Dollar! .$) during the 1962-2005 period ranged from $ 0.357 to $ 1.305 (see Appendix 1 Table 4.2 )
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The third three-year economic and social development plan 1973-1975 had a 
development budget of about, 2.6 billion L.D (Libyan Ministry of Planning, 1973). 
Figure 4.3 shows the planned and real development spending of the economic sectors 
for the third year plan4
4.4.3 The Third Three-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1973-1975)
Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 4.3
1 1-or more information see 'fable 4.3 in appendix 1
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The actual spending amounted to LD 2.2 billion. The main targets of the three year plan 
1973-1975 were as follows (Saleh, 2001):
• Decrease the country's dependence on oil.
• Diversify the economy by accelerating the rate of growth of crude oil 
production
• Increase per capita income from 638.6 million L.D in 1973, to 749.9 million L.D 
by the end of 1975.
• Raise gross national income at an annual compound rate of 10.4%.
• Raise total employment in the economy from 557.000 in 1972, to 682,900 by the 
end of 1975.
• Increase the output of the agricultural sector at an annual rate of 14.5%, and the 
output of the industrial sector by 24.5%.
The best results of the three year plan 1973-1975 were in the sectors of agriculture, 
manufacturing and construction. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from, 2182.7 
million LD in 1973 to, 3674.3 million LD in 1975 at an annual average rate of 31.7%. 
At the same time as the agricultural sector grew from 60.0 million LD in 1973 to 82.9 
million LD in 1975, an annual average of 24.5%. The manufacturing sector also 
increased from 43.8 million LD in 1973, to 65.5 million LD in 1975 an annual average 
rate of 27.2%. Also, the Oil and Gas sector grew from 1143.8 million LD in 1973 to
1981.8 million L.D in 1975.
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This plan was provided with a total planned expenditure of 7.6 billion'^  LD. Table 4.4 
shows the breakdown of major allocation by sector and the real expenditure during the 
period. All the allocations and real expenditure for this period are depicted in Figure 4.4 
below.
4.4.4 The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1975-1980)
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The main objectives of this plan are summarised as follows: 
• To raise the total production in all sectors.
' -For more information see Table 4.4 in appendix 1
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• To increase the private final consumption at a planned annual compound rate of 
9.4%. Public final consumption was planned to grow at an annual compound rate 
of 9.6%.
• The per capital income was planned to increase from 1678.9 L.D in 1976 to
1939.7 L.D in 1980.
This plan is considered a continuation of the development policies underlying the 
previous three-year plan. In total, the plan aims at attaining self-sufficiency at least in 
food products, reducing inequality of incomes and wealth and developing the country’s 
limited manpower through expanding training programmes and improving the Libyan 
educational system (Libyan Ministry of Planning, 1976). This plan was later revised 
with more investment going to agriculture rather than industry (Wright, 1981)
4.4.5 The Five-Year Development Plan 1981-1985
In 1981, the 1981-1985 economic and social transformation plan was allocated total 
funds of 17.000 million LD to different sectors. The highest allocation of 23.1% of plan 
went to industry, 16.1% to heavy industry, and 7.0% to light industry. Agriculture came 
second with an allocation of 18.2%. A low oil price caused serious shortages of funds 
and required a major modification of the 1981-1985 development plan6 (Abuarrosh, 
1996). Consequently, development spending declined since the mid-1980s, with only 
priority projects such as the Great Man-made River7 (GMR) continuing to attract funds
(> -See Table 4.5 socio-economic plan 1981-1985 in appendix 1
7- The GMR is a water supply project aimed at transporting water from the deserts of southern Libya to 
the northern coast, using about 3,380 km network of pipelines; the total cost is estimated at around $25 
billion. For more details see http://www.water-technlogv.net/gmr/gmr
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Oil Gas Directory, 1996). The main objectives of this plan were as follows:
• Continuation of investments in economic infrastructure.
• Plan emphasis on industrialisation following an extension of advanced 
production techniques in other fields of economic activity.
• To decrease dependence on foreign countries in meeting basic requirements by 
increasing the rate of agricultural growth and achieving food stuffs sufficient.
• Creating more equitable income distribution by providing employment, 
extending social and welfare services and expanding local development 
programmes, especially in rural areas.
• Diversifying the exportation of goods, expanding existing foreign markets, and 
penetrating new foreign markets.
• Improving administrative services by introducing basic changes in the 
administrative system and extending advanced managerial techniques to all 
ministries and to public as well as private organisations.
4 .4.6  Development plans from 1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 3
No formal long-term plan existed at 1986-1993, but a three-year economic plan
covering the period 1994-1996 was initiated. This plan aimed to:
• settle the outstanding debts of former development plans
• complete on-going projects (chiefly in the health, education, public utilities and
energy sectors)
and rem aining re lative ly  free o f  the paym ent delays exp erien ced  b y  other sectors (A rab
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• encourage investment in industrial production (whether through public finance 
or the regeneration of the private sectors)
• Postpone all projects which had not yet started (Ministry of Planning, Trade and 
Treasury, 1993).
The government's planned investment in the three-year programme was 2400 million 
LD but, due to a shortage of funds, actual expenditure was only 1451 million LD. The 
relatively low oil prices existing in the mid 1990s coupled with the impact of UN 
sanctions in place since 1992 had a severe effect on the actual amounts invested in 
comparison with original allocations (Ministry of Planning, 1998) which continued 
macroeconomic difficulties in the country.
4.4.7 Development plans from 1994-2005
At the beginning of 1994, the state launched a three-year programme covering the 
period 1994-1996. The programme’s main goals were: settling the debts of previous 
development projects; completion of existing projects, especially in health, education, 
public utilities and energy sectors; encouraging investment in production sectors, 
especially industry, whether through the public or re-emerging private sectors and 
stopping all projects that had not yet started (Secretariat of Planning, Trade and 
Treasury, 1993). However, this programme was abandoned with only a few of its goals 
achieved8. The total amount allocated to the 1994-1996 period was 2,400 million LD of
See Fable 4.6 Three year Programme 1994-1996 in appendix 1
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which only 1,450.556 million LD, or 60.44% of the total allocation, were actually 
invested (Ministry of Planning, Economy and Trade, 1997).
Increasing the role of the private sector in the Libyan economy and the focus on 
improving the economic performance became one of the economic policy priorities 
from the early 1990s. These priorities are evidenced in several areas of the five-year 
social and economic plan 2001-2005. In 1999, the state started to prepare a five-year 
economic and social transformation plan for 2001-2005, which was later adjusted to 
become the 2002-2006 economic and social transformation plans.
This plan was for 36 billion LD, with oil resources contributing 43% of the total, and 
the contribution of the foreign and national domestic sectors was estimated at 57% of 
the total (Al-Zini, 2002). The difference between this plan and previous plans is that 
the latest one apportions a very important role for the national and foreign private 
sector in financing and implementing the productive and service enterprises, while the 
state assumes its role of financing and implementing the infrastructure and service 
projects. The approval and implementation of this plan was delayed for several 
reasons, the most important being the high level of liabilities of previous development 
plans, the size of the plan’s expenditure and the international and domestic economic 
developments that the national economy faced (Al-Zini, 2002).
In order to place the role and effect of the development plans in context, it is necessary 
to understand the general nature of the Libyan budgetary system and so the next 
section addresses this issue.
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4.5 The State’s Budget
In the literature there are five different views of defining the government sector in the 
form of five questions; (A) what resources does the government use? (B) How much 
does the government spend? (C) What does the government own? (D) What does the 
government control? And (E) what does the government produce?
The impact of government expenditure depends not just on the size of the public sector, 
but also on its activities. A large public sector may be helpful to growth if the activities 
are in the areas of the economy where the market is weak (Gemmel, 1993). Therefore, 
government expenditure is the main instrument used by the government to affect the 
Libyan economy. However, oil revenue has been the main source of government 
finance. Given fluctuations in oil revenue, we would expect to see significant impact on 
government expenditure and economy performance
The structure of government budget revenue has been classified into four groups: (1) 
Budget allocation from oil exports, (2) allocation from direct and indirect tax revenue, 
(3) budget allocation from customs revenue, and (4) other revenue. The discovery and 
export of oil had a great impact on the government's budget. Libyan budget expenditure 
is divided into two main parts which are an administrative budget and a development 
budget.
The administrative budget formulates the revenue and expenditure plans of the 
ministries as well as any transfers to municipalities and public enterprises. Primary 
proposals for the administrative budget originate at municipal level, after which the 
proposals are forwarded to the appropriate ministry for merger and later submitted to the
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Finance Ministry, which in turn reviews and forwards the proposals to the GPC9 for 
final approval (Morales, 1989, Saleh, 1989). The development budget sets out an annual 
project expenditure programme. This programme is sometimes set within a framework 
of a three-year plan (e.g., the 1973-1975 development plans and the 1994-1996 
programme) or five year plan (e.g., the 1981-1985 Economic and Social Transformation 
Plan).
The development budget is initially prepared by corporations seeking to undertake 
specific projects, with all proposals then being sent to the Secretary of Finance and the 
Ministry of Economy and Planning for revisions and submission to the GPC. However, 
the Secretary has the authority to either approve or modify organisations, and 
companies’ budgets if considered appropriate.
Foreign exchange in Libya is strictly controlled by the State through the Central Bank of 
Libya. As a result of decreases in foreign exchange revenues, the Ministry of Industry 
does not usually approve companies’ budgets without recommending reductions. 
Consequently, many companies inflate their initial estimates in order to allow for the 
expected modifications (Kilani, 1998). Oil price changes also have a major influence on 
the Libyan government’s actual expenditure on both the administrative and development 
budget. Periods of high oil prices increase government revenues (leading to an increase 
in investment), while periods of low oil prices usually lead to a reduction in the number 
of projects and investment.
J GPC = General People's Congress.
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4.6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
This section discusses the growth of GDP, in both oil and non-oil sectors, in the Libyan 
economy before the discovery of oil and after it discovery during the period from 1962 
to 2006.
4.6.1 First Period 1962-1972
The growth of GDP in the Libyan economy from the oil sector and non-oil sectors, are 
depicted in Figure (4.5). In addition10 Table 4.7 presents the growth rate of real GDP 
during the period 1962-1972. During this period GDP increased from 155.5 million LD 
in 1962 to 1,223 million LD in 1969.
Total GDP in this period was 4,925 million LD. The GDP of the non-oil sector 
increased from 117.5 million LD in 1962 to 468.3 million LD by the end of this period. 
But, as a percentage of GDP, it has been decreasing from 75.6 per cent in 1962, to 38.3 
per cent in 1969. Also, the GDP of the oil sector grew from 38 million LD in 1962 to
754.7 in 1969. On the other hand, the oil sector’s contribution to GDP increased from
24.4 per cent in 1962 to approximately 61.7 per cent by the end of period (African 
Development Bank, 1995, p. 108).
111 - See Table 4.7 in appendix 1
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Source: plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 4.7
The conspicuous thing during this period was that, the relationship between the oil and 
non-oil economic sectors and their contribution to the GDP changed steadily in support 
of the oil sector.
4.6.2 S econ d  P eriod  1973-1983
Since 1970, the Libyan economy has witnessed steady and systematic changes. These 
changes were aimed at reforming the economy from a market to a socialist economy. It 
is natural that behavioural and institutional changes should follow the structural changes 
in the economy (Abdussalam, A. 1985). Table 4.8 shows the changes in real growth of 
GDP11. This period witnessed a significant investment in all sectors of the Libyan
- For more detuds see Table 4.8 in appendix 1
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economy, about 21,946 million LD. The total GDP for this period was 7,852.1 million 
LD.
The oil sector represented 44.57 percent (3,500.4 LD) of GDP and the non-oil sector
4.351.7 million LD (55.43 percent). Moreover, during this period, the average per capita 
income increased from 656 LD to 2,169 LD. Also, this period witnessed big increases in 
international crude oil prices which significantly increased GDP at current prices and 
the average monetary income per capita. GDP per capita increased from 1,288.3 million 
LD in 1970 to 10,553.8 in 1980 (Libyan Secretariat of Economic and Planning, 1991). 
In addition, the value of the oil sector and non-oil sectors in GDP during the period 
1973-1983, are described in Figure 4.6 below
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4.6.3 Third Period 1984-2004
The second period saw witnessed changes in the structure of the Libyan economy. 
These changes helped the non-oil sector as well as per capita income (Kilani, 1988). 
Furthermore, these figures confirm that changes in international crude oil prices 
significantly affected GDP, reflecting the fact that GDP still depended heavily on the oil 
sector (Bakar, 1998).
This period shows that the oil sector dominates the economy, this sector contributed 
around 90% of the country’s export earnings. Total GDP in the period from 1986 to 
2002 was 177,481.2 million LD 12 with a noticeable change in the structure of GDP. 
Approximately 32 per cent was contributed by the oil sector and 68 per cent by the non­
oil which represented a significant development for the Libyan economy. During the 
period, the number of small private businesses increased, to a total of 5,000 production 
units (Abobker, 2005).
The relationship between the oil and non-oil economic sectors changed compared to the 
period (1986-2002). GDP grew by 22.4 percent in 2003 compared with 2002, with the 
oil sector contributing about 60 percent of total GDP. Whereas, in 2004 the contribution 
of the oil sector was 64.4 percent, 25958 million LD, and GDP was estimated at 40.307 
million LD with a growth rate of about 27 percent compared on 2003, Figure 4.7 below 
shows the annual contribution of the oil sector and non-oil sectors to GDP.
12 - See Tables 4.9 and 4.10 in appendix 1
92
Source: plotted by the author based on data provided by Tables (4.9 and 4.10)
4.7 The Influence of the US and UN Sanctions on Libya
Libya has been subject to a wide range of US and UN sanctions since 1986. The Libyan 
economy has suffered from these sanctions, especially those imposed by the UN, which 
were imposed following the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. These sanctions included an 
air and arms sales embargo, a reduction in the number of Libyan diplomatic personnel 
serving abroad, the freezing of Libyan funds and financial resources in other countries, 
and banning of the provision to Libya of equipment for oil refining and transportation.
The US sanctions have been in force since 1985 in response to claims that Libya 
involved in international terrorism against the United States, other countries and 
innocent people. The US prohibited almost any kind of transaction. These sanctions
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remain most relevant for US companies and make the return of them to Libya almost 
impossible. The prohibitions are very wide and cover:
• Exports and Imports to and from Libya.
• Travel restrictions.
• Financing by banks, including foreign branches of the US banks.
• Any contracts, loans or transactions with Libyan entities, or which benefit 
Libyan entities directly or indirectly.
On August 5lh 1996, the US imposed additional sanctions on Libya as part of the Iran- 
Libya Sanctions act extending the measures to cover foreign companies making new 
investments of $40 million or more over a 12-month period in Libya’s oil and gas 
sector. The wide range of US and UN sanctions influenced the health and other aspects 
of the Libyan people’s lives. The growth of the Libyan economy had deteriorated, the 
number of foreign investments had dramatically decreased and the ability to obtain new 
manufacturing technologies had been restricted. (Abuseid Dourda)13 on March 8lh 2000, 
reported that Libyan companies suffered considerable losses as a direct consequence of 
the UN sanctions.
For instance, Libyan companies operating in the transportation sector suffered total 
losses of about $3,713 million, which has forced the closure of a large number of 
branches and a reduction in the labour force.
L' Abuzeid Dourdu is the permanent representative of Libya on the United Nations.
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The manufacturing sector has also made losses estimated at about $5,851 million, while 
the losses of the trade and commercial sector have been estimated at about $8,628 
million (cited in Alkizza, 2006).
These sanctions cost Libya approximately $34 billion, and caused substantial damage in 
the humanitarian, economic and social spheres. In addition, all infrastructure 
development programmes and plans were adversely affected, thereby affecting Libyan’s 
ability to achieve progress, well-being, development, stability, security and peace14. The 
UN secretary council suspended the sanctions against Libya in April 1999 after the 
Libyan government handed over on trial a special court. Eventually the Court found one 
of the two suspects guilty. On the 30th of June 1999, the UN Secretary General rendered 
his report, and on the 9th of July 1999, the secretary Council welcomed Libya’s 
satisfying progress in complying with the UN resolution, but did not formally lift the 
sanctions (Wallace and Wilknson, 2004).
In 2003, Libya agreed to pay compensation to the victims. Consequently, UN sanctions 
were completely lifted. On 23rd of April 2004, most of the US sanctions against Libya 
were lifted and on September of the same year, President Bush lifted the US sanctions, 
removed all restrictions on commercial air services to Libya and released $1.3 billion in 
frozen Libyan assets.
With the lifting of sanctions, the Libyan government announced plans to attract foreign 
investment, especially in its oil and gas exploration and production, and was seeking
14 H.\tracts from the report on the impact of the UN sanctions against Libya which were transmitted by 
the Libyan mission ter the UN Security Council in March 2000.
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financing of critical infrastructure improvements in its national highways, railroads, 
telecommunications networks, and irrigation systems.
4.8 Summary
To sum up, this chapter has discussed the economic performance of the Libyan 
economy over the period 1962-2005. Libya is a developing country, and it will stay so 
for some time. It has been established that despite the ambitious development 
investment in the country, the main objectives of diversifying the economy and 
accelerating the growth rates of the non-oil sectors.
Furthermore, this chapter began with the summary of the general information on Libya. 
The discussion then moved to explore the political background before, and especially 
after, the 1969 revolution when significant changes that took place through the 
introduction of a new political and economic system, based on socialist philosophy. This 
new socialist philosophy has affected the economy in terms of the ownership of 
economic activities and in the way that planning which still depends heavily on the oil 
revenues.
The State's development plans after the revolution were directed towards reducing the 
dependency on oil revenues by developing the agricultural and industrial sectors, in 
order to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. Also, this chapter has given some 
information of the effects of the UN sanctions on the Libyan economy. The next chapter 
focuses on the methodology that will be followed in testing Wagner's law in this 
research project.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Methodology and Data
5.1 Introduction
We have mentioned in Chapter One that the present study will adopt a Granger- 
causality test to examine the causal relationship between various measures of 
government expenditure and economic growth. The hypothesis tested in this study 
is Wagner’s theory or Wagner’s hypothesis. The hypothesis is that the causality 
runs from gross domestic product (GDP) to the total governmental expenditure 
(TGX), or in other words, the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP 
(TGX/GDP) would rise as GDP rises. In other words, an increase in economic 
activities causes an increase in government activities, which in turn increase public 
expenditure. Wagner recognized that there is a positive relationship between 
economic growth and the growth of government activities and thus government 
expenditure.
Within the framework of Granger-causality analysis, Ram (1989) maintains that 
the "growth of government is a natural consequence of economic development and 
that economic development causes a secular enlargement of the public sector". 
Mehra (1994) tests for Granger-causality using a three-step procedure: testing for 
the stationarity in the time series, the cointegration test and the Granger-causality 
test. This chapter is divided into six sections. The following section gives a brief 
review of the econometric methodologies. Section 5.3 focuses on Wagner's 
hypothesis with the six versions of this hypothesis using real GDP and non-oil 
GDP in Libya. Section 5.4 gives some details on data sources and description.
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Section 5.5 details the computer software programs and econometric techniques 
used in the analysis. Section 5.6 provides a summary.
5.2 An Overview
Past studies of government expenditure effectiveness were mostly based on time 
series data and cross-section data; only a few studies used time series data from 
individual countries. It is generally believed that single country time’s series 
analysis is more useful. Note though that time-series data may produce spurious 
relations if the variables under study are linked to common factors. If the variables 
follow a time trend (that is, their means and variances are not constant over time), 
they are said to be nonstationary. Two nonstationary variables may be found to be 
related, while in fact they are not, simply because of the common nature of their 
time trends. Thus, according to Engle and Granger (1987), the direct application of 
ordinary least squares or generalised least squares to nonstationary data produces 
regression results that are misspecified or spurious in nature. These regressions 
tend to produce performance statistics that are inflated, such as high R 2, F and t- 
statistics, which often lead researchers to commit Type I errors (Granger and 
Newbold, 1974)'. It is therefore important to test the nature of the time series data. 
Most macroeconomic time series data are found to be nonstationary or integrated 
of order 1, denoted by 1(1). That is, they can be made stationary by differencing the 
series once2. Earlier researchers who performed single-country analysis used the 
first difference of the time-series data to avoid spurious regression.
1 Type I error means the null hypothesis is rejected when it should not have been.
7“ It' a time-series has to be differenced d times, it is integrated of order d or 1(d). If d = 0, the 
resulting 1(0) process represents a stationary time series.
98
However, this creates the problem of losing long-run information on the variables. 
To deal with this, researchers are increasingly using cointegration and the error 
correction mechanism (ECM) to estimate time series relationships between GDP 
growth and government expenditure. In general a linear combination of 1(1) series 
is integrated of order 1. However, there exists a special case where the linear 
combination of 1(1) can be 1(0) or stationary. In that case, the series are said to be 
cointegrated.
It must also be remembered that the effect of government expenditure on economic 
growth in any one year is likely to be lagged and longer term. So, it is important to 
search for long-run relationships between GDP growth and whatever the 
mechanism by which the government expenditure exerts its influence on economic 
performance. Cointegration allows us to test for the presence of a non-spurious 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables under study in a 
multivariate setting with and without a time trend. Both cointegration and the error 
correction mechanism investigate long-run linkages.
Our empirical estimation is composed of four steps. As a prerequisite, we first test 
the stationarity of the time-series data, that is, we test for the presence of a unit root 
or 1(1) for each variable. Second, we test long-run for the cointegration vectors in 
the model. Third, we estimate and test short-run using the error correction model 
(ECM). Finally, we use Granger causality tests. In this chapter, we explain each of 
these in greater detail.
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This study investigates and examines the latest versions of Wagner’s hypothesis to 
search for the statistical existence of long-run causality from gross domestic 
product (GDP) to the share of total government expenditure (TGX) in GDP. To do 
so, this study will use data for Libya over the period of the data available from 
1962 to 2005.
The main contribution of Wagner’s hypothesis in this field was that he tried to 
establish generalizations about government expenditure, not from postulates about 
the logic of choice, but rather by direct deduction from historical evidence. 
Wagner’s hypothesis has become very popular in academic circles after the 
publication of English translations of Wagner’s works in 1958. It has been 
analysed and tested by many researchers, for example, Peacock- Wiseman (1967), 
Gupta (1967), Goffman (1968), Pryor (1969), Musgrave (1969), Mann (1980), 
Ansari et al (1997), Chletsos and Kollias (1997), Halicioglu (2003), and Florio and 
Caulatti (2003). Some of these researchers have applied traditional regression 
analysis, while some others have used causality testing, and more recently co­
integration analysis has appeared in the literature. Empirical tests of Wagner’s 
hypothesis have yielded results that differ considerably from country to country 
and period to period.
There are at least six versions of this hypothesis, which have been empirically 
investigated. As Henrekson (1992) points out, a test of Wagner’s hypothesis 
should focus on the time series behaviour of public expenditure in a country for as 
long a time period as possible. Therefore, this study examines whether there is a
5.3 Interpretation of Wagner’s Hypothesis.
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long-run relationship between government expenditure and GDP or per capita 
GDP, along the lines suggested by Wagner’s hypothesis, for Libya.
As the study mentioned above, there are at least six version of Wagner’s 
hypothesis. So this study needed to test all six versions of Wagner’s hypothesis in 
the period that is available for Libya. Finally, this study will use Ordinary Least- 
Squares (OLS) estimation to obtain the estimates of different coefficients.
5.3.1 The Six Versions of Wagner’s Hypothesis
This study uses the six different versions of Wagner's hypothesis which are 
summarized by Mann (1980), and Florio and Caulatti (2003). These interpretations 
of Wagner's hypothesis came into view as six different versions. During this 
study, we separated each version of Wagner's hypothesis to observe real GDP 
(General GDP all sectors) and to observe non-oil based GDP.
5.3.1.1 The Six Versions of Wagner's Hypothesis with Real GDP
In this section, the study tests six versions of Wagner’s hypothesis for estimating 
the relationship between (GDP) growth and government expenditure for Libya, 
during the period 1962 to 2005. The equations the study will use are shown in 
Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP
equation Functional form Version
5.1 In TGX  =  a + b\n(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman [1967]
5.2 In T G X C  = a + b\r\(GDP) Pryor [1968]
5.3 In TGX = a + b In (G D P /P O P ) Goff man [1968]
5.4 In {T GX/GDP  =  a + b\n{GDP/POP)) Musgrave [1969]
5.5 In (T GX /P OP) = a + b In {GDP/PO P) Gupta [1967]
5.6 In (TGX/GDP) = a + b In (GDP) Mann [1980
• The symbol “In” denotes the natural logarithm,
• “GDP” stands for Real Gross Domestic Product,
• “TGX” stands for Real Total Government Expenditure,
• “TGXC” stands for Real Total Government Expenditure on Consumption,
• “GDP/POP” stands for per capita GDP,
• “TGX/POP” stands for per capita TGX,
• “TGX/GDP” stands for the Share of Real Total Government Expenditure 
in Real Gross Domestic Product,
• “POP” stands for Population.
For the above six versions, based on Wagner’s reasoning, causality in our tests is a 
hypothesis of contrasting/comparing total real GDP or per capita GDP is the 
independent variable, which is compared to four dependent variables; TGX, 
TGXC, TGX/GDP, and per capita TGX.
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The six versions of Wagner’s hypothesis are used in this section to estimate the 
relationship between the non-oil GDP growth and government expenditure. The 
following table details the equations that will be used:
5.3.1.2 The Six Versions of Wagner’s Hypothesis with Real Non-Oil GDP
Table 5.2 Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real non-oil GDP
equation Functional form Version
5.7 In T G X  = a  + /?ln (nonoil GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967
5.8 In T G X C  = a + 0  In (nonoil GDP) Pryor[1968]
5.9 In T G X  = a  +  f i \ n  (nonoil GDP/POP) Goffman [1968]
5.10 \n(TGX /  n o n o i l G D P ) = a  + j3 \n(nonoi l  G D P /  P O P ) Musgrave [1969]
5.11 \ n { T G X / P O P )  = a  +  / 3 In (nonoil GDP/POP) Gupta [1967
5.12 \r\(TGX/ n o n o i lG D P )  = a  +  /? In (nonoil GDP) Mann [1980
• The symbol “In” before a variable denotes its natural logarithm,
• “ non-oil GDP” stands for Real Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product,
• “ non-oil GDP/POP” stands for per capita Non-Oil GDP,
• TGX/ non-oil GDP” stands for the Share of Real Total Government 
Expenditure in Real Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product.
For the above six versions, causality in our tests is hypothesised to run from non­
oil GDP or per capita GDP to the dependent variables, which take four forms 
TGX, TGXC, TGX/non-Oil GDP, and per capita TGX.
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5.4 Data Sources.
The study covers the time period for which the data is available for Libya from 
1962-2005. Therefore, this research uses data from the international sources 
whenever they are not available by the national sources. The study will use annual 
data; because only annual data is available that covers this period. The year 1962 is 
considered as the initial year because the year 1962 is the first complete year of oil 
exports, and secondly, it is the starting year of the systematic national accounts in 
Libya (Zarmouh, 1998). The annual data for Libya for 1962 to 2005 are available 
from:
1- Publications of the Libyan Central Bank (economic bulletin, the annual 
report, various issues).
2- Libyan government ministries (annual reports from 1962 -  2004).
3- International Monetary Fund (IMF), Report on the Libyan Economy 
Statistical Appendix Jan 4, 2005.
4- OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2004 (Data 1960- 2004).
5- Publications of the Arab Monetary Fund (national accounts of Arab 
countries, and annual Arab economic reports)
5.5 Computer Software Programs and Econometric Techniques.
We have used EViews 4.0 (computer software), available in the Dundee Business 
School for the unit root tests, cointegration test, the error correction model and 
Granger causality test.
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5.5.1 Unit Root Tests
As a first step of our analyses we checked for unit roots because: (1) Stock and 
Watson (1989) argue that the causality tests are very sensitive to the stationarity of 
the series; and (2) Nelson and Plosser (1982), state that many macroeconomic 
series are nonstationary. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips- 
Penon (1988) tests to assess the degree of integration of the two series (Ugur and 
Ramazan, 2003).
Before testing for cointegration, a unit root test is required to test if the variables 
under study are nonstationary 1(1). The cointegration test is only applicable if the 
variables are of the same order 1(1). The first step is to run a unit root test in which 
we can identify whether the series are stationary or non stationary. Earlier studies 
of the growth of government expenditure had not looked at the time series 
properties of the variables examined. There was an implied assumption that the 
data were stationary.
On the other hand, recent developments in time series analysis show that most 
macroeconomic time series have a unit root and this property is described as 
difference stationarity. There are many alternative tests available to examine 
whether the series are stationary or nonstationary. If the variables under 
investigation are stationary, which means that the variables do not have unit roots, 
then the series are said to be 1(0). If the variables under investigation are non 
stationary in its level form but stationary in its first difference form, which means 
that the variables do have unit roots, then they are said to be 1(1).
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Many macroeconomic time series are non-stationary which means that they 
contain unit roots that cause many econometric problems. In general, if the series 
of Yt is stationary after differencing (d) times, then (Yt) is integrated of order d, or 
1(d) where d represents the number of unit roots the series (Yt) contains. This study 
uses the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). 
In general, the tests are derived from OLS estimation of the following:
AY, = a„+ a lY,_, + £ # A  + e ,  (5.13)
1 = 1
Where A is the first difference of the series and n is the number of lags and (i =1, 
2, 3 ........... , n), a {) is a constant, or, and /? are parameters and £ t denotes a
stochastic error term, Yt is the relevant time-series.
The study will test the null hypotheses as follows:
HO: a t = 0  HI: or, * 0
We test the null hypothesis that a x is zero against the hypothesis that a x is less 
than zero and statistically significant. If 0, then the series is said to have a unit 
root and is nonstationary. Hence, if the hypothesis, a l =  0, is rejected for the above 
equation it can be concluded that the time series does not have a unit root and is 
integrated of order zero 1(0). These tests are carried out for all variables by 
replacing Yl with the variables under study in both tests (the ADF test and PP test), 
(Enders, 1995).
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5.5.2 Tests for Cointegration
There are two options for running cointegration tests; the Engle and Granger
(1987) two-step test and the maximum likelihood method developed by Johansen
(1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). The second test is preferred when there 
are more than two time series variables involved, because it can determine the 
number of cointegration vectors. In this study, Engle-Granger two-step test is used 
since there are only two variables involved.
If, after carrying out a unit root test, we find that some of the variables contain unit 
roots, we proceed to test for cointegration between the variables following Engle 
and Granger (1987). The concept of cointegration was first introduced by Granger 
(1981) to investigate short-run and long-run or equilibrium relationships between 
macroeconomic time-series (Ghosh and Gilmore, 1997).
To understand a cointegration relationship between variables, let us consider two 
time-series, Yt andX; , which are both nonstationary or 1(1). Let us suppose thatT,
and X, share the same trend; thus they may be tied together in the long run. 11 
Yt and X t are 1(1), a regression is run, such as:
Y ,= p X  , . ,+e,  (5.17)
If the residuals ( f , ) from the regression are 1(0), then X,and Yt are said to be
cointegrated. Thus, the series need to be integrated of the same order for 
cointegration to be possible. In other words, two variables will be cointegrated if 
they have a long-run or equilibrium relationship between them.
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Cointegration tests in this study are conducted using the method developed by 
Engle and Granger (1987). This procedure is the most reliable test for 
cointegration. For variables under investigation in this study, cointegration tests are 
performed for each version of Wagner's hypothesis for Libya to search for the 
existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables TGX 
and GDP as well as for TGX and non-oil GDP.
In general Engle and Granger (1987) show that if T, and X,are cointegrated there 
is then a long-run relationship between them. This long-run relationship exists 
when the residuals et are 1(0). The Engle and Granger test for cointegration
involves a two step estimation procedure. The first one, after discovering that the 
time-series are nonstationary in levels, runs the OLS regression of the 
cointegration variables in their levels. Second, the residuals from this OLS 
regression are retained to test for the presence of a unit root in the residual, see for 
example, Engle and Granger (1987), Hall (1986) and Davidson and Mackinnon
(1993).
If the time series is generated by a difference stationary process, then the time 
series need to be differenced to achieve stationarity. However, as Banerjee et. al, 
(1993) argue, differencing is not without cost. In particular, differencing omits 
some information pertaining to long-run adjustment inherent in the data. The same 
concern was raised by Davidson et.al (1978) and Hendry and Mizon (1978). On 
this, Granger and Newbold (1988) argue that differencing is better than doing 
nothing.
108
In summary, cointegration analysis allows us to model the equilibrium relationship 
among two or more time series, each of which is nonstationary but some linear 
combination of it is stationary Banerjee et. al (1993) Cointegration, therefore, 
becomes the platform for "discerning the nonsense correlation and the sensible 
long- run relationship" (Hatanaka, 1996).
A pre-condition for conducting the Engle-Granger cointegration test is that both 
the variables concerned must be integrated with the same level of integration 
(Enders, 1995). Finally, Granger (1988) pointed out that if there is cointegration 
between two variables, and then there must be Granger causality in at least one 
direction.
5.5.3 Error Correction Models
If the series are found to be nonstationary 1(1) and cointegrated between two 
variables, there must be Granger causality in at least one direction, but 
cointegration does not indicate the direction of causality between the variables. To 
determine causality, Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger (1988) provide a 
more comprehensive procedure having variables that are found to be cointegrated. 
This procedure is known as the error correction model (ECM). Therefore, the study 
specifies an ECM in order to examine the variable in the short-run. The error 
correction term (ECT) that is embodied in the following error correction model:
A\nTGXt = a {) + /3QA\nGDPt + y0E C T (5.18)
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Where A denotes the first difference operator, ECT,_, is the error correction term, 
and Yq is the coefficient of the error correction term, which measures the short-run
A
adjustment, to e, in equation (5.17), The ECM should be negative and statistically
significant if the relevant variables are cointegrated and therefore represents the 
disequilibrium residual of a cointegration equation. Thus, the coefficients of the 
ECTs capture the "speed of adjustment" which explains the deviation of a variable 
from the long-run equilibrium. In addition, in the above equation (5.18) y should 
respond negatively and in equation (5.19) x should respond positively to positive 
values of ECT,_,, and A should be negative for y and positive for x (Anwar et al., 
1996), and (Enders, 1995).
5.5.4 Granger Causality Test
Causality is assumed to be “explicit in any economic relationship" (Wold, 1954). 
The importance of establishing a causal relationship has long been recognised. In 
economic theory, relationships are often described as causal e.g. the relationship 
between quantity and price, money and income, government expenditure and 
national income, and others.
The concept of causality from the economic point of view, and the determination 
of causal directions only become possible after the operational framework was 
developed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). Their approach is crucially based 
on the maxim that the past and present may cause the future but the future can not 
cause the past (Granger, 1980). In econometrics the most widely used operational 
definition of causality is the Granger definition of causality, which is defined as 
follows: The variable X is a Granger cause of Y  (denoted asX —» Y  ), if present Y
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can be predicted with better accuracy by using past values of X rather than by not 
doing so, other information being identical (Charemza and Deadman, 1992).
For variables under investigation in this study, we test individually for the 
causality between the dependent variables, namely: TGX, TGXC, TGX/GDP, and 
per capita TGX, and gross domestic product (GDP or per capita GDP). However, 
before undertaking that we have to check for the time series properties and 
especially cointegration properties of the time series involved (Bahmani-Oskooee 
and Alse, 1993).
If the null hypothesis of noncointegration between TGX (total government 
expenditure) at time t and GDP (gross domestic product) at time t can be rejected, 
then the standard Granger causality test can be employed to examine the causal 
relationship between the series (using the variables in first differences) (Mahdavi et 
al.,1994). Following this statement, we can test the hypothesis that GDP growth, 
labelled (ALGDP), causes government expenditure growth, labelled (ALTCX), 
and vice versa, by constructing the following causal models:
tn n
A LTGX, = a  + Y^P<L TGX,-i + Y J‘>i&LGDP,-i + «„ (5.19)
/ = l  / =1
I* r
A LOOP, = ci + Y<hA LTGX , i A L G D P ,+ u 2l (5.20)
./ = > J = I
Where uu and u2l are two uncorrelated white-noise series and m, n and P,rare the
maximum number of lags. It is well known that the causality literature assumes 
stationarity of the time series being examined. Because of that, we will apply 
Granger causality using the variables if the first differences of logarithms of the 
variables are stationary 1(0). One can use the standard F-test or the probability
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value in order to determine the causal relationship between the variables. When 
testing causality in this study we have four possible findings:
(1) Neither variable Granger causes the other. In other words, independence is 
suggested when the sets of GDP and TGX coefficients are not statistically 
significant in both regressions (no causality)
(2) Unidirectional causality from GDP to TGX: that is, GDP causes TGX, but 
not vice versa (in this case Wagner’s hypothesis applies) (unidirectional 
causality )
(3) Unidirectional causality from TGX to GDP: that is, TGX causes GDP, but 
not vice versa (Keynesian modelling is valid in this case) (unidirectional 
causality).
(4) Bi-directional causality between GDP and TGX: that is, GDP and TGX 
“Granger cause” each other (feedback effect or bi-directional causality).
If (4) is found to be valid, there is a feedback effect or bidirectional causality 
between two variables (Miller and Russek, 1990); (Gujarati, 1995). In that case 
both the Keynes and Wagner approaches are valid. According to the above 
equations (5.20 and 5.21), the null hypothesis that GDP does not Granger cause 
TGX is rejected if the coefficients oft)',, ’s in equation (5.20) are jointly significant
(i.e. d] ^0), based on the standard F- test. The null hypothesis that TGX does not 
Granger cause GDP is rejected if the b s are jointly significant (i.e. bj *  0) in 
equation (5.21), and if both some <>' t- 0 and some bl * 0  then there is feedback 
between TGX and GDP.
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5.6 Summary
This chapter was about the research methodology used in this study. In this chapter 
we presented the sequential process in identifying Granger causality in 
econometrics analysis which involves testing for stationarity or unit roots, 
cointegration and finally Granger causality. As mentioned in the introduction, 
these procedures are used in analysing the relationship within the framework of 
Wagner’s hypothesis between government expenditure and economic development 
in Libya.
The process of testing for unit roots also involves testing for the data generating 
process to identify whether the data are difference stationary. The Error- 
Correction Model allows us to combine the short-run dynamics and the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables. Econometricians relate the short- 
run dynamics to the changes or the growth of a particular variable or time series. 
On the other hand, the long-run refers to the level of the variables. Since 
cointegration implies that there is Granger causality in one direction or another, 
error correction models will allow us to detect the direction in which Granger 
causality flows.
The next chapter will concern the test of the long-run equilibrium relationship for 
cointegration analysis. In this chapter we will be focusing on estimating the 
relationship between GDP of (total real GDP and total real non-oil GDP) growth 
and government expenditure in Libya over the period 1962-2005.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Long-run Analysis
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter two, Adolph Wagner (1883) formulated his famous law of 
increasing state activity for developing countries by linking the growth of 
government activity to economic development. Although there has been some 
disagreement among scholars regarding the correct interpretation of the hypothesis, 
Wagner’s law has been generally interpreted as follows; as per capita income 
increases in industrializing nations, a rising share of an economy’s resources will 
be devoted to public sector activities. Wagner’s hypothesis, i.e., the proposal that 
there exists a long-run propensity for the public sector to grow, has become a 
stylised fact in public sector economics (Brown and Jackson, 1990).
As explained in Chapter three, many studies have examined the empirical 
confirmation of Wagner’s hypothesis since the early 1960s. As new data sets on 
the relevant variables have become available, and more advanced econometric 
techniques have been developed, further tests of the law have been carried out. The 
discussion about the correct interpretation and validity of Wagner’s hypothesis 
continues today. Most empirical studies have been based on either time series 
analysis of a single country or cross-sectional analysis of different countries. The 
empirical results of Wagner’s hypothesis are inconclusive. Many time series 
studies find support for the hypothesis.
The purpose of this chapter is to use the techniques of cointegration analysis to 
examine the long-run relationship between two variables. Engle and Granger
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(1987) pioneered cointegration tests by proposing a residual based two step 
procedure to identify long-run relationships among stationary variables under 
study. The short-run relationship will be examined in chapter seven. We extend our 
analysis in the context of Libya to see the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic development. It is hoped that our findings will cast 
some light on explaining the government expenditure and GDP growth 
experienced by Libya in the period 1962 to 2005 within the framework of 
Wagner's law.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2 we present six different 
interpretations of Wagner’s law which lead to six different ways of formulating the 
law. In section 6.3 we present the econometric problem. In section 6.4 we present 
the practical aspect of the econometric methodology adopted in this chapter which 
comprises the unit roots test and the cointegration analysis. Finally, the summary is 
in Section 6.5.
6.2 The Empirical Models of Wagner’s Law
As in all other empirical studies, we need to choose a suitable model for an 
empirical confirmation of Wagner’s law. Due to the complexity of the problems 
and the vagueness of Wagner’s hypothesis, it is difficult to exactly define the 
empirical form of the relationship between public expenditure and the level of 
economic development. Different empirical researchers have interpreted the law 
differently and many different versions of Wagner’s law have appeared. Following 
Gandhi (1971) and Mann (1981), they have provided a useful comparison of the 
different interpretations of Wagner’s law. Based on earlier studies, they proceed to 
devise six different formulations of the law. We present these different
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formulations below. In what follows, TGX is total government expenditure, GDP 
is the gross domestic product, and TGXC is total government expenditure on 
consumption, GDP/POP is per capita income and POP is the population. The 
following six different versions of Wagner’s law have been most commonly 
investigated.
6.2.1 Peacocok and Wiseman Version
They tested the relation between government expenditure and GDP as follows:
TGX = f (GDP)  (6.1)
Where TGX is total government expenditure in real terms, and GDP is gross 
domestic product in real terms, used as the standard measure of the country's 
economic activities. They briefly write Wagner's law as "government expenditure 
must increase at an even faster rate than output" (Peacock and Wiseman, 1967, 
p. 17). This functional form is called the traditional Peacock-Wiseman version. 
According to this version, the elasticity of TGX with respect to GDP is expected to 
exceed unity.
6.2.2 Pryor Version
This version of Wagner's law was represented by (Pryor, 1968). According to, him 
"Wagner's law asserted that in growing economies the share of public consumption 
expenditures in the national income increases" (Pryor, 1968, p.451). According to 
the Pryor version, the elasticity of TGXC with respect to GDP would be expected 
to exceed unity. The symbolic statement of Wagner's law according to this version 
is:
TGXC = f(GDP)  (6.2)
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6.2.3 Goff man Version
This version of Wagner's law was proposed by Goffman (1968, p.359). According 
to him, "Essentially, Wagner argued that as a nation experiences economic 
development and growth, an increase must occur in the activities of the public 
sector and that ratio of increase, when converted into expenditure terms, would 
exceed the rate of increase in output per capita". The Goffiman version assumes a 
functional relationship of the form:
TGX = f  (GDP/POP) (6.3)
Where POP denotes population and GDP/POP is per capita gross domestic product 
in real terms. The elasticity of government expenditure (TGX) with respect to per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP/POP) is greater than unity.
6.2.4 Musgrave Version
Musgrave proposed this version (1969, p.74). According to him, "Ever since 
Adolph Wagner expounded his law of the expanding scale of state activity, 
economists have speculated on its validity and the underlying causes. The 
proportion of expanding scale, obviously, must be interpreted as postulating rising 
share of public sector or ratio of public expenditure to GDP... of the development 
of a country, from low to high per capita income” . The Musgrave version, the most 
widely accepted specification of Wagner’s law, can be written as follows.
TGX/GDP = / (GDP/ POP) (6.4)
Where TGXC is total government consumption expenditure in real terms.
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Where TGX/GDP, denotes the share of total government expenditure in gross 
domestic product in real terms. According to Musgrave’s version, Wagner’s law is 
validated if the ratio elasticity is greater than zero.
6.2.5 Gupta and Michas Version
Gupta (1967) and Michas (1975) have examined another version of Wagner’s 
hypothesis. According to this version, per capita government expenditure of a 
country rises more than proportionately as its per capita income rises in real terms. 
It is the traditional version of Wagner’s law but in per capita terms. The symbolic 
statement of Wagner’s law according to this version is:
T G X / P O P  = f  (GDP /POP )  (6.5)
Where TGX/POP represents per capita government expenditure in real terms. They 
tried to verify that the elasticity of public spending per capita with respect to GDP 
per capita is greater than unity.
6.2.6 Mann Version
The last formulation to test Wagner’s law was proposed by Mann (1980), and is a 
modified version of Peacock-Wiseman, in the sense that it converts the traditional 
Peacock-Wiseman formulation into a share version. According to the modified P- 
W version, the share specification most closely approximates the proper 
perspective of Wagner’s hypothesis. The increase in the share of total government 
expenditure is expected to be at a faster rate than that of gross domestic product. 
This version is the formulation used most frequently in empirical work (Ram 
1987). The law can be written as follows:
T G X / G D P  = f ( G D P )  (6 .6 )
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Where TGX/GDP is the share of total government expenditure in gross domestic 
product in real terms. In the relation, if the elasticity is greater than zero, then 
Wagner’s law is validated.
In this study we will be using these formulations of Wagner’s hypothesis for 
estimating the relationship between the total real GDP and total real non-oil GDP 
growth and government expenditure in Libya. The above formulations can be
expressed in log-regression forms as follows:
The six versions of Wagner’s law with total real GDP:
In TGX = a,  + /?, In G D P  + u (6.7)
In T GX C  = a 2 +/32 In G D P  + u (6 .8 )
In TGX = a s +  /?, In(G DP/P O P)  +  u (6.9)
\n(TGX/GDP) = a ,  + In {GDPI P O P ) + u  (6 .10)
\n(TGX/ PO P)=  a s + /?, In(G D P/ PO P ) + u (6.11)
\n{TGX/GDP) = a„ + In G D P  + u (6 .12)
Furthermore, the six versions of Wagner’s law with total real non-oil:
In TGX = + /?, \r\(nonoilGDP) + u (6.13)
In T GX C  = a 2 +/32 In(nonoilGDP) + u (6.14)
ln7T/X = + J32 \n(nonoilGDP/POP) + u (6.15)
\u(TGX/nonoilGDP) = a 4 + f i 4 \n(nonoilGDP/ PO P) + u  (6.16)
\n ( T G X /P O P ) -  a 5 + /35 \ n ( n o n o i l G D P / P O P ) + u (6.17)
\n(TGX/ nonoilGDP) = a () + (3G \r\(nonoilGDP) + u (6.18)
In the above equations, the estimated coefficients of the independent variable stand 
for the elasticity of demand for government expenditures with respect to GDP
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which will produce different values depending on the version used. To validate 
Wagner’s hypothesis the straight GDP elasticity requires to be >1 and the ratio 
GDP elasticity needs to be >0.
Most previous empirical tests of Wagner’s law in a single country over a long 
period have used time series data and the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
technique to estimate the above elasticity. Most of these empirical studies have 
found support for the law. However, they have suffered from various 
methodological flaws and errors. The traditional models have ignored the question 
of stationarity. In the subsequent section the study will examine these issues.
6.3 The Econometric Problem.
For more than two decades, many researchers have undertaken case studies for 
their countries with six different versions of Wagner’s law. In order to examine the 
validity of Wagner’s law, all of these studies have used time series data and 
employed the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique to estimate the regression 
coefficients. Most of these empirical tests of six different versions of the law have 
found a statistically significant positive relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth
In estimating six different equations for Wagner’s hypothesis, the previous studies 
have assumed that the time series data used on government expenditure and gross 
domestic product are stationary and that the error terms in the equation are serially 
uncorrelated. Under these assumptions, the method of OLS gives estimators that 
are unbiased and have constant variance; i.e. the estimated coefficients are 
consistent and have the usual asymptotic normal distribution.
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However, recent advances in time series analysis and available empirical evidence 
have suggested that many macroeconomic times series are nonstationary in the 
sense that the mean and variance depend on time, (Nelson and Plosser 1982; 
Schwert 1987 and Maddala 1992). If a variable tends to return to its mean level 
through time, the variable will be stationary. A stationary series has a well defined 
mean which will not vary greatly with the sampling period. If a series has a time 
varying mean, the time series is said to be nonstationary.
Nonstationarity in time series data gives rise to many econometric problems. 
Regressions involving such nonstationary variables are likely to produce spurious 
results. When nonstationary data are used in a regression, the results obtained are 
likely to be spurious because the variables are actually unrelated. The possibilities 
of spurious regression also exist if the variables under consideration are not 
cointegrated.
To overcome the problems of the previous studies dealing with Wagner's law, we 
need to examine the stationarity of each variable and investigate the long run 
relationship between government expenditure and GDP in terms of cointegration 
analysis.
As specified in the six different formulations of Wagner's law, the data under 
examination consist of the following: gross domestic product (GDP), government 
expenditure (TGX) and government consumption expenditure (TGXC) in real 
terms. In addition, the data are also examined in per capita terms: per capita GDP 
(GDP/POP), per capita government expenditure (TGX/POP) and the share of 
government expenditure in GDP (TGX/GDP) in real terms. All six series are
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measured in real terms and transformed to natural logs. Also, we examined the data 
for non-oil GDP at the same time.
6.4 Empirical Results and Analysis from Testing Six Versions of Wagner’s Law
The main focus of this chapter is to provide the general framework for the analysis. 
Some description of the econometric technique is presented. All the data are annual 
and are for calendar years. Econometricians suggest that, “the first step in any 
empirical analysis should be examining each of the variables individually to check 
their unit roots and their order of integration,” (Holden and Thompson 1992). In 
our study, the nonstationary property of the time series data must be considered 
first.
We employ the most widely used methods to test the time series data in our study 
for unit roots, which are the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test Dickey-Fuller 
(1981) and Phi 1 lips-Pcrron (PP) test (1988). Then, by employing the cointegration 
technique, we test for the existence of a long-run relationship (equilibrium) 
between the variables. In each sub-section the findings reported include the 
findings of the different tests for the relationship between the independent 
variables (GDP) and dependent variables (TGX, TGXC, TGX/POP, TGX/GDP) as 
well as the findings of the different tests for the relationship between the 
independent variables (non-oil GDP) and the dependent variables (TGX, TGXC, 
TGX/POP, TGX/non-oil GDP).
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6.4.1 Testing for Stationarity
A time series is considered to be stationary if its mean and variance are 
independent of time. If the time series is nonstationary, i.e. having a mean and or 
variance changing over time, it is said to have a unit root. Therefore, the 
stationarity of a time series is examined by conducting the unit root test. A 
nonstationary time series can be converted into a stationary time series by 
differencing. If a time series becomes stationary after differencing once, then the 
time series is said to be integrated of order one and denoted by 1(1). Similarly, if a 
time series has to be differenced d times to make it stationary, then it is called 
integrated of order d and written as I (d).
6.4.1.1 Graphs of Variables
The first technique which can be used to check stationarity of the variables is to 
graph the series. The graphs of these variables in logarithm form with total GDP 
and non-oil GDP are shown as follows:
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Figure 6.1 Graphs of the Variables for six versions with total GDP
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Figure 6.2 Graphs of the Variables for six versions with total non-oil
GDP
L N T G X N O G D P
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According to the graphs in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, the results indicate that the total 
GDP and non-oil GDP are possibly stationary in first differences. Hence, the 
variables are possibly integrated of order one. We can check the time series data 
for stationarily using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) 
tests for unit roots.
6.4.1.2 Unit Root Tests
A useful preliminary step to performing any regression analysis is to uncover the 
properties and characteristics of the actual data involved. Such an analysis of the 
individual time series variables is important because the properties of the 
individual series have to be taken into account in modelling the data generating 
process of a system of potentially related variables (Lutkepohl and Kratzig 2004). 
Since all variables under investigation are time series variables, we need first to 
test the properties of the scries. In fact, testing for the properties is important 
because ( 1 ) some time series techniques, cointegration analysis, for example, 
require that the time series involved be integrated of order greater than zero; (2 ) a 
nonstationary regress or invalidates many standard empirical results. For example, 
Granger and Newbold (1974) found that the F-statistic calculated from a regression 
involving nonstationary lime series does not follow the standard distribution.
Testing for unit roots in time series data has received considerable attention in 
recent econometric literature. Since there is exists the problem of spurious 
regression involving the levels of the variables, we need to examine whether each 
senes is stationary or whether the series has a stochastic trend. If a series contains a 
unit root, the time series data is not stationary and it will be have as a stochastic 
rather than a deterministic process.
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6.4.1.2.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Several methods of testing for unit roots have been proposed. 1 The Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test has been most commonly used. In our examination here 
we will be adopting the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) testing method, Dickey 
and Fuller (1981).
In the ADF test, the null hypothesis is that the variable under investigation has a 
unit root, against the alternative that it does not. The substantially negative values 
of the reported test statistic lead to rejection of the null hypothesis (Dickey et, ah,
1991). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests. In the case of the levels of the six variables, the t-values2 on 
the level obtained from ADF tests are clearly less negative than the critical values 
and therefore the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for each variable 
used in all of the six versions of Wagner’s law.
Also, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 shows the same test applied to the first differences to see 
whether we can achieve stationarity of the series by transforming the series. For 
the first differences of the variables (total GDP and non-oil GDP), the results show 
that the calculated t-values are greater than the critical t-values at the 5% level of 
significance. This implies that the null hypothesis that the series have unit roots in 
their first differences are rejected which means that the variables are stationary in 
their first differences.
1 For example, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the 
Instrumental Test, and the Phillips-Perron test. For a useful survey of the unit root literure, see 
Banerjee, et al. (1993).
‘ For more details from the tests see Appendices 2 and 3
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Table 6.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for
Level and First Differences with total GDP
Variables Level First Difference
Lag
Lengths
Order of 
Integration
trend No trend
In GDP -2.533 -4.604* 1 KD
In GDP/POP -2.554 -4.710* 1 KD
Ln TGX -2.164 -4.158* 0 KD
In TGXC -2.138 -3.731* 0 KD
Ln TGX/GDP -2.258 -3.359* 3 KD
Ln TGX/POP -2.157 -2.985* 2 KD
All regression estimations and test results are obtained by using Eviews 4 econometric software. 
* Significant at 5 ('/< level.
Critical value in level at 5C is -2.933.
Table 6.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests for 
Level and First Differences (non-oil GDP)
Variables Level First Difference
Lag
Lengths
Order of 
Integration
trend No trend
In (nonoil GDP) -2.258 -3.359* 3 HD
In (nonoil GDP/POP) -2.325 -3.555* 3 Id)
Ln TGX -2.164 -4.158* 0 KD
Ln TGX -1.909 -3.160* 1 I(D
Ln TGX/POP -2.157 -4.215* 0 KD
Ln TC.X/nonoil GDP -1.676 -4.102* 1 KD
All regression estimations and test results are obtained by using Eviews 4 econometric software. 
* Significant at 5 r/< level.
Critical value in level at 5C is -2.933
6.4.1.2.2 Phillips-Perron Test
Another test we can use for unit root tests is the Phillips-Perron (PP) test which is a
more comprehensive test for a unit root. Although it is similar to ADF tests, it
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incorporates an automatic correction to the Dickey-Fuller procedure to allow for 
auto correlated residuals (Brooks. 2002). The Phillips-Perron test is carried out 
using the t-statistic following the same procedure as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
approach. The major criticisms of the ADF and PP tests are that their estimation 
power is low if the process is stationary but with a root close to the nonstationary 
boundary. They have the tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity when it is in fact true, and under-reject the null when it is false 
(Brooks, 2002; Harris, 1995).
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 presented the results for the testing of stationarity for the real 
total GDP and non-oil real GDP. The results show that the null hypothesis of 
nonslalionanty cannot be rejected when variables are in levels. However, after 
taking first differences, all variables become stationary.
Table 6.3 Phillips-Perron Test for Level and First Differences with total GDP
Variables Level First Difference
Lag
Lengths
Order of 
Integration
trend No trend
In GDP -3.348 -5.446* 1 KD
In GDP/POP -3.331 -5.526* 1 1(1)
In TGX -1.848 -4.191* 2 KD
In TGXC -1.604 -3.744* 2 I(D
In TGX/GDP -1.920 -4.929* 1 KD
In TGX/POP -1.856 -4.155* 2 KD
:i:. indicate significant at 1%.
Critical value in level at 1%, is -3.593
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Table 6.4 Phillips-Perron Test for Level and First Differences (non-oil GDP)
Variables Level First Difference
Lag
Lengths
Order of 
Integration
trend No trend
In (nonoil GDP) -1.920 -4.929* 2 KD
In (nonoil GDP/POP) -2.006 -5.094* 2 KD
In TGX -1.848 -4.191* 2 Id)
In TGXC -1.560 -5.817* 2 KD
In TGX/POP -1.856 -4.254* 2 1(1 )
In TGX/nonoil GDP -1.816 -6.732* 2 Id)
:i: Significant at 1C level.
Critical value in level at 1 %  is -3.593
In addition, the results in Tables 6.5 and 6 .6  show that the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity cannot be rejected when variables are in levels. However, after 
taking first differences, all variables become stationary. Therefore, we can 
conclude that all the variables are first difference stationary, that is, each series is 
characterised as integrated of order one 1( 1 ).
Table 6.5 Comparison of ADF and PP tests for total GDP
Variables ADF test Phillips-Perron Test (PP)
Level First Difference Level First Difference
Ln GDP -2.533 -4.604** -3.348 -5.446*
Ln GDP/POP -2.554 -4.710** -3.331 -5.526*
Ln TGX -2.164 -4.158** -1.848 -4.191*
Ln TGXC -2.138 -3.731** -1.604 -3.744*
Ln TGX/GDP -2.258 -3.359** -1.920 -4.929*
Ln TGX/POP -2.157 -2.985** -1.856 -4.155*
- (*, ** significant at \ %  and 5 %  level at respectively.)
- Critical value in level at 5% is -2.933 and -3.593 at 1% level.
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Table 6.6 Comparison of ADF and PP tests for total non-oil GDP
Variables ADF test Phillips-Perron Test (PP)
Level First Difference Level First Difference
ln(nonoil GDP) -2.258 -3.359** -1.920 -4.929*
ln(non-oil GDP/POP) -2.325 -3.555** -2.006 -5.094*
InTGX -2.164 -4.158** -1.848 -4.191*
In TGXC -1.909 -3.160** -1.560 -5.817*
In TGX/POP -2.157 -4.215** -1.856 -4.254*
In TGX/nonoil GDP -1.676 -4.102** -1.816 -6.732*
*, ** significant at \r/< and 5 c/< level at respectively. 
Critical value in level at 5 (Z< is -2.933 and -3.593 at VZv
Therefore, we can conclude that since differencing once produces stationarity, all 
the six series (total GDP and non-oil GDP) used in the analysis are integrated of 
order one 1(1). Once the order of integration has been established, then we can test 
whether there is a long-run relationship between all of the variables. Now, this 
being the case, we can proceed to perform a cointegration test as the next step in 
our empirical investigation.
6.4.2 Testing for Cointegration
Having established the number of unit roots in the variable, we proceed to test for 
cointegration. A cointegration test can be applied to determine the existence of a 
long-run relationship between the variables when the variables are integrated at the 
same level of integration. The concept of cointegration was first introduced into 
econometrics by Granger (1981) and further developed by Engle and Granger 
(1987). The Engle and Granger two-step procedures involve firstly running the 
following cointegration regression:
Y, = a  + j3Xt + £, (6.19)
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If the residuals ( e t ) from the regression are 1(0), then X, and Y, are said to be
cointegrated. Clearly, the series need to be integrated of the same order for 
cointegration to be possible. To establish the stationarity of the residuals we can re­
write equation (6.19) as follows:
TGX, = a  + /3GDP, + e, (6.20)
The long-run relationship of two variables is examined using the two-step test for 
cointegration proposed in Engle and Granger (1987). Equation (6.20) can be 
written in log-linear from for the six versions with total GDP and non-oil GDP of 
Wagner’s law as follows:
Equations with total GDP 
Version one (Peacock and Wiseman)
In TGX = a , +  /?, In G D P  + e, (6.21)
Version two (Pryor)
In T GX C  = cr2 + /?2 In G D P  + f , (6.22)
Version three (Goffman)
In TGX = a , + / 3 ,  In (G D P/ PO P ) + e, (6.23)
Version four (Musgrave)
\n(TC,X/GDP) = a, + In(G D P/ PO P ) + e1 (6.24)
Version five (Gupta and Michas)
In {T GX /PO P) = a 5 + \n(GDP/POP)+ e,  (6.25)
Version six (Mann)
ln(7 G X / G D P )  = a 6 + /?J  n G D P  + e b (6.26)
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Equations with total non-oil GDP 
Version one (Peacock and Wiseman
In TGX  = a, + /?, \n(nonilGDP) + €] (6.27)
Version two (Pryor)
In TGX C = a 2 + J32 \w{nonoilGDP) + e 2 (6.28)
Version three (Goffman)
In TGX = « ,+ /? ,  \n{iwiioilGDP/POP) + £ , (6.19)
Version four (Musgrave)
\n(TGX/nonoilGDP) = « , + /?4 \n(nonoilGDP I P O P ) + £ 1 (6.30)
Version five (Gupta and Michas)
\n(TGX/ PO P)  -  a 5 + /35 \n(nonoilGDP/POP) + e 5 (6.31)
Version six (Mann)
\n{TGX/nonoilGDP) = a„ + /?(, ln(/iwio/7CD/5) + (6.32)
These equations can be estimated through cointegration regressions to examine the 
long-run relationship between government expenditure and gross domestic 
product, and then testing whether the residual {£,) is 1(0 ) or not.
The basic idea of cointegration is that if two or more series move together over 
time, combinations of these economic variables tend to converge in the long-run, 
even though they may drift apart in the short-run. If two or more I (1) variables 
tend to converge, or at least do not drift apart in the long-run, we can regard these 
variables as defining a long-run equilibrium relationship. Thus the concept of 
cointegration provides a theoretical foundation for dynamic modelling, and it also 
gives information about the long-run properties of data.
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There are several tests of the cointegrating regression. Mainly, these are: DW 
which is the cointegration regression Durbin-Watson statistic derived from Sargan 
and Bhargava (1983), the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, and the Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller (ADF) test. All these tests are used by Engle and Granger (1987) and Hall 
(1986). However, they suggest that in most applications the ADF test for unit roots 
in the residuals is best. Hence, it was decided to use the Engle and Granger residual 
based approach.3
We found that each of the variables used in all six versions of Wagner's law are 
1(1) in the real GDP and real non-oil GDP variables. Since all series are integrated 
of the same order, the series can be tested for the existence of a long-run 
relationship between them, i.e. cointegration. The procedure used to establish the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship is as follows: First, the hypothesised long- 
run relationship is estimated by OLS. This is called the cointegrating regression. 
Second, we can obtain the residuals . To test stationarity for the residuals the
study applies the ADF and PP tests. In other words, the null hypothesis of the 
cointegration test is that the residuals formed by the cointegrating regressions are 
not stationary. It is necessary to emphasise that the residual equation has no 
intercept or time trend. In this chapter, we will conduct two cointegration tests. The 
first one is with respect to total real gross domestic product (GDP), and the second 
one is with respect to real non-oil gross domestic product (non-oil GDP).
' There are other approaches as well, such as Johansen's Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) approach, and Stock and Watson's (1988) approach.
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Since the series here are integrated with the same order 1(1), a cointegration test 
can be conducted in order to examine the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the variables. To test the null hypothesis of nonstationarity 
against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity of the residuals, the study applied 
the ADF and PP tests to each of the six cointegrating regressions4. Table 6.7 
shows the results of the Engle and Granger two step test for cointegration. The 
results represent the six cointegrating regressions using the ordinary least square 
(OLS) method3 and represent the ADF test applied on the residuals obtained from 
the regressions.
6.4.2.1 Cointegration Tests with Total Real GDP
Table 6.7 Cointegration Regressions with Total Real GDP 
(The residual-based ADF test)
Cointegrating Regression
p Residual coefficient R 2
1 LnTGX = f ( L n G D P ) 1.35
(22.96)
-0.337
(-2.625*,
0.92
2 Ln TGX C  = f ( L n G D P ) 1.34
(15.13)
-0.077
((-1.169)
0.85
3 LnTGX = f ( L n  G D P / P O P ) 1.78
(9.97)
-0.068
(-0.879)
0.70
4 (Ln TG X /G D P) = f ( L n G D P / P O P ) 1.35
(9.13)
-0.071
(-1.071)
0.66
5 (L nT G X /P O P)  = f ( L n G D P / P O P ) 1.38
(13.17)
-0.208
(-1.860 ***)
0.80
6 (Ln TG X /G D P) = f ( L n G D P ) 1.06
(24.68)
-0.333 
(-2.744 *)
0.93
*, ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Critical values in level at 1%>, 5% and 10% are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively.
Before interpreting the cointegration results, it is necessary to highlight that the 
Engle and Granger method does not prove whether the relation is really a long-run 
one. This is a supposition and cannot be statistically confirmed. We need to have a
4- for more results see all tests in appendix (5 )
see appendix (14) for regression models.
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strong belief in a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables that is 
supported by relevant economic theory where the theory suggests a suitable 
assumption about a long run relationship (Charemza and Deadman, 1992).
Table 6.7 presents the results of the ADF test for the residual series from the six 
cointegrating Wagner's law regressions. We conclude that we must reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration in three versions of Wagner's law with respect to 
real GDP because the ADF statistic values are more negative than the critical 
values at the 1% or 10% levels with the Peacock-Wiseman version (No.l), the 
Gupta and Michas version (No.5) and the Mann version (No.6 ).
The results show evidence that the real total government expenditure and real gross 
domestic product are subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long run in three 
versions (1,5  and 6 ). Also, we have another technique which can be used to check 
for coinlegration using the residual namely the Phillips-Perron unit root test (PP). 
The results are presented in Table 6 .8  below. We found results if we compare these 
results with ADF results indicating that the four versions are cointegrated, see 
Table 6.7.
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Table 6.8 Cointegration Regressions with Total Real G D P  
__________ (The residual-based P P  test)__________
Cointegrating Regression fi Residual coefficient R 2
1 LnTGX = f ( L n G D P ) 1.35
(22.96)
-0.336
(-3.068*)
0.92
2 Ln T G X C  = f ( U i G D P ) 1.34
(15.56)
-0.105
(-1.693**)
0.85
3 LnTGX = f ( U i G D P / P O P ) 1.78
(9.97)
-0.078
(-0.854)
0.70
4 (L nT GX /G D P)  = {( L n G D P j POP) 1.35
(9.13)
-0.072
(-0.883)
0.66
5 (LnTGX / PO P)  = /(L iiG D P/  POP) 1.38
(13.17)
-0.212
(-2.080*)
0.80
6 (L nT GX /G D P)  = f ( L n G D P ) 1.06
(24.68)
-0.340
(-3.082*)
0.93
*, ** indicate significance at 1%, 10% levels respectively.
Critical values in level at 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively.
Two versions show no cointegration in the PP test. The results indicate that the 
total government expenditure on consumption and gross domestic product are not 
subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long run in versions 3 and 4. There are 
two possible reasons for this (1) the oil crises in the 1970s that affected oil revenue 
in the oil producing countries including Libya, (2) the Libyan economy suffered 
from US and UN sanctions since 19866.
Also Tables 6.7 and 6 .8  show the estimated income elasticity (/3) in all versions. 
The elasticity coefficients in the equations are greater than unity in all of the tests. 
The evidence shows that the estimated income elasticities are greater than unity 
and support the view that Wagner’s law is valid for Libya during the period under 
consideration.
More detailed reviews for these sanctions are included in Chapter 4.
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6.4.2.2 Cointegration Tests with Non-oil Real GDP
The same procedure as above is applied to non-oil GDP. Since the variables are 
1( 1 ), the cointegration technique is applied to different measures of government 
expenditure and real non-oil gross domestic product (GDP). The residuals from 
different regressions are then tested for stationarity using the ADF test and 
Phillips-PeiTon test (PP). If the residuals are 1(0), then a long-run relationship holds 
between the government expenditure variable and non-oil GDP. Table 6.9 
summarises the outcomes of the cointegration test with respect to real non- oil 
GDP for Libya.
Table 6.9 Cointegration Regressions with Total Real non-oil GDP (the residual -
based ADF test)
Coiintegrating Regression p Residual coefficient R1
1 In TGX = f(\n(nonoilGDP)) 1.24
(28.93)
-0.180
(-1.67***)
0.95
2 In TGXC = f(\n(nonoilGDP)) 1.29
(27.19)
-0.1 1 
(-1.329)
0.94
3 In TGX = f(\n(nonoilGDPf POP)) 1.92
(20.46)
-0.06
(-0.628)
0.90
4 \x\{TGX/nonoilGDP) = f(\n(nonoilGDP/ POP)) 0.40
(6.11)
-0.19
(-1.61 ***)
0.47
5 \n(TGX / POP) = f(\x\{nonoilGDPI POP)) 1.40
(21.23)
-0.192 
(-1.61 ***)
0.91
6 In (TGX/nonoilGDP) = f{\w(nonoilGDP)) 0.25
(5.73)
-0.180
(-1.66***)
0.43
*** indicate significance at 10% level.
Critical values in level at 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.618, -1.948, and -1.619 respectively.
Table 6.9 shows the Engle-Granger residuals based on the ADF cointegration 
test7. We conclude that we must reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in
7 -for more results see all tests in appendix (6 )
138
four out of six versions of Wagner's law: Peacock-Wiseman version (1), Musgrave 
version (4), Gupta-Michas version (5) and Mann version (6 ), because the ADF 
statistic values are more negative than the critical values at 1 0 % levels. 
Cointegrated relationships were found for the versions of Wagner's law with 
respect to real non-oil GDP. In this case, an even stronger result indicates that the 
real total government expenditure and real non-oil gross domestic product are 
subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long-run .
Another method which can be used to check the cointegration between the 
variables and the residuals is the (PP) test. The test results can be seen in Table
6 . 1 0  below.
Table (6.10) Cointegration Regressions with Total Real non-oil GDP (the
residual -  based PP test)
Cointegrating Regression n Residual coefficient R 1
1 In TGX  =  f(\n(nonoilGDP)) 1.24
(28.93)
-0.19
(-1.99**)
0.95
1 \wTGXC = f(\n(nonoiIGDP)) 1.29
(27.19)
-0.12
(-1.61 ***)
0.94
A In VGA’ -  /\\w[nonoil  G D P j P O P ) ) 1 92 
(20.46)
-0 02 
(-0.62)
0 90
4 \n(TGX / nonoilGDP) =  f(\n(nonoilGDP/POP)) 0.40
(6.11)
-0.21
(-2.04**)
0.47
5 In (TGX  / P O P ) =  f(\n(nonoILGDP/ POP)) 1.40
(21.23)
-0.216
(-2.04**)
0.91
6 \n{TGX /nonoilGDP) -  f  {\n(nonoilGDP)) 0.24
(5.73)
-0.19
(-1.995**)
0.43
** and*** indicate significance at 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Critical values in level at 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.616, -1.948, and -1.619 respectively.
The Engle and Granger (1987) residual based on (PP) cointegration test results
reject the null hypothesis with five versions of Wagner’s law at the 59?- and 109?
s- see appendix (15) for regression models.
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level, and they are: Peacoek-Wiseman version (1), Pryor version (2), Musgrave 
version (4), Gupia-Miehas version (5) and Mann version (6 ). Because the PP 
critical value is more negative than the critical values at the 5% and 10% levels, 
the results show that there is a long-run relationship between government 
expenditure and non-oil GDP in these versions.
These results show that the real income elasticities range from 0.25 to 1.92 for real 
non-oil GDP in the ADF test and 0.24 to 1.85 with the PP test. Most of the 
elasticity coefficients in the above versions are greater than unity. These results 
imply that most versions support Wagner’s law for Libya during the study period.
In general, the analysis of the results of the Engle-Granger test for cointegration is 
as follows. These results are mixed and sometimes inconsistent. As stated by 
Obben (1998) and Cheong (2003), where there is inconsistency between the ADF 
results and the PP result, the number of cointegrating relationships ranges from 
three in Table 6.7 to five in Table 6.10. Versions 1, 5 and 6 of Wagner’s law are 
cointegrated in all four tests, and version 3 is non cointegrated in all four tests. /? 
is sometimes less than unity in the PP tests. The conclusion from the PP test is 
preferred.
Although some of our findings fail to reject the null hypothesis of no long-run 
relationship between the variables, we have to treat these results with caution. We 
need to consider the weaknesses and limitations of cointegration analysis. The 
findings of non-cointegration do not exclude the possibility of cointegration in 
some higher order system that includes more variables. We will consider some of 
them in Chapter 8 . The omission of important variables may produce the non­
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cointegration result. As Muscatelli and Hum (1992) pointed out “the omission or 
inclusion of certain variables from the cointegration regression can dramatically 
affect the results obtained from cointegrating regressions"
6.4.2.3 Cointegration Tests including two Dummies Variables with Total Real
GDP
In this section, the study tests the long-run relationship between two variables 
which are examined using the two step test for cointegration proposed in Engle and 
Granger (1987). Also, we examine the inclusion of two dummy variables in order 
to investigate the effect these dummies have on the regression. To establish the 
stationary of the residuals we can rewrite the equation as follows:
TGX  = a {) + f3()G D P  + Al)Diunl + S()D u m + e (6.33)
Then we can write equation (6.33) in log-linear form as follows:
In TGX  = a { + /?, In G D P  + A, Dum, + 3, Dum1 + £, (6.34)
ln7T/XC = a ,  + /?, In G D P  + A.Dan^ +S-,Dum-, + £2 (6.35)
In TGX  = a,  + /3y In G D P  + A^Dum  ^ + S2Dum2 + (6.36)
In{TGX/GDP) = In G D P  + AADum{ + SADum2 + eA (6.37)
In (TGX / PO P) = a ,  + /35 In G D P  + A.Dum, + S 5Dum2 + £ 5 (6.38)
ln(7'(/X/G D P ) = a (t + f3h In G D P  + AbDuml + SbD u m + £b (6.39)
After we estimated the equations for all six versions of Wagner’s law, the results in 
Table 6.11 below show that the variables under study are cointegrated at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels a part from the third version of Wagner’ law.
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Table 6.11 Cointegration Regressions with Total Real GDP 
(The residual-based ADF and PP test)
Cointegrating Regression ADF
Residual
PP
Residual fi A
8 R 2
1 In TGX =  f{\x\{GDP),Dum,, -0.53 -0.58 1.69 -0.94 -0.02 0.93
D u m ) (-3.21*) (-4.59*) (13.01)* (-2.97)* (-0.25)
2 \nTGXC  = f (\n (G D P), D um {, -0.36 -0.39 1.49 -0.92 0.739 0.92
D u n u ) (-2.05**) (-3.24*) (10.09)* (-2.55)** (5.73)*
3 In TGX =  f ( \ n ( G D P / P O P ) , -0.13 -0.13 1.59 0.18 0.76 0.79
Duml , D un u ) (-1.11) (-1.37) (4.67)* (0.29) (3.47)*
4 111 (TGX/GD P) =  f(\ n(G D P / POP, -0.30 -0.25 1.23 0.01 0.88 0.85
Dunz,, Dunu ) (-1.96**) (-1.98**) (5.42)* (0.04) (6.00)*
5 In ( T GX /P O P)  = f O M G D P I  POP), -0.23 -0.24 1.40 -0.08 0.23 0.81
Dunz,, Dunu ) (-1.87***) (-2.31**) (6.00)* (-0.21) (1-53)
6 \n(TGX/GDP) =  / ( ln (G D P ) , Dum, , -0.82 -0.80 1 24 -0 69 0.28 0.96
Dumt ) (-4.14*) (-5.65*) (15.88)* (-3.63)* (4.18)*
*, ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Critical values in level at 1%. 5% and 10% are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively.
j6 - is the non-oil GDP elasticity. A - The coefficients of the duml. 8  - The coefficients of the dum2
The elasticity is more than unity, and consistent with Wagner’s law. Furthermore, 
the study estimated the equations with two dummies to see their effect on the six 
versions of Wagner’s law regarding the Libyan economy. The results in Table 6.11 
show that the variable dummy 1 was not found to be significant with versions 3, 4 
and 5 but significant at the 1 % level in version 1 and 6 and 5% level with version
2. This implies that the dummy 1 did not have any effect on these three versions. 
But the long-run relationship results on the dummy 2 coefficient are significant at 
the 1% level in versions 2, 3, 4 and 6 and insignificant in versions one and five of 
Wagner's law9.
( >-  For more results see all tests in appendix (5).
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6.4.2.4 Cointegration Tests including two Dummies Variables with Total Real
non-oil GDP
We know that the standard cointegration analysis requires the classification of the 
variables onto I( 1). Now we can test the residuals of our data for non-oil GDP with 
six versions of Wagner’s law on the long-run with two dummy variables as
follows:
InTGX -  + /?, \n(nonoilGDP) + A^Dum  ^ + SxDum2 +£,
In TGXC = a , + /?, In{nonoilGDP) + A^Dnm{ + S^Dum, + e ,
ln7Y/X = a, + /Y \n(nonoilGDP/POP) + A}Dumx + S2Dum2 + ey
\n(TGX/ nonoilGDP) = a 4 + /?4 \n(nonoilGDP/ POP) +A.Diun, 
+ S4Dum2 + £a
In {TG X/POP) = + /?, \n(nonoilGDP/ POP)  + A5Duml
+ S5Dum-, + £5
\n(TGX/ nonoilGDP) = a () + J3() \r\(nonoilGDP) + A()Dumx 
+ SbDunu + G,
(6.40)
(6.41)
(6.42)
(6.43)
(6.44)
(6.45)
After we estimated the residuals in all the equations, Table 6.12 below summarises 
the results of the cointegration analysis using the Engle and Granger method. The 
results show that there exists a long-run relationship between government 
expenditure and non-oil gross domestic product in five versions of Wagner’s law 
and no cointegration in the third version10.
in- For more results see all tests in appendixes (6).
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Table 6.12 Cointegration Regressions with Total Real non-oil GDP 
(The residual-based ADF and PP test)
Cointegrating Regression ADF
Residual
PP
Residual fi A s R 2
1 In TGX  = f(\n(nonoilGDP), -0.38 -0.36 1.34 0.05 -0.40 0.96
Dum^, D u m , ) (-2.85*) (-3.06*) (19.31)* (0.29) (-4.62)*
■> InTGXC  = f  {\n{uonoilGDP), -0.21 -0.21 1.236 -0.14 0.39 0.96
Duni{, Duin2) (-1.84***) (-1.85***) (15.44)* (-0.74) (3.97)*
3 In TGX = f(\n(n onoilG DP /PO P) -0.02 -0.09 1.75 0.22 0.21 0.91
, D///n,, Dmii^) (-0.19) (-0.63) (10.55)* (0.75) (1.64)***
4 (in T G X /nonoilGDP) -  f{\n(non -0.24 -0.27 0.39 0.17 -0.24 0.55
o i l G D P / POP), Dumi, Dum )^ (-1.98**) (-2.37**) (3.50)* (0.87) (-2.79)*
5 {\nTGX/POP) = f(\n(nonoilGDP) -0.24 -0.26 1.39 0.17 -0.24 0.92
/ POP, Dum{, Ditni-,) o 1.98**1 (-2.37* (12.45)* (0.88) (-2.79)'
6 (in TGX  / nooilGDP) = f(\r\(non -0.38 -0.36 0.34 0.05 -0.40 0.64
oilGDP), Dum{, Dum2) (-2.84*) (-3.06*) (4.91)* (0.29) (-4.63)*
*, ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Critical values in level at 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively. 
(3 - is the non-oil GDP elasticity. A - The coefficients of the duml 
d - The coefficients of the dum2
The dummy 1 coefficient are all insignificant. However, there is an effect from 
dummy 2 on all six versions because the dummy has a significant and negative 
coefficient. This implies that there has been an effect of the UN sanctions on the 
six versions of Wagner's law on Libya’s non-oil GDP. In addition, the non-oil 
GDP elasticity gives a clear indication of the importance and significance of non­
oil GDP growth in four of the six versions of Wagner’s law.
With evidence of cointegration in all most of the versions of Wagner’s law, an 
error correction procedure to model short-run relationship can not used. It is 
possible to continue to model the short-term relationship by applying the Granger
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causality test to measure for possible causal relationships between variables, 
(Ansari et a l 1997).
6.5 Summary
The aim of the present chapter was to test the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between measures of real government expenditure and real gross domestic product 
to test the validity of Wagner's Law, using annual time series data taken from 
Libya covering the period 1962-2005. The study included two dummy variables to 
test this relationship.
Although empirical studies have used a diversity of models to examine the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth, for my study I 
have used six different formulations of the Law for real total GDP and real total 
non-oil GDP. The empirical analysis commenced with the examination of the time 
series properties of the variables. This procedure involved testing for stationarity 
and cointegration analysis.
Wagner’s Law has found much support from many previous time series studies. 
However, these studies have suffered from frequent methodological problems in 
their time series analysis. Since they did not test the stationarity of the variables, 
the empirical results might lead to the problem of spurious regression. To 
overcome the problems of previous studies, 1 attempted to test the stationanty of 
the time series data on real government expenditure and real gross domestic 
product using Libyan data for the period from 1962-2005.
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In specific terms, we tested for the existence of unit roots using the ADF and PP 
tests for all the variables. The unit root test results showed that all the variables 
were nonstationary in levels, but stationary in first differences. This means they are 
integrated of order one I( 1).
Since the variables are integrated of 1(1), the cointegration test was applied, in 
order to investigate the long-run relationship on all versions of the regression 
models (GDP and non-oil GDP) based on the two step Engle-Granger method. 
Based on the results of the cointegration tests the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration test was rejected for many of the versions of Wagner's law with total 
GDP and total non-oil GDP.
In other words, there is some support for the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between government expenditure and GDP for the Libyan case. 
However, we got the best results when the study included two dummy variables to 
test this relationship with total GDP and total non-oil GDP. In the next chapter the 
stud) will be testing the short-run relationship between gross domestic product and 
government expenditure. The study will use the error correction model to test this 
relation, and the Granger causality tests will be used in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Short-run Analysis
7.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate causality between government 
expenditure and real total GDP and non-oil GDP in Libya for the period 1962- 
2005. In this chapter, the study applies the short-run equilibrium relationship, 
aiming to explain the relation between GDP growth and government expenditure 
using the Granger causality test for the estimated period. First, using the error 
correction model analysis with real total GDP and non-oil GDP in section 7.2, we 
analyse the Granger causality test for real total GDP and non-oil GDP in section
7.3, while section 7.4 is the summary.
7.2 Error Correction Model (ECM)
The error correction model (ECM) is concerned with the short-run of variables in 
the systems which are influenced by deviation from long-run equilibrium (Enders,
1998). The idea is that disequilibrium in the economic system from one period is 
corrected in the next period. The concept of error correction is related to 
cointegration because the cointegration relationship describes the long-run 
equilibrium. If a set of variables are cointegrated, then there exists an error 
correction model to describe the short-run adjustment to equilibrium. Following 
Engle and Granger (1987) Engle and Granger (1988), if two variables are 
cointegrated then there is an error correction model, or ECM representation, 
between them. Granger (1988) suggests that if the series are found to be stationary
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1(1) and cointegrated, then include an equivalent ECM to re-parameterise the 
model, (Miller and Russek, 1990). According to Engle and Granger (1988), 
cointegrated variables must have an ECM representation. The main reason for the 
popularity of cointegration analysis is that it provides a formal background for 
testing and estimating short-run and long-run relationships among economic 
variables. Furthermore, the ECM strategy provides an answer to the problem of 
spurious correlation (Enders, 1998)1.
For the short-run relationship between government expenditure and gross domestic 
product, the study utilises an error correction model estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), and derives this ECM using the residuals from the estimated 
cointegrating regression for both real total GDP and real total non-oil GDP. In this 
case the error correction model that links the short-run behaviour of the two 
variables is given by the estimating equation (7.1) with all variables in first 
difference form, and the one year lagged residual from the cointegration equation 
(which represents the error correction term, ECTM ) as follows:
Ain'/ G X t — (X() + /?()A In (jDPt + y0E C T  (7.1)
Where A denotes the first difference operator, ECT,_, is the error correction term, 
and y0 is the coefficient of the error correction term, which measures the short-run
adjustment. The ECM should be negative and statistically significant if the relevant 
variables are cointegrated. These conditions provide further evidence and 
confirmation of the long-run and short-run relationships between the variables 
(Iyare and Troy, 2004). Now we apply equation (7.1) to the relationship between
1 For a useful discussion of spurious correlations and ECM strategy, see Enders (1998).
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government expenditure and gross domestic product with real total GDP and real 
non-oil GDP.
7.2.1 Error Correction Model with Real Total GDP
As we mentioned earlier, the specification of error correction models requires the 
existence of some equilibrium relationship between the variables. This means that 
if two variables are cointegrated, according to Engle and Granger (1988), there is a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between these variables. Even if Wagner’s law 
corresponds to a long run model, it is of high interest to examine the short run 
reactions of government expenditure, (Nikolaos. D and Antonis, A. 2004). In this 
case the error correction model is given by the following equations.
Peacock-Wiseman model:
A In TGX,  = + /?, A In GDP, + yxECT,_x + u, (7.2)
Pryor model:
Ain TGXC,  = or, + A In GDP, + y^ECT,_{ + u, (7.3)
Goffman model:
Ain TGX, = a,  + A In G D P  / POP, + y}ECT,_{ + u, (7.4)
Musgrave model:
A In TGX / GDP, = + j3,A In G D P / POP, + y,ECT,_, + u, (7.5)
Gupta model:
A In TGX  / POP, = a 5 + $  A In G D P  / POP, + y5ECT,_, + u, (7.6)
Mann model:
A In TGX I GDP, = a ,  +/?fiAln GDP, + y (, ECTi +u, (7.7)
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The estimation results for all six versions of Wagner’s law for the Libyan economy 
are presented2 in Table 7.1
Table 7.1 Error Correction Model (ECM) Results with Real Total GDP
Dependent variable a p Y
1 Ain TGX 0.074
(2.383)**
0.398
(2.608)*
-0.243
(-2.895)*
2 A In TGXC 0.086
(6.434)*
0.258
(3.968)**
-0.085
(-3.534)*
3 A In TGX 0.092
(3.104)*
0.288
(1.850)***
-0.107
(-2.515)**
4 Ain (TGX/GDP) 0.072
(4.196)*
0.150
(1.669)***
-0.126
(-4.358)*
5 A In (TGX/POP) 0.057
(1.970)**
0.316
(2.093)**
-0.205
(-2.898)*
6 A In (TGX/GDP) 0.061
(3.562)*
0.238
(2.859)*
-0.308
(-5.092)*
The numbers in parentheses are the values o f the estimated t-statistic.
*. ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Critical values in level at 1%. 5% and 10% are-2 .618 ,-1 .948 ,-1 .619  respectively. 
P  is the GDP elasticity, y  is the value of the ECT coefficient.
The results show that there is a short-run relationship in all the versions with 
respect to real GDP. We reach this conclusion because the signs for ECT,_, are
negative, and their coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Also this 
result is in agreement with the economic theory. The results also show that the 
short-run coefficients of GDP (GDP elasticity) are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance.
: for more results from tests see appendix (8)
7.2.2 Error Correction Model including two dummies with Real Total GDP
In this section we rewrite the six versions of Wagner’s law with two dummy 
variables to test the effect of these dummies on the relationship in the short-run. In 
this ease the error correction model is given by the following equations:
Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.8)
A In TGX, = a x + /3X A In GDP, + yxECT,_x + A]Dumi + SxDum2 + u lt
Pryor model: (7.9)
A in TGXC, -cx, + j3^  A\r\ GDP, +y^ECTl_l + A1Duml + S2Dum2 + u 2/
Goff man model: (7.10)
A ln T G X , = + /? 3A ln  G D P/ POPl + y}ECT,^ + A7tDumx + S liDuin-l + u2,
Musgrave model: (7.11)
A In TGX / GDP, -  a ,  + /?4A In GDP I POP, + y^ECTt_x + AADumx + SADum2 + 
Gupta model: (7.12)
A In TGX / POP, = a 5 + J85 A In GDP I POP, + y5ECT,_{ + AsDum{ + S5Dum2 + u5f 
Mann model: (7.13)
A In T G X  / G D P ,  -  a b + f i bA In G D P , + ybECTt_x + AbDumx + SbDiun2 + u bt
The results for error correction residual coefficients based on the cointegration test 
results are presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 in chapter six. Now, we can see the 
results for the error correction model in Table 7.2 below'.
' -Please refer to the appendix (8) for the results of individual version.
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Fable 7.2 Error Correction Model results with real total GDP and included
Dummies
Dependent variable a fi r A S
1A lnT G X 0.146
(1.79)***
-0.307
(-3.34)*
0.385
(2.31)**
-0.042
(-0.49)
-0.078
(-1.28)
2 A In TGXC 0.130
(4.00)*
-0.131
(-3.73)*
0.236
(3.58)*
-0.015
(-0.45)
-0.069
(-2.83)*
3 A lnTG X 0.183
(2.21)**
-0.132
(-2.42)**
0.226
(1.36)
-0.057
(-0.63)
-0.088
(-1.41)
4 Ain (TGX/GDP) 0.154
(3.32)*
-0.174
(-3.76)*
0.111
(1.20)
-0.053
(-1.05)
-0.083
(-2.33)**
5 A In (TGX/POP) 0.137
(1.69)***
-0.215
(-2.89)*
02.588
(1.59)
-0.054
(-0.60)
-0.070
(-1.14)
6 A In (TGX/GDP) 0.134
(2.87)*
-0.372
(-4.24)*
0.228
(2.40)**
-0.050
(-1.03)
-0.067
(-
1 87)***
The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic 
*. ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Critical \allies m level at 1 lZ  , 5 ‘A  and 10C are -2 .618,-1 .948 ,-1 .619  respectively 
(3 is the n o n -o il GDP e la s t ic ity , y is the coefficients of the ECT 
A is the coefficients of dum 1. d  Is the coefficient of the dum2
The results show that the dummy 1 variable is not important because the 
coefficients were not found to be significant at any level with all six versions of 
Wagner's law. However, the coefficients for dummy 2 were significant in versions
2. 4 and 6.
7.2.3 Error Correction Model with Real non-oil GDP
In this section we report on using the error correction model with real non-oil GDP. 
Gummell (1990) and Manning and Adriacanos (1993) noted that in the absence of a 
long-run relationship or cointegrating relationship between variables it is still of 
interest to examine the short-run linkages between them. The argument is that even 
though a long-run relationship between two macroeconomic variables may not be 
established for a given time period, it is still possible that the variables are causally 
related in the short-run. We estimate the following equations:
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Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.14)
Ain 7T7A, + /?, A \n(nonoilGDPt) + y{ECTt_{ + u u
Pryor model: (7.15)
A In /GAG, = a, + j3, A \n(nonoilGDPl ) + y2ECTt_\ + u2l
Goffman model: (7.16)
A In TGX, = a } + (32A \n{nonoilGDP/ POP,) + y2ECTt_, + u3t 
Musgrave model: (7.17)
A In 7GA / nonoilGDP[ = #4 + /?4A ln(/zo/zo/7GZ)P/ POP,) + yAECTt_{ + uAl 
Gupta model: (7.18)
A In PGA / POP; = + fc&KnnonoilGDP/POP, ) + y5ECTt_, + u5l
Mann model: (7.19)
A In 7’GA / nonoilGDP' = tf() + /?()A ln(/zt»/zo/7GDP,) + ybECTt_x + ubl
The results from estimating the error correction model for real non-oil GDP are
reported4 in Table 7.3.
4 Please refer to the appendix (9) for the results of individual version.
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Table 7.3 Error Correction Model results with real non-oil GDP
Dependent variable a p Y
1 A In TGX 0.036
(1.12)
0.890
(4.23)*
-0.144
(-1.42)
■» A In TGXC 0.076
(4.09)*
0.381
(3.19)*
-0.120
(-2.33)**
3 A In TGX 0.044
(1.38)
0.800
(3.81)*
-0.009
(-0.21)
4 A In (TGX/ nonoil GDP) 0.035
(1.11)
-0.108
(-0.51)
-0.150
(-1.41)
5 A n (TGX/POP) 0.032
( 111)
0.886
(4.14)*
-0.151
(-1.43)
6 A In (TGX/ nonoil GDP) 0.036
(1-12)
-0.109
(-0.51)
-0.144
(-1.42)
- The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic.
*, ** and*** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Critical values in level at 1%, 5% and 10%> are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively 
13  - is the non-oil GDP elasticity. - y is the values of the ECT
The results show that the error correction coefficients in five equations are negative 
and statistically insignificant. Only the coefficient in version (2) was significant at 
the \°/( level. However, the short-run coefficients of the non-oil GDP with respect 
to each variable show that real non-oil GDP has a positive impact in 4 versions and 
all the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. To sum up, four 
versions (No.l, 2, 3, and 5) of Wagner’s law are found to hold for non-oil GDP in 
the case of Libya.
7.2.4 Error Correction Model including two Dummies Variables with Real
non-oil GDP
In this section, before we examine the error correction model with two dummies for 
non-oil GDP, we rewrite the six versions of Wagner’s law with two dummy 
variables. In this case the error correction model is given by the following 
equations:
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Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.14)
A l n T G X ,  =  a { +  / ? , A  ^ ( n o n o i l G D P , ) +  yxECTt_x + A lDum] + S^Dum2 + u u
Pryor model: (7.15)
Goffman model: (7.16)
Vlusgrave model: (7.17)
A  In M X  /  nonoilGDP, =  a x +  (14A  In{nonoilGDPI POP, ) +  y4ECT,_{ +
/ l 4 D w m ,  +  S4Dum2 + u4[
Gupta model: (7.18)
A  In M X  /  POPl = 6i^ + /3^X\n{nonoilGDP I POP,) + y5ECT,_{ + A5Duml 
+ S^Dunu +ip,
Mann model: (7.19)
A  In TGX /  nonoilGDP, =  a 6 +  / ? 6A  l n ( n o n o / / G D / ^ ) +  yGECT, +  AbDumi
+ SbDum2 +  w 6/
The results of the error eorrection model test including two dummy variables are
carry the expected negative sign on all variables but are insignificant. Also, the 
results for the two dummy coefficients were insignificant with all six versions. In 
summary, there was no short-run relationship between government expenditure and 
non-oil gross domestic product when the study includes these two dummies in the
a n a l y s i s
Please refer to the appendix (9) for the results of individual version
presented in Table 7.4 below‘\ The results show the error correction coefficients
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Table 7.4 error correction model results with real non-oil GDP and included
dummies
Dependent variable a p Y A S
1 A In TGX 0.089
(1.05)
-0.167
(-1.34)
0.776
(3.25)*
-0.028
(-0.32)
-0.042
(-0.65)
2 A lnT G X C 0.129
(2.75)*
-0.151
(-2.28)**
0.288
(2.16)*
-0.018
(-0.39)
-0.069
(-1.92)
3 A In TGX 0.125
(1.55)
-0.079
(-0.96)
0.748
(3.19)*
-0.035
(-0.41)
-0.050
(-0.96)
4 Ain (TGX/ nonoil GDP) 0.080
(1.00)
-0.145
(-1.27)
-0.224
(-0.95)
-0.031
(-0.36)
-0.034
(-0.53)
5 A In (TGX/POP) 0.080
(0.99)
-0.146
(-1.27)
0.775
(3.30)*
-0.031
(-0.36)
-0.033
(-0.53)
6 Ain (TGX/ nonoil GDP) 0.089
(1.05)
-0.168
(-1.34)
-0.223
(-0.93)
-0.028
(-0.32)
-0.042
(-0.65)
The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic.
*, ** and*** indicate significance at V'A, 5 (/t and 10%  levels respectively.
C'ritical values in level at l r/<. 5A and \ 0 c/( are -2.618, -1.948, -1.619 respectively. 
fj is the non-oil GDP elasticity, y is the coefficients of the ECT 
A is the coefficients of the duml. d is the coefficients of the dum2
7.3 Granger Causality Tests.
The Granger causality test is used because of its popularity in economic literature 
and, in particular, in these types of studies (Asserey, Ahmad, 1996). According to 
Assercy "one important implication of the Granger Causality theorem is the super 
consistency property that can be used to formulate Granger Causality with 1(1) 
variables” . Since we applied cointegration tests earlier in chapter six and found 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship in most versions of Wagner's law, it is now 
possible to apply causality testing.
If the null hypothesis of cointegration between Yt (government expenditure TGX), 
and X, (gross domestic product GDP) cannot be rejected then the standard Granger
causality test can be employed to examine the causal relationship between the 
senes using the variables in first differences (Mahdavi et al., 1994). Following this
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statement we test the hypothesis that GDP growth, labelled A In GDP causes 
government expenditure, labelled AlnTGX and vice versa, by constructing the
following regression equations:
ni n
A In TGX = a„ + ]T /? A In TGX f , + ^ (AlnGD/%, + «, (7.20)
/=1 f = l
■s r
A In GDP = a {) + ^c)'.Aln GDP, t ;A In Yt_j +u, (7.21)
l = \ ,, = l
Where //, are white-noise series and m, n and s, r is the maximum number of lags.
In subsection 6.4.1 in chapter six the study found that the variables were non 
stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences. The causality literature 
assumes stationary of the time series being examined. Therefore, we will apply 
Granger causality tests using the variables in first differences of the logarithms of 
the variables which are stationary 1(1).
The findings from the Granger causality tests will examine different possibilities: 
(1) neither variable causes the other. In other words, independence is suggested if 
the sets of GDP and TGX coefficients are not statistically significant in both 
regressions. (2) Unidirectional causality from GDP to TGX. That is GDP causes 
TGX, but not vice versa (in this case Wagner's law applies); (3) Unidirectional 
causality from TGX to GDP: that is TGX causes GDP, but not vice versa 
(Keynesian model), (4) GDP and TGX "Granger cause" each other. If (4) is found 
to be true, there is a feedback effect between the two variables (Gujarati, 1995). We 
apply the Granger causality test with total real GDP, and with total real non-oil 
GDP
157
To test whether government expenditure Granger causes gross domestic product, 
this study applies the causality test developed by Granger (1969). In order to 
examine Granger causality involving two variables, the equations are:
7.3.1 Granger Causality Test with Total Real GDP
Peacock-Wiseman model:
A In / ( / X  — (X , + /?! A In TC j X  , + 8 { A In GDPt ; +
(7.22)
Ain GDP, = a 2 + I > :  A In TGX,_, + Y j 81X\nGDPt_j + u 2t
(=i 7=1
Pryor model:
k in
Ain TGXC, = a ,  + 3Aln TGXCt_t + b'3A In GDPf/ +u-
i=i
Ain GDP, = a 4 + Y j fi4A\nTGXC,_l + Y j 84A\nGDPl j^ +w.
7 = 1
Goffman model:
A In 7T7X, = a 5 + J]/?5A ln TGXt t + J^85A\t\(GDP/ POP),_J +u.
/ = !
(7.23)
(7.24)
Mn{GOP/POP), = a b + Y j /J(jM n'iG X l_l + H G D P / P O P )t_j + u(
7 = 1( = 1
Musgrave model: (7.25)
k in
A\n(TGX/GDP\ = a 1 + ^ / ? 7Aln(7’GX/GDP),.i + J^ j S1A\n(GDP/ P°P),_1 +u,
7 = 1
 ^ m
Ain (GDP/POP), = « 8 +2A A In(7'G A '/G D 7,),_, + '£j S„A\n{GDP/POP),^, +n,
158
Cupta model: (1 26)
Ain (TGX/POP), 
A ln(0-DPI POP),
k  I I I
= + ^ / t ,A  \n(TGX / POP)^! + ^& >A ln(G D f7 POP),., + «„
1=1 7=1
k m
= a w + Y J/3nA\n(TGX/POP),_i + Y l SaMn(GDP/POP),.l + u m
lYlann model: (7.27)
k in
Ain (TGX/GDP), = au +YJf t A ]n(TGXlGDP),-, + TjSnAlnGDPi-j +
i =  1 7 = 1
k in
Ain GDP, = a r_ + ^ / ? I2A ln(7GX/G’DP),_( + ^ £ 12Aln GDPt_j + w12,
, = l 7=1
The results from the standard Granger causality tests for the six versions of 
Wagner’s Law with total real GDP are shown6 in Table 7.5 below.
The empirical results in this study the first step for statistical results for real total 
G D I 3 a s  f o l l o w s .  W e  f i n d  unidirectional causality from gross domestic product (In 
GDP) to government expenditure (In TGX) with version No.l because the 
hypothesis has rejected the causality between the variable and is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Consequently, this version of Wagner’s Law (No.l) is 
found to support Wagner’s hypothesis.
l h e  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  f o u n d  that the unidirectional causality runs from gross domestic 
product (In GDP) to government expenditure on consumption (In TGXC). This is 
for version (No.2) of Wagner's law because the results indicate that there is 
causality to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level. This shows support the
Wagner's Law
6 - Please refer to the appendix (11) for the causality results.
159
Table 7.5 Results of Granger Causality Tests for Total Real GDP
version Hypothesis lag P-value Decision Conclusion
(1,1) H (): In GDP docs not cause In 
TGX
l 0.063 Reject H () at 10% In GDP ----->• In TGX
U.2) l l (): In TGX docs not cause In 
GDP
1 0.214 Accept H 0 In TGX In GDP
(2,1) H (): In GDP docs not cause In 
TGXC
l 0.060 Reject H 0 at 10%- In GDP ----->  In TGXC
(2,2) H (): In TGXC docs not cause 
In GDP
1 0.782 Accept H 0 In TGXC - ^ >  In GDP
(3,1 ) H ,, In GDP/POP docs not 
cause In TGX
1 0.134 Accept H () In GDP/POP In TGX
(3,2) H (): In TGX docs not cause In 
GDP/POP
1 0.528 Accept H() In TGX In GDP/POP
(4,1) H (): In GDP/POP does not 
cause In TGX/GDP
4 0.00 Reject H0 at 5% In GDP/POP----->  In TGX/GDP
(4,2) H (): In TGX/GDP does not 
cause In GDP/POP
4 0.185 Accept H0 In TGX/GDP In GDP/POP
(5.1) H(): In GDP/POP docs not 
cause In TGX/POP
1 0.052 Reject H 0 at 10% In GDP/POP — >  In TGX/POP
(5, h I I (). In TGX/POP docs not 
cause In GDP/POP
1 0.960 Accept H () In TGX/POP 1" GDP/POP
(6.1) H (): In GDP docs not cause In 
TGX/GDP
4 0.00 Reject H0 at 5% In GDP ----->  In TGX/GDP
(6.2) H„: In TGX/GDP docs not 
cause In GDP
4 0.286 Accept 5% In TGX/GDP In GDP
We using Akaikc’s Information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) for the chosen lag
>  Unidirectional causality Non causality
Also, from the Table 7.5 above it could be conclude more results. In the case of 
version (No.3), we run the standard causality test between the variables and can 
report that there is no causality running from per capita (In GDP/POP) and 
government expenditure (In TGX). This does not indicate the direction of causality 
between the variables. By looking at the probability values we conclude that the
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standard Granger causality test for this version of Wagner's Law indicates that there 
is no causality between the two variables because the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis is more than 5% level.
After running the standard Granger causality test between the variables for version 
(No.4) among the variables the results indicates that there is unidirectional causality 
which runs from per capita (In GDP/POP) to government expenditure in real gross 
domestic product (In TGXGDP) because the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis is less than the 5% level. This version also shows support for Wagner's 
Law.
The results for version 5 of Wagner's law indicate that there is unidirectional 
causality that runs from per capita (GDP/POP) to the per capita government 
expenditure (TGX/POP). We could establish Granger causality between the 
GDP/POP, TGX/POP because the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is less 
than the 10% level. This version also shows support for Wagner's Law.
In the last Wagner's Law version (No.6) with real total GDP. The causality is 
hypothesised to run from gross domestic product (In GDP) to the real total 
government expenditure in real gross domestic product (In TGX/GDP). In other 
words, the hypothesis is that (In GDP) causes the (In TGX/GDP). The test is carried 
out and the results showed unidirectional causality which run from (GDP) to 
(TGX/GDP), because the hypothesis has been rejected at the 5% level. This 
version is also supports Wagner’s hypothesis.
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Variables
The following Granger causality test includes two dummy variables. In order to 
investigate the effects of the two dummies variables the equations are rewritten as 
follows:
Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.22)
k m
A In TGX r — cxx + H P  ,A In TGX l _ i  + ^  A,A In GDPt_j + AxDumx + yxDum2 + uXl
/ = l ./ = l
7.3.2 Granger Causality Test with Total Real GDP including two Dummies
k
A In GDP = + ^ / ? :A!n TGX,
! =  \
+ 2 ] A In GDPl_j + A^Dumx + y2Dum2+ u 2l
7 =  1
Pryor model: (7.23)
k hi
A In TGXC, -  /^A In T G X C ^  A'^ A In GDPt_j + A2Dumx + y2Dum2 + m3,
< =  1 7 =  1
k in
Ain GDPt -  a 4 + ^T/?4 A In TGXC, ^  A4A In GDPI_J + A4Dumx + y 4Dum2 + u 4l
: I /■-1
Goffnian model: (7.24)
k n;
A In /GX{ -  A In TGXf_l + A5A ln((/D/V POP)t_j + A5Dumx + y5Dum2 + m5/
( =  1 7 =  1
k in
A i n  {GDP I POP) j -  a h +  ^ / ? 6A  In TGXl_i + ^ A 6A l n ( G D P  / POP),_j + AbDumx
, =  l 7 =  1
+ y(Dum2 + ubt
Musgrave model: (7.25)
k in
Ain (TCX/GDP\ = cx1 + £ / ? 7Aln(7'GA'/GD/>),_i + ^<?,Aln(G£>/>//W,),_J +
l =  1 7 =  1
A-jDumx + y1Dum1 +w7,
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k m
Ain (GDP/POP), = as + Y j fisA\n(TGX/GDP)l^ + '^ S tA\n(GDP/POP)l_J
/ = ! 7 = 1
+ A v,Dum[ + yHDum2 + uHl
Gupta model: (7.26)
k in
Ain (TGX/POP\ = a „  + £ # )Aln(7’GX//>0/’ ),_j + Y JS^A\n(GDP/POP),^
, = l 7=1
+ Al)Dum] + yi)Dum2 +u9l
k m
Ain {GDP/POP), = a ni + ' £ f i llA\n{TGX/POP),_l + ' £ S l0Aln{GDP/POP),_J
i = I 7 = 1
+ AU)Dum] + y H)Dum, + u n)l
Mann model: (7.27)
k in
Ain (TGX/GDP), = a u + £ / J nAln (TGX/GDP)^ + £<JMAlnGD/%y
/ = 1 7 = 1
+ AnDuni\ + yuDum2 +w,„
k in
A in GDPf -  a r +'^Jf3r A\n(TGX/GDP)i i + ^ S]2A in GDPt_j + A]2Dw?i\
i , i
+ ,Dum^  + uri
Table 7.6 below presents the results of Granger causality testing with two dummy 
variables for the six versions of Wagner’s Law with total real GDP7. The results 
from Table 7.6 indicate that there exists bidirectional (feedback) causality between 
gross domestic product (GDP) and government expenditure (TGX) in one lag 
length in version one, that is, In GDP <-> In TGX. The null hypothesis that GDP 
does not cause TGX, alternatively, TGX does not Granger causes GDP is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance.
7 - Please refer to the appendix (11) for the causality results when included two dummies
Table 7.6 Results of Granger Causality Tests with two Dummies for Total Real
GDP
version Hypothesis lag P-value Decision Conclusion
( U ) H (): In GDP does not cause In 
TGX
1 0.010 Reject H 0 at 5% In GDP ----->  In TGX
(1.2) H (): In TGX does not cause In 
GDP
1 0.036 Reject H () at 5% In TGX ----->  In G DP
i l l  i II (). In GDP does not cause In 
TGXC
1 0.037 Reject H () at 5'/r In GDP ----->  In TGXC
(2.2) H () ■ In TGXC does not cause In 
GDP
1 0.396 Accept H0 In TGXC In GDP
(3.1) H (): In GDP/POP does not cause 
In TGX
1 0.900 Accept H 0 In GDP/POP In TGX
(3 2) H (): In TGX does not cause In 
GDP/POP
1 0.436 Accept H () In TGX In GDP/POP
(4.1) I I (): In GDP/POP does not cause 
In TGX/CDP
4 0.023 Reject H () at 5 % In GDP/POP -----►  In TGX/GDP
(4.2) H (): In TGX/GDP docs not cause 
In GDP/POP
4 0.0002 Reject H 0 at I % In TGX/GDP----->  In GDP/POP
(5.1) H (): In GDP/POP does not cause 
In TGX/POP
1 0.589 Accept H 0 In GDP/POP In TGX/POP
(5.1) H (): In TGX/POP does not cause 
In GDP/POP
1 0.156 Accept H () In TGX/POP In GDP/POP
(0.1 1 II (l In GDP docs no! cause In 
TGX/GDP
1 0 006 Reject H0 at 1' / In GDP -----►  In TGX/GDP
(6.2) H (): In TGX/GDP does not cause 
In GDP
1 0.0004 Reject H 0 at 1 % In TGX/GDP — >  Ln GDP
We using Akaikc's Information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) for the chosen lag 
lengths.
Unidirectional causality Non causality
Also, it can be seen from Table 7.6 above more results, for the version 2 of 
Wagner’s law we reject the null hypothesis that gross domestic product (In GDP) 
does not Granger cause government expenditure on consumption (In TGXC) at the 
5% level of significance. However, we can not reject the null hypothesis that
g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  o n  c o n s u m p t i o n  ( I n  T G X C )  d o e s  n o t  G r a n g e r  c a u s e  g r o s s
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domestic product (In GDP) at any levels. We therefore, conclude that a one way 
causality relationship exists which flows from GDP to TGXC.
The results are shown that there is no causality in any direction between GDP and
government expenditure in the third version, because we accept the null hypothesis. 
Neither economic growth leads government expenditure to growth (as opposed to 
Wagner’s law) or government expenditure leads economy to growth (as opposed to 
Keynesian hypothesis).
In addition, the results indicate that there is a bidirectional Granger causality or 
feedback between government expenditure and gross domestic product, that is 
(GDP/POP «-> TGX/GDP) in the version 4. this is because the study reject the null 
hypothesis at level 5% level of significance that GDP/POP does not Granger cause 
TGX/GDP and the study reject the other null hypothesis at the 1% level of 
significance that TGX/GDP does not Granger cause GDP/POP.
In the fifth model the results in Table 7.6 shows that the null hypothesis that In 
GDP/POP does not Granger cause In TGX/POP and cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level for one lag (p-value: 0.589), and the null hypothesis that In TGX/POP does 
no! Granger cause In GDP/POP cannot be rejected at the 5% level for one lag (p- 
value: 0.156). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no causality relationship 
between these variables for this version.
The results for version 6 of Wagner’s law are also displayed in Table 7.6. The 
results indicate that Granger causality runs in both directions that is; there is 
bidirectional causality or feedback between GDP and TGX/GDP. The empirical 
investigation results revealed that causality ran from GDP to TGX/GDP in the first
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hypothesis at the 1% level so we conclude that there is evidence to support 
Wagner’s law. Also, we reject the null hypothesis that TGX/GDP does not Granger 
cause GDP at the 1% level. This result therefore shows support for the Keynesian 
hypothesis.
7.3.3 Granger Causality Test with Total Real non-oil GDP.
The Granger causality test helps in determining the direction of causality between 
the variables included in the model. The variables in this case are real total 
government expenditure (TGX), real total government expenditure on consumption 
(TGXC), per capita government expenditure (TGX/POP), and real total government 
expenditure in real gross domestic product (TGX/GDP). Real total non-oil GDP 
and per capita non-oil GDP will also be included. Since the two series are 
integrated of order one 1(1). the Granger causality test is applied using the first 
differences of the two variables involved as follows:
Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.28)
k in
Ain TGX, = <2 , + ^  A In T G X ^ SxX\r\{nonoilGDP,_,) + uu
i = l 7 = 1
k hi
Ain (nonoilGDP,) = <2, + ^  /T A In TGX, , + ^ 6 2X\n(nonoilGDP,_ ,) + u2l
/ = I 7 = 1
Pryor model: (7.29)
k in
A In TGXC, — cc2 + A In TGXC,_i + ^  \n(nonoilGDPt_ f) -I- w3,
< = l 7 = 1
k in
XlninonoilGDP, ) = a 4 + ^ / ? 4A ln TGXC,_t + A \n(nonoilGDP,_,) + u4l
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Goffman model: (7.30)
Ain TGX, = a 5 + A In T G X S 5 A \n(nonoilGDP/ POP,_j) + m.
7 = 1
A W
A In{nonoilGDP! POP,) = a b + ^  /?6 A In TGXt_i + ^  £6A In{nonoilGDP! POPt_j ) + u(
/=i 7 = 1
Musgrave model: (7.31)
k in
A\nTGX! n o n o ilG D ^ -^  + ^fyA lnTG X /nonoilG D fc  + '^ S 1A\n{nonoilGDB POPt_).)
7 = 1
+ u74/
A\n{nonoilGDP / POP,) = + ^ / ? 8A lnrG X  ! nonoilGDP, + ^j3^A\n{nonoilGDP I POP,_t)
7 = 1
Gupta model: (7.32)
7 //
A lnTO X /PO f; = a„ + £/?„Aln TGX I POP,^ + £ £ 9Aln(//oiio;7GZ?P//>OP,_/) + M9,
, = l ./ = l
A \r\{nonoilGDP! P O f)) = or1() + E t f„ A ln  TGX I POP, + ]T <?,„A\n(nonoilGDPI POP,,,)
7=1
Mann model: (7.33)
A In TGX / nonoilGDP, = or,, + 2 >  nAlnTGA / n o n o i l G D P , A,, A In (nonoilGDP,_;)
/ = ! 7 = 1
+  U 1 1/
A \n(nonoilGDP,) = a r + ^T/3r A In TGX / n o n o i l G D P , £12A \n{nonoilGDP,_l ) + u12/
7 = 1
According to the Granger representation theorem, at least one-way causality is 
confirmed if two variables are cointegrated. In this situation the null hypothesis of
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noncausality has been tested using F-statistics for total real non-oil GDP. The 
Granger causality test results for the six versions of Wagner's law are presented8 in 
Table 7.7 below.
After running the standard Granger causality test for version No.l, the study 
concluded that there is unidirectional causality that runs from government 
expenditure (In TGX) to total real non-oil gross domestic product In (non-oil GDP), 
because of the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at 5% level. Thus, this 
version of Wagner’s Law is not valid, which supports the Keynesian proposition.
In the case of version No. 2 of Wagner's law which test the hypothesis for causality 
between the variables, the result in Table 7.7 shows causality running from the real 
total non-oil gross domestic product In (non-oil GDP) to real total government 
expenditure on consumption (In TGXC). Also, the result indicates that there is 
unidirectional causality from In (non-oil GDP) to In TGXC because of the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis at 5% level. So we can conclude that the 
version (No.2) is supporting the Wagner's law for the period of analysis.
Please refer to 'fables in the Appendix (12) for the results.
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Table 7.7 Results of Granger-Causality Tests for Total Real non-oil GDP
version Hypothesis lag P-
value
Decision Conclusion
(1.1) H (): In non-oil GDP does not 
cause In TGX
1 0.829 Accept H 0 In (non-oil GDP) — In TGX
( 1.2) H (): In TGX does not cause In 
non-oil GDP
1 0.044 Reject H () at 5% In TGX ---- >■  In (non-oil GDP)
(2.1) H (): In non-oil GDP does not 
cause In TGXC
4 0.001 Reject H () at 5% In (non-oil GDP)----> In TGXC
(2.2) H (): In TGXC does not cause 
In non-oil GDP
4 0.880 Accept H 0 In TGX \ >  In (non-oil GDP)
th.l) H (): In non-oil GDP/POP 
does not cause In TGX
1 0.948 Accept H () In (non-oil GDP/POP) \ *In TGX
(2.2) H (): In TGX does not cause In 
non-oil GDP/POP
1 0.588 Accept H () In TGX \ >  In (non-oil GDP/POP)
(4.1) H (): In non-oil GDP/POP
does not cause In TGX/non- 
oil GDP.
2 0.011 Reject H() at 5% In (non-oil GDP/POP) ^ In TGX/non-oil GDP
(4.2) H ():In TGX/non-oil GDP
does not cause In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
2 0.130 Accept H 0 In TGX/non-oil GDP \ >In (non-oil GDP/POP)
(5.1) 11 (): In (non-oil GDP/POP) 
dos not cause In TGX/POP
1 0.805 Accept H () In (non-oil G D P / P O P ) I n  TGX/POP
(5.2) 11 (): In TGX/POP does not 
cause In non-oil GDP/POP 1 0.074
Reject H () at 10% In TGX/POP ----> In (non-oilGDP/POP)
lb. 1 ) 11 (): In non-oil GDP does not 
cause In TGX/non-oil GDP.
2 0.006 Reject H 0 at 1 % In (non-oil GDP) — ►  In
TGX/non-oil GDP
(6.2) H (): In TGX/non-oil GDP
does not cause In (non-oil 
GDP)
2 0.104 Accept H () In TGX/non-oil GDP - \ >  In (non-oil GDP)
We u s i i i l ! Akaike's Information enlcrion ( A I C ) and the Sclnvar/ information criterion (SIC) for the chosen lag 
lengths.
>  Unidirectional causality Non causality
As can be seen the results from Table 7.7 above, we run the standard Granger 
causality test lor version No.3 between the real total per capita non-oil GDP In 
(non-oil GDP/POP) and real total government expenditure (In TGX). Result is
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reported in Table 7.7 and indicates that there is no causality that runs from non-oil 
GDP/POP to (TGX).
To reject the null hypothesis for version No.4 of Wagner's Law, the study run the 
standard causality test between real total per capita non-oil GDP In (non-oil 
GDP/POP) and real total government expenditure in real non-oil gross domestic 
product (In TGX/non-oil GDP). The Granger causality result is presented in Table
7.7 and shows that is unidirectional causality running from In (non-oil GDP/POP) 
to (In TGX/ non-oil GDP), because, by looking at the probability values, we can 
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. This version therefore also supports 
Wagner's Law.
The result of Granger causality for version No.5 for non-oil GDP is also shows in 
Table 7.7. The causality test runs between the per capita government expenditure 
(In TGX/POP) and per capita non-oil gross domestic product In (non-oil 
GDP/POP). The result shows as the standard unidirectional causality running from 
In TGX/POP) to In (non-oil GDP/POP because the probability value shows 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level. This version therefore shows 
support for the Keynesian hypothesis.
In the last version of Wagner's law, with respect to non-oil GDP, we run the 
standard Granger causality test between the non-oil gross domestic product In (non- 
oil GDP) and the real total government expenditure in real non-oil gross domestic 
product (In TGX/non-oil GDP). Again the results are shows in table 7.7 and 
demonstrate a unidirectional causality which running from non-oil GDP to 
TGX/non-oil GDP, because the probability values allow us to reject the null
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hypothesis at the 5% level. We can therefore say that this version of Wagner's law 
is valid and Wagner's hypothesis is supported.
We seat that the Keynesian proposition is supported by versions No.l and No. 5 for 
non-oil GDP. When the causality runs from government expenditure to non-oil 
GDP, this means that the government is heavily spending on investment 
infrastructure to accelerate the process of development. This type of government 
expenditure is expected to cause an increase in its national income.
7.3.4 Granger Causality Test with Total Real non-oil GDP including two
Dummies Variables.
The following Granger causality test includes two dummies variables; and as such 
we can now rewrite the equations as follows.
Peacock-Wiseman model: (7.34)
k m
Ain TGX. -  o r ,  + y /?, A 1 n TGX, + ^  SiA\n(nonoilGDPl_l.) + AlDumi + y]Dum  ^ +u
< = l 7 = 1
k in
A In(nonoilGDPl ) = a 2 + ^  /32 A In TGXt_t + S2A IninonoilGDP^j) + A2Dum{
i =1 7=1
+ y^Dum-, + u2l
Pryor model: (7.35)
k in
A In TGXC, = ct2 + ^  A In TGXCl_j + ^  A \x\{nonoilGDP,_ t) + A2Dum{
/ =l  7 =  1
+ y^Dum  ^ + u2t
k in
A \n{non()ilGDPl ) = a A + ^  /?4 A In T G X C A4A \n(nonoilGDPl_/) + A4Dum{
/=! /=1
-t y  J ) i t u i , +- u 4l
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Goff man model: (7.36)
AlnTGX, = a 5 + ^ / ? 5Aln PGX,_, + ^ S 5 A \n(nonoilGDP / P O P , ) + A5Dum{
/=i 7 = 1
+ y5Dum~, + a
A In (non -  oilGDP/ POP,) = a b + ^ / ? ()A ln7GXf_( + ^ £ 6Aln(non -oilG D P/ POP^,)
,=l 7=1
+ AbDum{ + ybDum2 + ubt
Musgrave model: (7.37)
X\nTGX/nonoilGDp=a, + ^ /?,A ln 7(7X /mmoilGD? , + ]T & A ln (nonoilGDF PDF; ,)
/ = l
+ A1Dun\ + y1Dum1 +u1At
7 = 1
A \n(nonoilGDP/ POP,) = cir8 + ^ / ? 8 A lnPGX / nonoi\GDPt_l + /?8A \n(nonoilGDP/ POP,_; )
i=i
+ A^ Dum^  + y^Dunu + G8,
7=1
Gupta model: (7.38)
Aln/G X/PO P, = cr9 + £ A In 7G X /P G /V  + ^ ^ 9Aln(no/2o//GDP/PO/,/_y) + ^DMm1
(=i 7 = 1
+ y^Dum-, + ul
MniiumoilGDP/POP) = a,„ + £/?HIAln TGX I POPlt + Y J5 [„X\n(nonoHGDP I POP, ,)
/ --1
+ An)Dumx + y H)Di(m2 + ul0,
7 = 1
Mann model: (7.39)
A In TGX / nonoilGDP, = a u + , A In PGX / nonoilGDPl_j + , A ln(/i6>/zo//GDP,_/)
i=i
+ /111Dm/»1 + yuDiun-) + uu,
7 = 1
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A \n(ii()iwilGDPl )
k in
A InTGX /nonoilGDPl_j + ^ Sv k\x\{nonoilGDPt_j)
( = 1 7 = 1
+ Ar Dum] + y r Dw?u + m, 2/
We use the standard Granger causality tests for the six versions of Wagner’s Law 
for total real non-oil GDP with two dummies variables. Also, from Table 7.8 we 
can present the results9.
The results show that there is no causality in any direction between the variables for 
versions 1, 3 and 5. This means there is no evidence to supports Wagner’s law or 
the Keynesian hypothesis in these versions.
Also, the results show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that In non-oil GDP 
does not cause In TGXC at the V/r level for 4 lag (p-value: 0.270). However, 
causality from government expenditure on consumption to non-oil gross domestic 
product is observed because the null hypothesis that In TGXC that does not 
Granger cause In non-oil GDP is rejected at the 1% level. This means there is 
unidirectional causality running from TGXC to non-oil GDP. This supports the 
Keynesian view that causality runs from government expenditure to growth.
In the fourth version of Wagner’s law, the null hypothesis that In (non-oil 
GDP/POP) does not Granger cause In TGX/non-oil GDP, cannot be rejected 
because we accept this hypothesis at the 5% level. There is therefore no Granger 
causality between the variables. On the other hand, the study reject the null 
hypothesis that In TGX/non-oil GDP does not Granger cause In (non-oil GDP/POP) 
at the 5% level. This result gives support for the Keynesian hypothesis because
- Please refer to the appendix (12) for the results
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there is unidirectional causality which runs in one way from TGX/non-oil GDP to 
non-oil GDP/POP.
The results also indicate that unidirectional causality exists between In non-oil GDP 
and In TGX/non-oil GDP because the null hypothesis that In (non-oil GDP) does 
not cause In TGX/non-oil GDP and cannot be rejected at any level. Moreover, we 
can reject the second null hypothesis that In TGX/non-oil GDP does not cause In 
non-oil GDP at the 1% level. This means that causality runs from In TGX/non-oil 
GDP to In non-oil GDP and in this case, the results also support the Keynesian 
hypothesis.
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Table 7.8 Results of Granger-Causality Tests with two dummies variables for
Total Real non-oil GDP
version Hypothesis lag P-value Decision conclusion
(1 I) H (). In (non-oil GDP) does 
not cause In TGX
I 0.241 Accept H 0 In (non-oil GDP \ *  In TGX
(1.2) H (): In TGX does not 
cause In ( non-oil GDP)
1 0.370 Accept H 0 In TGX \ >  In (non-oil GDP)
(2.1) H (): In (non-oil GDP) does 
not cause In TGXC
4 0.270 Accept H 0 In (non-oil GDP) \ >  In TGXC
(2.2) H (): In TGXC does not 
cause In (non-oil GDP)
4 0.0002 Reject H () at 1% In TGX --- ►  In (non-oil GDP)
(3.1) H (): In (non-oil GDP/POP) 
does not cause In TGX
2 0.408 Accept H 0 In (non-oil G D P/PO P)A ^- In
TGX
(3.2) H (): In TGX does not
cause In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
2 0.135 Accept H 0 In TGX In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
(4.1) H (): In (non-oil GDP/POP)
docs not cause In 
TGX/non-oil GDP.
2 0.399 Accept H 0 In (non-oil GDP/POP) \ *  In 
TGX/non-oil GDP
(4.2) I I (): In TGX/non-oil GDP
does not cause In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
2 0.018 Reject H () at 5% In TGX/non-oil GDP — ►  In 
( non-oil GDP/POP)
(5.1) H 0 : In (non-oil GDP/POP) 
dos not cause In TGX/POP
2 0.403 Accept H 0 In (non-oil GDP/POP) In 
TGX/POP
(5.2) H (): In TGX/POP does not
cause In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
2 0.178 Accept H 0 In TGX/POP In (non-oil 
GDP/POP)
(6.1)
(6.2)
H (): In (non-oil GDP) does
not cause In TGX/non-oil 
GDP.
H 0 : In TGX/non-oil GDP
does not cause In (non-oil 
GDP)
2
2
0.329
0.005
Accept H 0 
Reject H 0 at 1 %
In (non-oil GDP) \  * In 
TGX/non-oil GDP
In TGX/non-oil GDP-----►  In
( non-oil GDP)
We using Akaike's Information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC) for the chosen lag
lengths.
>  Unidirectional causality A - >  Non causality
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In general, in this section we have studied the possibility of Granger causality 
between In GDP (for both total real GDP and non-oil GDP) and In TGX. We have 
reported the Granger causality test results obtained by the vector auto regression 
(VAR) approach applied to the Libyan economy data. We need to check if evidence 
of causality is observed. It can run from gross domestic product (GDP and non-oil 
GDP) to government expenditure (TGX) (Wagner's Law), or from government 
expenditure (TGX) to (GDP and non-oil GDP) (the Keynesian hypothesis).
We know the Granger causality test is very sensitive to the number of lags included 
in the regression. We have experimented with a lag period up to 4 lag lengths, using 
Akaike’s Information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion 
(SIC)10, following Afxentiou and Serletis (1992) and Demirbas (1999).
The null hypothesis of non causality has been tested using (P-value) statistics to 
infer the direction of the causality relationship amongst the variables. We can be 
summarised of results in Table 7.9.
7.3.5 Summary of Results of the Granger Causality tests without Dummies
Variables.
10 - this study uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) in selecting the optimal order of lags in 
the estimations, and adopted the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) as a supplementary 
measure to the AIC. Importantly, the causality is sensitive to the number o f lagged terms 
included (Khan and Leng, 1997.).
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Table 7.9 Summary of Results of Granger-Causality for Total Real GDP and non-Oil
Conclusion
Total real G D P Total real non-oil G D P
1 In GDP — > In TGX In TGX — Mn (non-oil GDP)
2 In GDP — Hn TGXC In (non-oil GDP)— ►  In TGXC
3 No causality No causality
4 In GDP/POP — ►  In TGX/GDP In (non-oil GDP/POP) — > In TGX /non-oil GDP
5 In GDP/POP — ►  In TGX/POP In TGX/POP — >ln (non-oil GDP/POP)
6 In GDP — > In TGX/GDP In (non-oil GDP)— > In TGX/ non-oil GDP
----->• This is unidirectional causality
From the Table 7.9 above it eould be conclude that the majority of the results have 
been supported Wagner’s law 8 out of 12 results, and 2 out of 12 supports Keynes 
hypothesis and there is no support for either Wagner’s law or Keynesian hypothesis 
for 2 versions.
7.3.6 Summary of the Results of Granger Causality with Dummies Variables.
In this section we summarised the results when the study used two dummy 
variables to test for Granger causality. We report the Granger causality test results 
obtained by using the vector auto regression (VAR) approach for the Libyan 
economy data in Table 7.10 below.
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Table 7.10 Summary of Results of Granger-Causality for Total Real GDP and non-
Oil GDP with two dummies variables
Conclusion
Total real GDP Total real non-oil GDP
1 In GDP <-+  In TGX No causality
2 In GDP — > In TGXC In TGXC— ►  In (non-oil GDP)
2 No causality No causality
4 In GDP/POP <—Mn TGX/GDP In TGX/ non-oil GDP— > In (non-oil GDP/POP
5 No causality No causality
6 In GDP In TGX/GDP In TGX/ non-oil GDP— ►  In (non-oil GDP)
This is unidirectional causality.
There is feedback causality between the two variables
According to the results obtained from the equations as stated earlier in Tables 7.6 
and 7.8, the standard causality between the variables in terms of the real total GDP 
and real total non-oil GDP can be summarised in Table 7.10 above. The results has 
been shown that one out of 12 tests supports Wagner’s law and 3 out of 12 tests 
supports Keynes hypothesis also, 3 out of tests has been supported both Wagner 
and Keynes, and 5 versions no support for either Wagner’s law or Keynesian 
hypothesis .
7.4 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the relationship in the short-run for the 
six versions of Wagner’s law on Libyan economy. The study used the Granger 
causality test to examine these relationships. The error correction model (ECM) 
was estimated in order to capture the short-run relationship between the 
government expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP and non-oil GDP)
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The study examined the Granger causality test for total real GDP and total real non­
oil GDP, the tests showed that 9 out of 24 tests support Wagner’s law and 5 out of 
tests has been supported Keynes hypothesis, also 3 out of 24 tests support both 
Wagner and Keynes lastly, 7 out of 24 tests has been supported neither Wagner nor 
Keynes.
These are mixed results. The tests without dummies clearly support Wagner’s law 
see Table 7.9, but the tests with dummies show limited support for Keynes (3 out of 
12) or bidirectional causality (3out of 12) see Table 7.10. In general, Wagner’s law 
appears to have more empirical support than Keynes hypothesis.
This Chapter analysed the short-run relationship between GDP and government 
expenditure for six versions of Wagner’s law. The next Chapter will discuss the 
model of relationship between the Libyan government expenditure on six sectors 
and gross domestic product: applying of Wagner’s law.
179
CHAPTER EIGHT
Relationship between Government Functional Expenditure and Gross
Domestic Product
8.1 Introduction
In the last few decades, the academic literature dealing with explanations for 
government expenditure and economic growth has expanded greatly and new theories 
have appeared at a fast rate. Many theoretical studies have attempted to explain the 
sources of government growth, while others have tried to test these explanations 
empirically. As far as empirical research on public expenditure growth is concerned, 
most studies have concentrated on Western developed countries (see Henrekson, 1992; 
Gemmell, 1993; Albatel, 2000; AL-Hakami, 2002; Chiung 2006).
On the empirical side, a few studies have tried linking particular components of 
government expenditure to economic growth. Most of these attempts seem to be 
deficient in not having a rigorous theoretical framework (Diamond, 1989). The 
expenditure composition issue has been investigated by several authors using theoretical 
models focused on the productivity of public expenditure in the developed countries 
(Aschauer, 1989; Morrison and Schwartz, 1991). Other studies focus on the productivity 
of government expenditure in developing countries (Devarajan et al, 1996). The idea of 
this chapter is to analyse government functional expenditure on six sectors in the 
government’s desire to satisfy the social needs of its people and to implement its long­
term goals.
The study focuses on growth because as growth is one of the objectives of a 
government, it is useful to know the contribution of different types of expenditure to this 
objective as a means of assessing the cost of pursuing other goods; gross domestic
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product is easier to measure than some of the other objectives of government (Devarajan 
et al, 1996). Although the public sector played an important role during the development 
procedure, few studies have been devoted to the time pattern growth of government 
expenditure in developing countries. Most empirical studies attempting to explain the 
growth of government expenditure in those countries are based on a cross-section 
approach.
In this chapter, I will attempt to explain the growth within Libyan government spending 
through functional expenditure in those sectors. Section 8.2 discusses the econometric 
model for government functional expenditure within the six sectors. The study tests 
long-run and short-run equilibrium in section 8.3 using econometric techniques with two 
dummy variables. Section 8.4 presents the re-estimation without dummies using 
econometric techniques, and the summary is presented in section 8.5.
8.2 Econometric Model for Functional Expenditure
In this chapter, I used the same approach which was used in chapters six and seven. 
Therefore we will not discuss the methodology in detail. As Muscatelli and Hum (1995) 
have pointed out “there is an increasing trend for researchers to adopt dummy and proxy 
variables to explain possible structural breaks in the long-run relationship between a 
number of economic series” . In the Libyan case, there are several extraordinary events 
which may cause structural breaks in the long-run relationship between the variables in 
question. For this reason, we will include two dummy variables in our functional 
expenditure regressions. To analyse the government functional expenditure, the study 
uses annual data1 over the period 1962-2005 for the six sectors. To estimate the impact
1 The dala are provided by ihe General Planning Council (2000), Report of Libyan Economic and Social Indicators 
1962-2000. and Central Bank of Libya report (2005)
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of gross domestic product on government expenditure, the government functional 
expenditure is based on the idea that government expenditure is a function of the GDP. 
Two dummy variables are included to capture special events over the study period. In 
the usual notation, the government functional expenditure relationship can be written as
follows:
TGX = /{GDP, DUM„DUM2) (8.1)
Where:
i = 1, 2,3,4,5 and 6
TGX jiw is the i i h  government functional group in real terms (education, health,
agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, and transportation and 
communication).
GDP= gross domestic product in real terms.
DUM1 = dummy variable used to assess the impact of the discovery of oil on economic 
growth (Dum=l during the stable period from 1969-2005 and zero 
otherwise.)
DUM2= dummy variable used to capture the effects of the UN sanctions on the Libyan 
economy (Dum= zero during 1969-1984 and 2004-2005 when there were 
no sanctions, and one when there was sanctions from 1985-2003)
Following the approach used in chapter six, the study uses the logarithm of the variables 
in real terms; so the parameters measure the elasticity of each of the variables in the 
function. In terms of computing these elasticities, the study uses the most popular 
formulation of Wagner's law given in the following equation:
In TGX fun -  u  + J3 In G D P  + yDuml + a D luu0 -t- u/ (8.2)
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The separate regressions for the six categories of functional government expenditure, for
the case of Libya (1962-2005) are as follows:
In TGXAGR = or, + /?, In GDP + AtDuml +S\Dum2 + e u (8.3)
In TGXEDU = cr, + ^  In GDP + A2Dumx + S2Dum2 + £2l (8.4)
In TGXHEA = a } + /32 In GDP + AyDumx + 83Dum2 + e 3l (8.5)
In TGXH & P = a x + /?4 In GDP + A+Dum] + SADum2 + eAt (8.6)
In TGXMAN = a 5 + /J5 In GDP + A3Dumx + S5Dum2 + e 5l (8.7)
In TGXT &  C  = or() + j3b In GDP + AbDuml + S6Dum2 + £b[ (8 .8 )
Where
TGXEDU= real government expenditure on education2 
TGXHEA= real government expenditure on health 
TGXAGR= real government expenditure on agriculture
TGXH&P= real government expenditure on housing and public utilities
TGXMAN= real government expenditure on manufacturing
TGXT&C= real government expenditure on transportation and communication
l he methodology in this chapter is as follows: in the first step the study analyses the 
empirical results of a cointegration test and whether it can be applied to determine the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the variables or not. The analysis is based 
on Engle and Granger (1987) methods for modelling the relationship between 
cointegrated variables. The empirical analysis of a cointegration test includes ADF unit 
root tests in order to know which one of these variables used in all six categories of 
Wagner's law is stationary.
all variables expressed in million LDs
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In the second step, the study uses an error correction model estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS), to determine the existence of a short-run relationship between the 
variables in the government functional expenditure regression. The ECM uses the 
residuals from the estimated cointegrating regression for all equations.
In the final step, we adopt Granger causality tests to determine the direction of the 
causality between the variables in the government functional expenditure regressions. If 
cointegration exists we know that causality should exist in at least one direction in the 
1( 1 ) variables. The direction of causality between GDP and government functional 
expenditure is analysed using two dummy variables
8.3 Estimation of Government Functional Expenditure with two Dummies
Variables.
In this section the study includes the functional expenditure classification relating to 
government spending in the economic sectors. Our available data for government 
expenditure includes data for overall government expenditure and (six) compositional 
expenditures. Figure 1.1 in Chapter one shows the six categories for government 
expenditure: TGXEDU (education), TGXHE (health), TGXAGR (agriculture), TGXHOU 
(housing and public utilities), TGXMAN (manufacturing), and TGXTRA (transportation 
and communication), and other spending for economic services. Since these categories 
have some importance in GDP, it is very important to analyse their relationship with the 
growth of gross domestic product according to Wagner’s law.
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8.3.1 Testing for Stationarity
8.3.1.1 Graphs for Six Categories
The first technique which can be used to check stationarity of the variables is to graph 
the series. The graphs of these variables in logarithm for the six categories, all the 
variables which we used in the study the Figures are shown as following.
Figure 8.1 Graphs of the Variables for Six Categories
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The graphs indicate that all the variables are stationary in first differences. Therefore, 
the variables seem to be integrated of order one. Now we can check for stationarity 
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests for unit roots.
8.3.1.2 Testing Unit Roots For Six Categories
One of the most important characteristics of a time series variable is its order of 
integration. The study applies the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) tests to test the stationanty of the variables. We test the null hypothesis HO: (3 =0 is
tested against H,: j3,  ^ 0 by comparing the calculated t- ratio of /?, with the critical 
value from tables. If the calculated critical value is less than the t-value, then the null 
hypothesis of the unit root is nonstationary, hence we accept the null hypothesis of a 
unit root.
The results of the ADF and PP tests are presented in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 below. The 
estimation is based on a total of 44 observations for the period 1962 to 2005. The results 
show that all variables (In GDP, In AGR, In EDU, In HEA, In H&P, In MAN, and In 
T&C) are stationary in the first difference. This is because the ADF test and PP test
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statistic is more negative than critical value. Based on the results in these tables we 
reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. That means the variables are integrated of 
order one I( 1 ).
Table 8.1 Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Tests for Six Categories
Variables Level First Difference
Lag
Lengths
Order of 
Integration
In GDP -2.533 -4.604* 1 KD
In AGR -2.639 -6.284* 1 KD
In EDU -3.074 -5.019* 1 KD
In HEA -3.060 -4.576* 1 KD
In H&P -2.641 -3.348** 1 KD
In MAN -2.999 -4.243* 1 Id)
In T&C -1.989 -3.874* 1 HD
* Significant at V'k level
- Critical value in level at 1% is -4.1896. -3.5189 at 5% and -3.1898 at 10%
Table 8.2 Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests for Six Categories
Variables Level First Difference LagLengths
Order of 
Integration
In GDP -3.011 -5.446* 1 HD
In AGR -2.495 -7.807* 1 KD
In EDU -2.617 -5.588* 1 KD
In HEA -2.702 -7.855* 1 KD
In H&P -2.325 -6.049* 1 HD
In MAN -2.616 -6.613* 1 HD
In T&C -1.936 -5.845* 1 KD
* indicate significant at 1 (Z
- Critical value in level at 1% is -4.1896, -3.5189 at 5% and -3.1898 at 10%
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Since the variables are stationary, the next step is to use the Engle and Granger (1987) 
two step method to test for cointegration.
8.3.2 Cointegration test for Six Categories
The study tests the Wagner’s law for cointegration, for functional government 
expenditure using the following type of equation:
In TGX fun = a  + /? In G D P  + ADum, + SDum1 + £ (8.9)
Where, TGX jm is the individual category of government functional expenditure, GDP 
is gross domestic product and £{ is the error term. The cointegration model for the six
categories can be written as follows:
• Agriculture Sector
In T G X A G R  -  + /?, In G D P  + AxD u m x + S iD u m 2 + £ x (8 .10)
• Education Sector
\n T G X E D U  = a 2 + yfr, In G D P  + A2D u m x + S 2D u m 2 + £ 2 (8.11)
• Health Sector
In TG XH EA  = a y + In G D P  + A^Dum^ + S 2D u m 2 + £ 2 (8.12)
• Housing and Public utilities Sector
In T G X H  & P  = a 4 +  /?4 In G D P  + A4D u m { +  S 4D u m 2 + e 4 (8.13)
• Manufacturing Sector
In T G X M A N  = a 5 + In G D P  + A5D u m i + S 5D u m 2 + e 5 (8.14)
• Transportation and Communication
In TGX T & C  = a () + /3() In G D P  + AbDuml + SbDunu + £b (8.15)
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Having concluded from the ADF results that each first differenced time series is 
stationary, i.e it is integrated of order one 1(1 ), the study proceeds to the second step, 
which requires that the two time series be cointegrated. In other words, to examine 
whether or not there exists a long-run relationship between the variables (Miguel, 2000). 
Then we need an estimation of the cointegration regression of the form of equation (8 .8) 
for the individual six sectors.
Engle and Granger (1987) introduced the concept of cointegration, where economic 
variables in the expenditure functions and GDP might reach a long-run equilibrium that 
reflects a stable relationship between them. For stationary variables to be cointegrated, 
they must be integrated of order one 1(1) and the residuals must be stationary 1(0). The 
two-step approach to test for cointegration as proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) is 
used for this.
The null hypothesis of no cointegration between GDP and the functional expenditure 
variables can be rejected if the unit root test of the residuals turns out to be stationary in 
level, 1(0). The cointegration test results for government functional expenditure are
presented in Table 8.3 below'7
3 - for more details see the results in appendix (7).
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Table 8.3 Cointegration Regressions with Dummies for Six Categories
Cointegrating Regression Residual
coefficients
p A s R 2
In TGXAGR=f(ln GDP. Dum ,, Dum 2 ) -0.783
(-4.207*)
1.784
(6.45*)
-0.273
(0.41)
-0.943
(-3.92*)
0.81
In TGXEDU=f(ln GDP, Dum ,, Dum 2) -0.451
(-3.346*)
2.294
(7.48*)
-1.733
(-2.32**)
-0.274
(-W2)
0.80
In TGXHEA=f(ln GDP, Dum ,, Dum 2) -0.516
(-3.136*)
2.557
(8.31*)
1.668
(-2.22**)
-0.167
(-0.62)
0.85
In TGXH&P =f(ln GDP, Dum , ,Dum 2) -0.328
(-2.826*)
1.377
(5.979*)
-0.098
(-0.175)
-0.665
(-3.32*)
0.80
In TGXM AN=f(ln GDP, Dum ,, Dum ) -0.581
(-3.726*)
2.206
(4.598*)
-0.093
(-0.080)
-1.287
(-3.08*)
0.70
n TGXT&C=f(ln GDP. Dum ,, Dum , ) -0.293
(-2.444**)
1.758
(6.436*)
-1.271
(-1.910)
-0.810
(-3.41*)
0.73
* And** indicate significant at 1% and 5 %  levels respectively, for Critical Values of the ADF test. 
- Critical values in level at l c/< and 5 c/< are (-2.618, -1.948) respectively 
-The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic 
(3 -  is the elasticity. A - The coefficients of the duml 
d  - The coefficients of the dum2
The table indicates that there is evidence of a long-run relationship between real gross 
domestic product (GDP) and all the variables in functional expenditure in the case of 
Libya. The results indicate that the ADF test value is greater than the critical t-value for 
all the variables and hence, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected.
The residuals coefficient is negative and significant at 1% for all six relations except the 
relationship between spending on transportation and communication (In T&C) and 
GDP. The results show the residuals for the six categories of functional government 
expenditure are integrated of order zero in their levels and, hence, the two variables are 
cointegrated. For spending on the six categories which the study tested (In TGXAGR, In 
TGXEDU, In TGXHEA, In TGXH&P, In MAN, and In TGXT&C) with real GDP, 
statistics show that the null hypothesis is rejected, which suggests the existence of a 
cointegration relationship and significance at both the 1% and 5% levels.
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Moreover, for the long-run impact, in this test the coefficients of the GDP variable in 
all six relations are found to be positive and significant4. This indicates a positive 
relationship between the variables in the government functional expenditure (education, 
health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication) and real gross domestic product.
Furthermore, in the relevant analysis, the study uses two dummy variables to take into 
account the structural breaks, the first one being the impact of the discovery of oil on the 
economic sector's growth, and the other the effect of UN sanctions on the Libyan 
economy. The estimated value of the coefficients of the two dummy variables show that 
the coefficient of the dummy regarding the UN sanctions is significant in agriculture, 
housing and public utilities, manufacturing, transportation, education and health . This 
implies that there has been a significant effect of the UN sanctions on these economic 
sectors, which means a decrease in the country's expenditure on these sectors in the 
long-run. Also, the results show the coefficients of this dummy as insignificant for 
education and health.
Also, the results had shown that the effect of the discovery the oil on the economic 
sectors because the dummy sign was negative. This means there is a relationship in the 
long-run between the dependent variables in the functional expenditure and GDP. 
Therefore, these sectors contribute to increase the gross domestic product in the long- 
run. This is because the country spent a lot of money on development expenditure for 
these sectors as a result of the oil revenue.
4 - Please refer to appendix (16) for the results of individual equation.
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On the basis of the results, a long-run relationship between the variables (government 
functional expenditure as a dependent variable and GDP as an independent variable) is 
found by using Engle and Granger in two stages. This confirms earlier findings but, 
without evidence of causality, nothing can be said about whether Wagner's or Keynes
hypotheses are valid.
8.3.3 Testing Error Correction Model for Six Categories
According to the Engel and Granger theorem (1987), if two variables are integrated of 
order one 1( 1 ) and the residuals are 1(0 ), this indicates that the two variables are 
cointegrated and must have an ECM representation. In other words, the existence of 
cointegration between a set of economic variables provides a statistical foundation for 
the use of error correction models. We can model the error correction model in the 
following form:
A \n(TGX hlllj) = a () + /?()A In (GDP)  + y()E C T  l_i+A0Duml + S0Dum2 + ut (8.16)
Where A denotes the first difference operator, ECT,_, is the error correction term and 
y 0 the coefficient of the error correction term, which measures the speed of adjustment.
The study will use the six categories of government expenditure to test the ECM in the 
equations as follows:
• Agriculture Sector
Ain(TGXAGR) -  + /3^\n{GDP) + y{E C T l_]+AlDum] + S lDum2 + u t (8.17)
• Education Sector
A \n{TGXEDU) = cx2 + P 2A \n(GDP) + y2E C T l_l+A2Duml + S 2Dum2 + u t (8.18)
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Health Sector
A In (TGXHEA) = + /T, A In {GDP) + y^ECT l_l+/i?iDuml + S2Dum2 + ut (8.19)
• Housing and Public utilities Sector
X\n(TGXH &  P) = a 4 +/?4Aln(GDP) + y4E C T  l_i+A4Dumi + S4Dum2 + ut (8 .20)
• Manufacturing Sector
A \n(TGXMAN) = a 5 + fi5 A ln(GDP) + Y5E C T  t_l+A5Duml + S5Dum2 + ut (8 .2 1 )
• Transportation and Communication sector
A ln(7T7AT & C) = a h + J3()X In {GDP) + ybE C T  + SbDum2 + ut (8 .2 2 )
The estimated error correction term coefficient (ECT) should be negative and 
statistically significant in the short-run equations. With respect to the Granger 
representation theorem, negative and statistical significant error correction coefficients 
are necessary conditions for the relevant variables in question to be cointegrated 
(Jackson, 1998 and Engle and Granger, 1987). The error correction model for the six 
models was estimated using the OLS method. The results shown in Table 8.4 are the 
focus of the study, which is the significance of the error correction models5
 ^ For more details see the results in appendixes 10.
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Table 8.4 Error Correction Models (ECM) with Dummies for Six Categories
Dependent variable a P r A 8
d(ln AGR) 0.304
(1.029)
0.438
(0.763)
-0.687
(-4.656)*
-0.133
(-0.427)
-0.208
(-0.948)
d(In EDU) 0.466
(1.771)
0.288
(0.558)
-0.305
(-2.578)*
-0.353
(-1.272)
-0.077
(-0.397)
d(ln HEA) 0.563
(1.982)
0.173
(0.310)
-0.446
(-3.454)*
-0.419
(-1.401)
-0.090
(-0.431)
d(In H&P) 0.316
(1.956)
0.190
(0.606)
-0.281
(2.923)*
-0.176
(-1.029)
-0.174
(-1.449)
d(ln MAN) 0.640
(1.516)
0.096
(0.117)
-0.473
(-3.958)*
-0.406
(-0.909)
-0.244
(-0.774)
d(ln T&C) 0.287
(1.444)
0.088
(0.230)
-0.299
(-2.998)*
-0.132
(-0.629)
-0.205
(-2.998*)
-The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic. 
-the estimation for HC'M has included Duml and Dum2.
^-statistical significance at VZc level 
/3 - is the elasticity, y -  is the coefficients of the ECM
A - The coefficients of the duml. 6 - The coefficients of the dum2
The results in this table show that there is a significant short-run relationship in all 
equations because the error correction term is negative and significant at the one percent 
level. Also, the results show that the In GDP coefficient was positive in all six models. 
This means there is a relationship between gross domestic product and government 
expenditure in the six sectors under consideration. These results are in agreement with 
economic theory.
As can be seen from Table 8.4 the null hypothesis of no error correction model (ECM) 
can be rejected for GDP with functional expenditure for the sectors used in the study in 
this chapter. Thus, there is evidence of a short-run relationship between Libyan Gross 
Domestic Product and the functional sectors education, health, agriculture, housing and 
public utilities, manufacturing, transportation and communication.
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Having established that six sectors in the functional expenditure and GDP are 
cointegrated with the inclusion of the dummies, the representation theorem tells us that 
causality must exist in at least one direction for the 1(1) variables. The causality issue is 
a very crucial point in the context of bivariate analysis i.e. Wagner's law. It is important 
to mention that there is evidence of Granger causality from the GDP to government 
expenditure in the six categories of functional expenditure and not vice versa.
To test whether government expenditure on these sectors Granger causes GDP, this 
study applies the causality test developed by (Granger, 1969). A simple Granger
causality test involving two variables (expenditure variable and GDP) is written as:
8.3.4 Granger Causality Test for Six Categories
Ain TGX  = a 0 + + l A 14 lnCDC J + Dum,
< = 1 7 = 1
+ Dum-, + e u
k m
A In GD P| -  a 0 + ^  a nA  *n TGX  In GDP l_j + Duml
7 = 1
+ Dum2 + e u
(8.23)
(8.24)
Where In TGX Umi is the six categories government functional expenditure in the real
term, In GDP is the real gross domestic product in natural log. The parameters /?, and
P , are the corresponding short-run parameters. Then we can write the above models in
separate equations for the six sectors (education, health, agriculture, housing and public 
utilities, manufacturing, transportation and communication) to test the causality as 
follows:
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Agriculture Sector
K n\
Ain TGXAGR  = a {) + Y , a n A ,n TGXAGR, _ t + 2 X A1" GDP,_,+
( = 1
Dum, + D u m + £.
A In GDf; = a 0 + £ «,-2A lnT G X A G R , + £  /?y 2Ain GDP,_j +
/ = l 7 =  1
(8.25)
( 8.26)
Dzzm. + Dzz/??. +
• Education Sector
a »i
A In TG XE DU  = tf() + ^ a ,,A ln  T G X E D U + ;)Aln GDPt_j +
^  ./=! (8.27)
Dum{ + Dum, + <f1;
a- in
A\nGDP, = a 0 + Y j a tlA \ n T G X E D U , _ , + Y , l 3n ^ n GDP,-1 +
,=i 7=i (8.28)
Dzzm, + Dzz/zz2 + £■„
Manufacturing Sector
A \n T G X M A N  = a 0 + ^  or,, A 1 n TGXM AN, + £ / ? y|A in G D /^  +
/=i
Dzz/zz, + Dum2 + £u
k
A ln GDP, = a 0 + Y ,  ®nAln T G X M A N + X . 0 j 2 Ain GDP,_] +
/=i
Dzz/zz, + Dzz//z2 + £u
7 =  1
(8.29)
(8.30)
• Housing and Public utilities Sector
k in
A lnTGXH &  P = a 0 + £«,., A InTGXH & /%, + 2X A InG D /5_ ,+
, = I  7 = 1  (8.31)
D«/;z, + Dum2 + £u
k in
Ain GDP, = a„ + £<*,:A In TGXH  & P,_,+ , Ain GDP,_; +
,.i j=i (8.32)
Dzz/zz, + Dum 2 +
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Health Sector
A\nTGXHEA = a Q+ J ^ a ilA\nTGXHEA1_i + Y j /3j A \n GD Pl_j +
, = l 7 = 1
Dum^ +  D u n u  +  £ u
k m
Ain GDP, = a„ + ^ « :;Aln7'GXW£A,_, + £ / ? ;2Aln GDP,^ +
i = I
D u m ^  + D u u i 2 + £ u
7 = 1
(8.33)
(8.34)
Transportation and Communication sector
k in
A \ n T G X T & C  = a () -h J^a ^A inTG XT &  C r_ , + ^ / 3 J A\nGD Pl_l +
7 =  1
D w i h  + D u m , + £ ,
A In GDP, = a 0 + ^ a , 2A In TGX T  & C,_, + ^ ^ . 2A In GD^ _ 7 +
i=i 7 =  1
(8.35)
(8.36)
D u n i \  + + £ u
The study tests the null hypotheses of no causality as follows:
1- H(): this hypothesis means that government functional expenditure does not Granger 
cause GDP.
2- H0: this hypothesis means that GDP does not Granger cause government functional 
expenditure.
As mentioned earlier in chapter seven, there are four patterns of causality that could be 
defined based on the relationship between expenditure and GDP in these six categories 
as follows. If none of the hypotheses are rejected, it means that government functional 
expenditure in any sector does not Granger causes GDP, and GDP does not Granger 
cause government functional expenditure in the sectors. It indicates that the two 
variables are independent of each other. If the first hypothesis is rejected, it shows that 
government functional expenditure Granger causes GDP. Rejection of the second 
hypothesis means that there is unidirectional causality from GDP to government
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functional expenditure as in Wagner's law. If all hypotheses are rejected, there is 
bidirectional causality between the variables (Eita et al, 2008).
In this analysis, the study applied the Granger causality test, conducted using a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model (Anoruo et al, 2000). The test used one lag to determine 
the direction of the relationship between government functional expenditure and GDP 
for six categories (education, health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, 
manufacturing, transportation and communication) in terms of logarithms. The results 
for the Granger test are presented in Table 8.5 below6.
() -For more details see the causality results in appendixes (13)
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Table 8.5 Results of Granger Causality Test on six Categories with Dummies
version Hypothesis P-
value
Decision Conclusion
1.1 H (): In TGXAGR does not 
cause In GDP
0.002* Reject H 0 at 1% In TGXAGR ---- >  In GDP
1.2 H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXAGR
0.951 Accept H 0 In GDP In TGXAGR
2.1 H (): In TGXEDU does not 
cause In GDP
0.025* Reject H 0 at 5% In TGXEDU ---- ►  In GDP
i  i H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXEDU
0.255 Accept H () In GDP In TGXEDU
3.1 H (): In TGXMAN does not 
cause In GDP
0.063* Reject H 0 at 10% In TGXMAN---- ►  In GDP
3.2 H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXMAN
0.867 Accept H 0 In GDP In TGXMAN
4.1 H (): In TGXH&P does not 
cause In GDP
0.087* Reject H () at 10% In TGXH&P — >  In GDP
4.2 H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXH&P
0.964 Accept H 0 In GDP In TGXH&P
5.1 H (): In TGXHEA dos not 
cause In GDP
0.002* Reject H 0 at 1 % In TGXHEA---- ►  In GDP
5.2 H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXHEA
0.216 Accept H 0 In GDP In TGXHEA
6.1 H(): In TGXT&C dos not 
cause In GDP
0.004* Reject H 0 at 1 ch In TGXT&C---- ►  In GDP
6.2 H (): In GDP does not cause 
In TGXT&C
0.864 Accept H () In GDP-\>- In TGXT&CT
Note: the analysis Granger causality has been included Duml and Dum2.
- ^Rejection of the null hypothesis
- The lag order is 1 in the causality analysis
>  Unidirectional causality -V>. Non causality
The results of Table 8.5 show P-values which are a standard test for testing the null 
hypothesis for government functional expenditure. The first null hypothesis tested 
whether government expenditure in the Agriculture sector (In TGXAGR) does not
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Granger cause (In GDP). The result shows the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level 
which means (In TGXAGR) causes (In GDP) in the period covered by the case study. 
Our results from this table show the unidirectional causality running from In TGXAGR 
to (In GDP) because the probability for rejecting the second null hypothesis (In GDP) 
does not Granger cause (In TGXAGR) and as such accepting this hypothesis. This 
means there is no causality between them.
Furthermore, Table 8.5 shows the results regarding Granger causality tested among 
between functional expenditure in the Educations sector (In TGXEDU) and gross 
domestic product (In GDP). The first null hypothesis, that (In TGXEDU) does not 
Granger cause (In GDP), is rejected at the 1% level, which mean the causality runs in 
one direction from government expenditure on Education to GDP. In other words, (In 
TGXEDU) causes (In GDP). This is because in other direction, the null hypothesis that 
(In GDP) does not Granger cause (In TGXEDU), is accepted this hypothesis. This 
means that there is no causality running from (In GDP) to (In TGXEDU) in this 
hypothesis.
In addition, the results in Table 8.5 present the causality test results for testing the null 
hypothesis between government expenditure on Manufacturing (In TGXMAN) and (In 
GDP). The probability for rejecting the null hypothesis that (In TGXMAN does not 
Granger cause In GDP) is such that we reject this hypothesis at the 10% level. This 
means that (In TGXMAN) causes (In GDP) for the time period in the case study. In the 
second direction we accepted the null hypothesis that (In GDP) does not Granger cause 
(In TGXMAN), which means that there is no causality between the dependent and 
independent variable. In general, Granger causality for this sector was unidirectional, 
the causality running from (In TGXMAN) to (In GDP) almost at the 10% level.
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Moreover, Table 8.5 has shows the results for the Granger causality test on government 
expenditure on the Housing and Public utilities (In TGXH&P) and (In GDP). The result 
indicates that the null hypothesis that (In TGXH&P) does not Granger cause (In GDP) 
can be rejected at the 10 % level of significance for one lag. This means that (In 
TGXH&P) causes (In GDP) at the 10% level. This result leads to an acceptance of the 
major hypothesis. The null hypothesis that (In GDP) does not Granger cause (In 
TGXH&P) cannot be rejected. This means that there is no causality running from (In 
GDP) to (In TGXH&P). In general, in this model, the result shows unidirectional 
causality running from government expenditure on the Housing and Public utilities to 
GDP.
The study also applied the Granger causality test to the null hypothesis between the 
government expenditure on the Health sector (In TGXHEA) and real gross domestic 
product (In GDP). The result is displayed in Table 8.5 and indicates that the null 
hypothesis that (In TGXHEA) does not Granger cause (In GDP) can be rejected at the 
1% level for one lag. This means that there is causality running from (In TGXHEA) to 
(In GDP). In other words, (In TGXHEA) causes (In GDP) at the 1% level of 
significance for the time period covered by the case study. On the other hand, the results 
shown in the same table indicate strong evidence of no causality existing from (In GDP) 
to (In TGXHEA), because the study cannot reject the null hypothesis in the second test. 
Therefore, we conclude that there is a one way causality relationship which flows from 
Health sector functional expenditure to GDP.
Another result we can see in Table 8.5 regards Granger causality test between 
government expenditure on Transportation and Communication (In TGXT&C) and (In
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GDP). The result indicates that the null hypothesis that (In TGXT&C) does not Granger 
cause (In GDP) can be rejected at the 1% level for one lag. This means that (In 
TGXT&C) causes (In GDP) at the 1% level of significance in this case study. In the 
other direction, when we test the null hypothesis that (In GDP) does not Granger cause 
(In TGXT&C), the results show that we cannot reject. This means that there is no 
causality in this direction. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is unidirectional 
Granger causality running from (In TGXT&C) to (In GDP), significant at the 1%  level, 
in the transportation and communication sector.
8.3.5 Summary of the Granger Causality Tests
The summary of the analysis of the results for the six sectors used to test the direction of 
causality between the government expenditures and gross domestic product with one lag 
are presented in Table 8.6  below. The results show Granger causality running in one 
direction, i.e. unidirectional causality, this for the six categories (education, health, 
agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication), from government expenditures (In TGX funi ) to gross domestic
product (In GDP).
This result is not consistent with Wagner's law, because he said unidirectional causality 
would run from GDP to government functional expenditure. The main conclusion from 
the Granger causality test is therefore that there is no support for Wagner's Law. 
However, the results do support the Keynesian proposition over the period 1962-2005.
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Table 8.6 Summary of Results of Granger Causality Test for Six Categories
Hypothesis Direction Conclusion
1 In TGXAGR— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXAGR to In GDP
2 In TGXEDU— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXEDU to In GDP
3 In TGXMAN— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXMAN to In GDP
4 InTGXH&P— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXH&P to In GDP
5 In TGXHEA— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXHEA to In GDP
6 In TGXT&C— ► In GDP There is causality from In TGXT&C to In GDP
> Unidirectional causality
8.4 Re-Estimating of Government Functional Expenditure without Dummies
In this case we re-examine the government functional expenditure without the two 
dummies variables. As the study mentioned earlier for the results from the ADF and 
(PP) tests, all the variables are stationary in the first difference and are integrated of 
order one 1( 1 ).
8.4.1 Cointegration Test without Dummies Variables for Six Categories.
Since we are now certain that the variables are integrated of order one, the next step is to 
test if a long-run relationship exists among variables in the six categories of government 
functional expenditure. The study re-tested for cointegration without dummies for 
functional government expenditure using the following type of equation:
In TGX Jun = a 0 + j3Q In G D P  + e  (8.37)
Now we can apply this function on all the six categories of cointegration model as
follows:
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Agriculture Sector
In T G X A G R  = a, + /?, In G D P  + e x (8.38)
Education Sector
In T G X E D U  = a 2 + J32 In G D P  + £2 (8.39)
Health Sector
In T G X H E A  = + A  In G D P  + f 3 (8.40)
Housing and Public utilities Sector
In T G X H  &  P  = a 4 + In G D P  + £4 (8.41)
Manufacturing Sector
In T G X M A N  = a 5 +  J3, In G D P  +  e 5 (8.42)
Transportation and Communication Sector
In T G X T  & C  = a b +  In G D P  + e bi (8.43)
The results in Table 8.7 show that the variables are cointegrated, because the Engle- 
Granger residuals rejected the null hypothesis of no cointegration between government 
functional expenditure and GDP7; the results are significant at 1% or 5 %  levels for all 
residuals. This means the residuals coefficients of these variables are significant in the 
long-run relationship equilibrium and these results are in agreement with economic 
theory.
Moreover, the results shown in Table 8.7 indicate that the long-run GDP elasticity is 
more than one and significant at 1% level in agreement with the economic theory. Since 
the variables are cointegrated, we can investigate the short-run relationship between the 
variables in the function and GDP.
7 -See the appendix (7) for more results from the estimating the variables.
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Table 8.7 Cointegration Regressions without dummies for Six Categories
Cointegrating Regression Residuals
coefficient
p R2
In TGXAGR= /  (In GDP) -0.473
(-3.082*)
1.460
(10.983*)
0.74
In TGXEDU= /  (In GDP) -0.410
(-3.315*)
1.608
(11.952*)
0.77
In TGXHEA= /  (In GDP) -0.460
(-2.979*)
1.920
(14.373*)
0.83
In TGXH&P = /  (In GDP) -0.215
(-2.174**)
1.183
(11.129*)
0.74
In TGXMAN= /  (In GD) -0.368
(-2.877*)
1.864
(8.550*)
0.63
lnTGXT&C= /  (In GDP) -0.216
(-2 .2 1 0 **)
1.109
(8.506*)
0.63
* And** indicate significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
- Critical values in level at 1% and 5% are (-2.618, -1.948) respectively 
-The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic
8.4.2 Error Correction Model without Dummies Variables for Six Categories.
In this section we write the function for the error correction model without dummies in 
the following form:
A In (TGX ) = a 0 + /?0A In (GDP) + yi)E C T l_]+ut (8.44)
From this equation the study can re-write the six categories of government expenditure 
to test the ECM in the equations as follows:
Agriculture Sector
Ain (TGXAGR) = a { + /?,Aln (GDP) + ylE C T l_l+ul (8.45)
Education Sector
Ain (TGXED U) = a 2 + /32A\n(GDP) + y2E C T (8.46)
Health Sector
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A \ n(TGXHEA) = a 3 + j3,A In (GDP) + y . E C T ^ + u ,  (8.47)
Housing and Public utilities Sector
Ain(TGXH & P )  = a 4 + J34A \n(GDP) + y4E C T  t_x+ut (8.48)
Manufacturing Sector
A \n(TGXMAN) = a 5 + 0 5A In (GDP) + y5E C T  l_l+ut (8.49)
Transportation and Communication Sector
A \n(TGXT & C )  = a 6 + A  A In (GDP)  + ybE C T  ,^+u, (8.50)
After estimating the error correction model for six categories of government functional 
expenditure, we consider the coefficients of the ECT terms, which are presented in 
Table 8 .8 . The ECT coefficients for all the six sectors are negative in sign and are 
significant. These results give support for the relationship between the variables in the 
short-run, and the results are in agreement with the economic theory.
Table 8.8 Error Correction Models Results for Six Categories
Dependent variable a 0 Y
d(In AGR) 0.060
(0.518)
0.747
(1.321)
-0.473
(-3.569*)
d(In EDU) 0 . 1 1 1
(1.160)
0.458
(0.974)
-0.287
(-2.604*)
d(ln HEA) 0..147
(1.389)
0.329
(0.632)
-0.403
(-3.257*)
d(ln H&P) 0.061
(0.977)
0.468
(1.525)
-0.196
(-2.184**)
d(ln MAN) 0.132
(0.801)
0.613
(0.761)
-0.333
(-2.896*)
d(ln T&C) 0.058
(0.760)
0.318
(0.852)
-0.199
(-2.232**)
-The numbers in parentheses are the values of the estimated t-statistic. 
-*and ^^-statistical significance at 1% and 5 %  levels respectively.
P~ is the elasticity, y - is the coefficients of the EC M
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8.4.3 Granger Causality test without Dummies Variables for Six Categories.
As we mentioned in section 8.3.4 and from the equations (8.22 and 8.23), we will 
rewrite government functional expenditure to test Granger causality without dummies as 
follows:
Agriculture Sector
k m
A\nTGXAGR = a {) + Y j a , A \ nTGXAGR!-l + Y ,P  i A lnGDP' i  +£->
7=1
A In GDP, = «„ + Y j a r A\nTGXAGR,_, + J^/3l2A\nGDP,_,+ e„
i = \ 7 =  1
Education Sector
 ^ m
Ain TGXEDU = a () + Y Ja nAlnTGXEDUi-l + £ /? ,  AinGDP,_i + £u
, = l 7 = 1
k ni
Ain GDP, = a„ + Y da , A \ n T G X E D U + £ / ? , ,Ain GDT’,., + £„
1 = 1 7 =  1
Manufacturing Sector
k in
A In TGXMAN  = a () + ^  or,, A 1 n 7GXMANt + I/ ? „A ln  GDP,.i + e u
/ = ! 7 = 1
k in
Ain GDP, = a {) + ^ a i2A\nTGXMAN ,_i + £ / ? ; 2AlnGD^_y + £u
i=\ 7 =  1
Housing and Public utilities Sector
k in
A\nTGXH & P = a 0 + ^ a i[A\nTGXH & P,_t + Y , f i JlA\nGDPl_J +
i = l 7 =  1
k inAin GDP, = a {) + ^ e r ,2A ln7GX/7 & P,_, + A In GD/^_y + £ u 
Health Sector
(=i 7 =  1
A In TGXHEA = a 0 + ^ a i] Ain TGXHEAt_i + ]T /?7 A In GDPt_} + £x
i = \ 7 = 1
k in
A In GE>PI = a () + Y j a , 2A ln TGXH EAi-, + £ / ? /2A In GDP,_;. + £V
7 =  1
(8.51)
(8.52)
(8.53)
(8.54)
(8.55)
(8.56)
(8.57)
(8.58)
(8.59)
(8.60)
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Transportation and Communication Sector
\ m
A ln r c x r & C  = a„ + £ a l|AlnrGXr&C,_, + £ / ? ;|AlnGDf;_, +£,, (8.61)
1 = 1 7 = 1
k m
Ain GDP, = ^  O',, A In TGXT  & C,_, + X ^ P A lnGD^_( + £„ (8.62)
7 =  1
The main results of the Granger causality test are presented in Table 8.9 below. The
Q
results include the six sectors of government functional expenditure . 1
1 - For more details see the causality results in appendixes (13)
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Table 8.9 Results of Granger-Causality Tests for Six Categories
N Hypothesis P-value Decision conclusion
1.1 H (): In TGXAGR does not 
cause In GDP
0.021* Reject H () at 5 % In TGXAGR----->  In GDP
1.2 H (): In GDP does not cause In 
TGXAGR
0.733 Accept H () In GDP - \ > l n  TGXAGR
2.1 H (): In TGXEDU does not 
cause In GDP
0.125 Accept H () In TGXEDU In GDP
2.2 H 0 : In GDP does not cause In 0.50 Accept H 0 In GDP In TGXEDU
TGXEDU
3.1 H (): In TGXMAN does not 0.151 Accept H 0 Ln TGX MAN In GDP
cause In GDP
3.2 H (): In GDP does not cause In 
TGXMAN
0.736 Accept H 0 In GDP ~ \ > l n  TGXMAN
4.1 H (): In TGXH&P does not 
cause In GDP
0.453 Accept H 0 ln TGXH&P In GDP
4.2 H (): In GDP does not cause In 0.724 Accept H () In GDP In TGXH&P
TGXH&P
5.1 H (): In TGXHEA dos not 
cause In GDP
0.015* Reject H () at 5 % ln TGXHEA ---- ►  ln GDP
5.2 H (): In GDP does not cause In 0.362 Accept H 0 ln GDP ln TGXHEA
TGXHEA
6.1 H (): In TGXT&C dos not 
cause In GDP
0.261 Accept H () ln TGXT&C In GDP
6.2 H 0 : In GDP does not cause In 
TGXT&C
0.951 Accept H () ln GDP - V  in TGXT&C
- * Rejection of the null hypothesis
- The lag order is 1 in the causality analysis
>  Unidirectional causality Non causality
The results show that there is unidirectional causality between government expenditure 
on agriculture and GDP, because the null hypothesis of TGXAGR does not cause GDP 
and is rejected at the 1% level of significance. On the other side, the causality from
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gross domestic product to government expenditure on agriculture is accepted because 
the null hypothesis of GDP does not causes TGXAGR is accepted. This result supports 
the Keynesian hypothesis which stipulates that causation runs from government 
expenditure to gross domestic product.
There is also evidence for Granger causality which runs from government expenditure 
on health to gross domestic product. The result indicates that the null hypothesis of 
TGXHEA does not causes GDP can be rejected at the 5 %  level for one lag (p-value 
0.015). Whereas the null hypothesis that GDP does not Grange cause TGXHEA can not 
be rejected. This means there is unidirectional causality running from TGXHEA to 
GDP; this result also supports the Keynesian hypothesis.
Overall, the results from Table 8.9 show that there is no causality between four sectors 
of government expenditure and gross domestic product: the sectors are TGXEDU, 
TGXH&P, TGXMAN and TGXT&C because we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The 
results indicate that there is no evidence to support either Wagner’s law or the
Keynesian hypothesis in these sectors.
8.4.4 Summary of the Granger Causality Tests without Dummies Variables for
Six Categories.
The results in Table 8.10 below show the direction of causality between the government 
functional expenditures on the six categories and gross domestic product for two 
categories (agriculture and health), these results show that the causality runs from the 
government expenditure to GDP. The main conclusion is that there is no support for 
Wagner's Law, but the results do support the Keynesian hypothesis over the period 
1962-2005.
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Table 8.10 Summary of Results of Granger Causality Test for Six Categories
Hypothesis Direction Conclusion
1 In TGXAGR — > In GDP There is causality from In TGXAGR to In GDP
2 In TGXEDU < V  In GDP No causality
3 In TGXMAN In GDP No causality
4 In TGXH&P<\> In GDP No causality
5 In TGXHEA— > In GDP There is causality from In TGXHEA to In GDP
6 In T G X T & C I n  GDP No causality
Unidirectional causality < \ >  Non causality in both directions
But other results from Table 8.10 show that there is no evidence for unidirectional or 
bidirectional Granger causality in four sectors (education, housing and public utilities, 
manufacturing, transportation and communication). This means there is no support for 
either Wagner’s law or the Keynesian hypothesis.
8.5  Summary
This chapter has investigated the relationship between government functional 
expenditure and gross domestic product using time series data for the period 1962-2005. 
Four econometric techniques, which were presented in chapters six and seven, have 
been applied in this chapter. The study applied the unit root test, and used the Dickey- 
Fuller and Phillips-Perron (PP) methods to test the stationarity and the order of 
integration of the individual variables. The results from the two tests indicated that most 
of the variables were stationary in their first difference.
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The six categories (education, health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, 
manufacturing, transportation and communication), were found to be cointegrated with 
GDP. The long-run cointegration relationship which exists between the variables was 
estimated using the Engle-Granger two step method. The study also used two dummy 
variables to capture the effects of the discovery of oil on economic growth and the 
effects of the UN sanctions on the Libyan economy. The results show that all variables 
are cointegrated and have a stable relationship in the long-run.
After investigating the cointegration relation in the long-run between the variables, the 
study moved on to test the relationship in the short-run between the six categories of 
functional expenditure with GDP. The study also included two dummy variables in the 
analysis. The Error Correction Model (ECM) was used to examine the short-run 
relationship. The results from the ECM show that all the error correction term 
coefficients (ECT) for the government functional expenditures have negative signs and 
are significant. This means that there is a short-run relationship in the data used in this 
case study.
Moreover, the study has applied the Granger causality test to determine the casual 
direction among the variables under study. The estimation results of the causality test 
with dummies show that a causality relationship runs from the six categories (education, 
health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication) in the individual equations to GDP, but not from GDP to any variable 
in the expenditure functions. This means the Granger causality estimation does not 
support Wagner's law but supports the Keynesian hypothesis for all six expenditure 
variables.
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The study re-examines the cointegration test, error correction term and Granger 
causality test without two dummy variables. The results show that there is a long-run 
relationship for all sectors of government expenditure with gross domestic product in 
the same period.
For the error correction model, the results show that the error correction term coefficient 
for the six sectors is negative in sign and significant: this means there is a short-run and 
is consistent with the theory. But the results for the GDP coefficient and the constant are 
not significant.
The results from the Granger causality test without dummies show that there is causality 
from two sectors (agriculture and health) to GDP and no causality between the variables 
and gross domestic product in 4 sectors (education, housing and public utilities, 
manufacturing, transportation and communication). These results support the 
Keynesian hypothesis for 2 expenditure variables.
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CHAPTER NINE
Summary and Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
The expansion of government spending is one of the most lasting issues in public 
economics literature. The main objective of this thesis has been to examine the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth in Libya over 
the period 1962-2005 using modem time series techniques. The economist, Adolph 
Wagner, was perhaps the first to propose a direct explanation that the growth of 
government activity share in the economy responds positively to changes in 
economic development, so that as a country's income increases, the size of that 
country's public sector relative to the whole economy rises as well. This study has 
applied empirical tests of Wagner's law on the time series data for Libya from 
1962-2005.
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the main findings of the study and to draw 
some general conclusions. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 9.2 the Reconsideration of the research objectives. Section 9.3 provides the 
main conclusions. The section 9.4 describes the contributions of the research to 
knowledge. The main limitations of the study are discussed in section 9.5. Section
9.6 recommendations. A number of potential areas for further research are 
suggested in section 9.7.
9.2 Reconsideration of the Research Objectives
This study has four main objectives, which would demonstrate the relationship 
between government expenditure and gross domestic product growth attained by 
Libyan government within the period 1962-2005.
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9.2.1 Research Objective: One
This research intends to investigate the existence of long-run and short-run 
relationship between the six versions o f Wagner's law and the Libyan economy.
To achieve this aim, Engle-Granger two-steps approach should be used to estimate 
cointegration for long-run and error correction model for the short-run; as it has 
been adopted over the period 1962-2005.
Chapter six give details of the cointegration results for real gross domestic product 
which are cointegrated (four out of six versions of Wagner’s law). Also, the results 
from testing the real non-oil gross domestic product show the five versions of 
Wagner’s law, found to be cointegrated. Therefore, the test for this aim in the long- 
run indicates a long-run positive relationship between government expenditure and 
real gross domestic product and non-oil gross domestic product.
The results in chapter seven for the error correction model show that, there is a 
short-run relationship in all versions with respect to real GDP and non-oil GDP 
because the ECM coefficients are all negative and statistically significant. The 
findings from long-run and short-run have shown that, the objective was achieved.
To achieving these aims, the study has employed four types of econometric tests,
thus; Unit root tests, Cointegration test, Error correction models and Granger
causality test. Each of these objectives has been tested as follows:
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9.2.2 Research Objective: Two
The study also investigates the long-run and short-run equilibrium between 
Libyan GDP and six categories of government functional expenditure.
To achieve this aim we can adopt the econometric techniques that were used in the 
previous objective to examine the long-run and short-run relationship between six 
government functional expenditures and real total GDP, based on Wagner's law 
using time series data for the period 1962-2005 for Libyan economy.
The result from chapter eight revealed that; all the variables are stationary in first 
difference and integrated of order 1(1). Also, the results from testing for 
cointegration between government expenditure on the six categories and gross 
domestic product show that, the variables are cointegrated, because the residuals 
are 1(0). Also, the estimated results of the short-run relationship shown that, there 
is a short-run relationship between government expenditure on the six categories 
and real GDP, because the ECM coefficients for all the six sectors are negative and 
significant. Best on the findings above, a long-run and short-run test indicate that, 
the research objective should be achieved.
9.2.3 Research Objective: Three
To examine the Granger causality test between government expenditure and 
gross domestic product in Libya over the period 1962-2005 and six categories of 
government functional expenditure.
Granger causality test was also used for testing the causation between the variables 
in order to achieve this aim.
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In chapter seven the results of Granger causality tests for Wagner's law with 
respect to total real GDP show a strong unidirectional causal relationship running 
from real GDP to real TGX in five versions of Wagner’ law. This revealed that 
Wagner's law is generally supported by the study period for the Libyan economy in 
our sample. The results of Granger causality tests also indicate that, Wagner's law 
with respect to total real non-oil GDP versions 2, 4 and 6 support Wagner’s law 
and versions 1 and 5 support the Keynesian hypothesis. The research objective is 
said to be achievable best on the result from the test (testing the causality between 
government expenditure and real gross domestic product and non-oil GDP).
Another results in the subsequent chapter 8 ; “the Granger causality test”, test the 
six categories of government functional expenditure which show clear evidence on 
the six cases, that have a unidirectional causality relationship from government 
expenditure on education, health, agriculture, housing and public utilities, 
manufacturing, and transportation and communication to GDP.
In general, all the six categories of government expenditure are supporting the 
Keynesian proposition over the period from 1962-2005, because the causality runs 
from government expenditure to economic growth, and these results are in line 
with other studies examining the relationship between government expenditure and 
gross domestic product in other economies. From the findings, we can justify that 
the research objectives have been achieved, as it has been demonstrated in the 
causality test between six categories of government expenditure and real gross 
domestic product.
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9.2.4 Research Objective: Four
To achieve this aim, the study had analysed time series econometric techniques 
such as unit root tests, cointegration, error correction models and finally the 
Granger casualty test. These tests are performed for all six versions of Wagner’s 
law in terms of real GDP, real non-oil GDP and government expenditure for 
Libyan economy using data for the period 1962-2005. Also, these tests are applied 
to investigate the long-run, short-run and causation relationship between the six 
government functional expenditures and GDP based on Wagner’s law.
Some researchers used the Granger causality test to see whether government 
expenditure causes economic growth or economic growth causes government 
expenditure. However, previous empirical results from other studies gave different 
conclusions, i.e., several researchers (Jiranyakul, 2007 Ome, (2006) Eita, J.H. and 
Mbazima, D (2008), found that government expenditure causes economic growth, 
while others found that economic growth causes government spending to expand. 
There is also evidence of bidirectional causality between government spending and 
economic growth.
As per our findings, if we found the causality running from the gross domestic 
product (GDP) to government expenditure (TGX), this means support “Wagner’s 
law". Conclusively, it analyses that, there is strong support for Wagner’s law in 
relationship between the government expenditure and growth in the real GDP as 
well as in the non-oil GDP, because the causality was from gross domestic product
To investigate the Libyan economy, as to whether it supports Wagner’s law or
not by testing Libyan data for the period 1962-2005.
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to the government expenditure. While, at the disaggregate level it revealed that, 
there is strong support for the Keynesian hypothesis and no support for Wagner’s 
law. However I can conclude by proving that, the research objectives could be 
achieved by using the aggregate data and could not be achieve by using 
disaggregate data.
9.3 Main Conclusions
From the preceding results, we can reach the following conclusions:
1- The results are sensitive to the model specification i.e.
(i) total GDP or non-oil GDP
(ii) with or without dummies
(iii) aggregate or disaggregate government spending
2- The Granger causality tests (GCT) results are particularly sensitive to the
aggregate or disaggregate specification:
(i) At the aggregate level, there is strong support for Wagner’s law, and 
some limited support for the Keynesian hypothesis.
(ii) At the disaggregate level there is strong support for the Keynesian 
hypothesis, and no support for Wagner’s law.
3- Overall, these results are very mixed, and we should be very careful about 
drawing policy implications from them.
4- One way to reconcile the apparently conflicting results is to consider the 
distinction between the short-run and the long-run.
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(i) in the short run, the Keynesian hypothesis is supported
(ii) In the long run, Wagner’s law is supported.
Overall in light of the results, the relationship between government expenditure 
and gross domestic product is shown in Figure 9.1 below.
Figure 9.1 Keynes and Wagner-Reconciliation.
In the short-run, when government spending increases, output will increase. This is 
the Keynesian hypothesis, which includes a multiplier effect; that is, output 
increases by a multiple of the original change in spending that caused it. Thus, 
increased government spending will expand the economy. According to the results, 
real government expenditure in Libya in the long-run is determined largely by 
gross domestic product. In other words, these results support the validity of 
Wagner’s hypothesis in the long-run, and imply that government expenditure in 
Libya is dependent on GDP. Therefore, when gross domestic product increases this 
means the government revenue will increase as well.
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5- Evidence for this distinction is that in the disaggregate models (which support 
the Keynesian hypothesis) the ECM (which defines the short-run relationship) 
is always valid (both with and without dummies).
9.4 Contributions of the Study to Knowledge
This sub-section highlights the main contributions of this study to the economic
literature.
1 This study has made a significant original contribution to knowledge. 
Specifically, it fills the gap in the public finance area of Libyan growth studies 
by testing Wagner's law on the Libyan economy. Also, this study has used the 
long-run and short-run relationship between government expenditure and total 
gross domestic product with GDP and non-oil GDP, as well as undertaking a 
causality analysis between the relevant variables.
2 This study contributes to knowledge in macroeconomics. It improves 
understanding of the Libyan economy and fills the gaps in economic theory by 
investigating the relationship between different measures of real government 
expenditure and real gross domestic product.
3 Another contribution is that not only do we test the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth on the six versions of Wagner’s 
law with aggregate data, but we also test this relationship with disaggregated 
data on six categories of government expenditure.
9.5 Limitations o f the Study
There is no perfect study and this study is no exception. It is subject to the
following limitations.
221
1 Limitations of data were an obstacle faced by the researcher. Data on Libya 
during the period 1962-1967 and 1992-1996 is very restricted and classified and 
is therefore not always available. The researcher was forced to attempt to gather 
this data from different sources.
2 The research study was applied on one country. We could in the future work on 
a comparative study between Libya and any country with the same economic 
environment or any oil country such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain or Kuwait.
3 The problem of data quality is a general problem, particularly for developing 
countries. The data compiled for a developing country, like Libya, might be less 
reliable and it appears that nothing can be done about this limitation.
9.6 Recommendations
In the light of what has been presented in this thesis, it is possible to suggest the
following recommendations:
1 The economic growth and development are the main objectives of the 
government expenditure in Libya, especially in terms of human and a capital 
investment. I recommend that, Libyan government should make a policy to 
emphasize on investment in human development and provide adequate social 
infrastructures through modem technology for the sustainable economic 
growth and development.
2 The relevance of Wagner’s law to the Libyan economy is quite recommendable
because the government expenditure depends on gross domestic product 
which is very effective to government policy. Therefore, it can be suggested
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that, the government continue to encourage government expenditure towards 
non-oil activities.
3 This study gets some results which support Keynesian hypothesis. In this case 
the total real government expenditure has positive effects on economic growth 
and development. Therefore, the importance of government spending on 
economic growth should be recognised and the direction of spending should 
be towards sectors that have more effect on economic growth and 
development of the country.
4 Public expenditure on infrastructure that facilitates economic growth is 
required to put the economy on the path of higher long term growth.
5 For Libya to maintain its economic growth it is important to have effective 
fiscal and monetary polices tools that will allow these policies to be carried 
out. In this regard, the development of economic institutions including 
financial and capital markets is crucial for sustainable economic development.
6 Government expenditures should be re-examined with the view to assess (i) 
their contribution to an efficient allocation of resources within the economy 
and (ii) their potential to finance growth and enhance spending categories 
(such as, infrastructure, development, education, and health).
7 The government should check the relationship between expenditures and 
revenues in such a ways that are consistent with the country’s revenue 
mobilization potential. This framework could help the government to control
its expenditures.
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8 When the results show some sings of Wagner’s law which can be noticed by 
the rapid increase in government size and its influence in the performance of 
the economy. We can suggest that there is a need to reduce the government 
size to an optimal sector by adopting a policy on privatisation (private public 
partnership).
9.7 Suggestions for Future Research
In this regard it is useful to mention some suggestions concerning future studies of
government expenditure and gross domestic product growth in Libya
1 We can in the future attempt to further disaggregate the data to see the 
relationship between government expenditure and GDP in more than 6 
categories.
2 In particular, I suggest a study of the evaluation of government expenditure on 
infrastructure in various sectors. Due to lack of planning and fast development, 
the infrastructure in Libya has resulted in overcapacity in some areas, while 
others are still underserved. The government could make a comprehensive 
evaluation of the existing infrastructure to determine the viability of several 
policy options.
3 Because the Libyan environment was the focus of this study, it would be 
interesting to duplicate it in other Arab countries or to do a comparative study, 
so that comparisons could be drawn, especially as these Arab countries have 
many similarities to the Libyan environment.
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Appendix (2)
The results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test on real total GDP
243
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (LN GDP)
ADF Test Statistic -4.604020 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5973
-2.9339
-2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:18
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.892805 0.193918 -4.604020 0.0000
D(LNGDP(-1),2) 0.048376 0.150223 0.322026 0.7492
C 0.059555 0.032137 1.853175 0.0716
R-squared 0.444122 Mean dependent var -0.007152
Adjusted R-squared 0.414865 S.D.dependent var 0.236167
S.E. of regression 0.180654 Akaike info criterion -0.514116
Sum squared resid 1.240156 Schwarz criterion -0.388733
Log likelihood 13.53938 F-statistic 15.18014
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013718 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000014
A u g m e n t e d  D ic k e y - F u l le r  U n it  R o o t  T e s t  o n  D  (L N  G D P N )
ADF Test Statistic -4.710785 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDPN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:21
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDPN(-1)) -0.922351 0.195796 -4.710785 0.0000
D(LNGDPN(-1 ),2) 0.064739 0.150144 0.431181 0.6688
C 0.031174 0.029487 1.057212 0.2971
R-squared 0.452341 Mean dependent var -0.007972
Adjusted R-squared 0.423516 S.D.dependent var 0.236307
S.E. of regression 0.179419 Akaike info criterion -0.527826
Sum squared resid 1.223270 Schwarz criterion -0.402443
Log likelihood 13.82043 F-statistic 15.69309
Durbin-Watson stat 2.008085 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000011
A u g m e n t e d  D ic k e v - F u l le r  U n it  R o o t  T e s t  o n  I )  (L N  T G X )
ADF Test Statistic -4.158247 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:23 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005 
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGX(-1)) -0.605235 0.145550 -4.158247 0.0002
C 0.068096 0.034130 1.995188 0.0529
R-squared 0.301810 Mean dependent var 0.002071
Adjusted R-squared 0.284356 S.D.dependent var 0.231448
S.E. of regression 0.195795 Akaike info criterion -0.377045
Sum squared resid 1.533434 Schwarz criterion -0.294299
Log likelihood 9.917945 F-statistic 17.29102
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122950 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000165
ADF Test Statistic -3.731570 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
’MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:24 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints______________________________
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (LN TGXC)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXC(-1)) -0.517730 0.138743 -3.731570 0.0006
C 0.056733 0.020739 2.735517 0.0092
R-squared 0.258224 Mean dependent var -0.000350
Adjusted R-squared 0.239679 S.D. dependent var 0.104084
S.E. of regression 0.090757 Akaike info criterion -1.914811
Sum squared resid 0.329474 Schwarz criterion -1.832065
Log likelihood 42.21103 F-statistic 13.92462
Durbin-Watson stat 2.031635 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000591
A u g m e n t e d  D ic k e y - F u l l e r  U n i t  R o o t  T e s t  o n  D  (L N  T G X G D P )
ADF Test Statistic 3.359395 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.6067
-2.9378
-2.6069
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:25 
Sample(adjusted): 1967 2005
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXGDP(-1)) -0.591028 0.175933 -3.359395 0.0019
D(LNTGXGDP(-1 ),2) -0.093426 0.182934 -0.510710 0.6129
D(LNTGXGDP(-2),2) 0.190061 0.175401 1.083578 0.2862
D(LNTGXGDP(-3),2) 0.120781 0.136933 0.882048 0.3839
C 0.035802 0.021759 1.645387 0.1091
R-squared 0.465439 Mean dependent var -0.010680
Adjusted R-squared 0.402549 S.D. dependent var 0.134255
S.E. of regression 0.103773 Akaike info criterion -1.574021
Sum squared resid 0.366137 Schwarz criterion -1.360744
Log likelihood 35.69341 F-statistic 7.400885
Durbin-Watson stat 1.508777 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000212
A u g m e n t e d  D ic k e y - F u l le r  U n it  R o o t  T e s t  o n  1) (L N  G D P N )
ADF Test Statistic -2.985043 1% Critical Value* -3.6019
5% Critical Value -2.9358
______________________________________10% Critical Value_____________ -2.6059
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:27 
Sample(adjusted): 1966 2005
Included observations: 40 after adjusting endpoints______________________________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXN(-1)) -0.586128 0.196355 •2.985043 0.0051
D(LNTGXN(-1),2) -0.080746 0.196772 ■0.410352 0.6840
D(LNTGXN(-2),2) 0.160689 0.170828 0.940650 0.3532
C 0.041072 0.034743 1.182162 0.2449
R-squared 0.356059 Mean dependent var -0.003292
Adjusted R-squared 0.302397 S.D.dependent var 0.237026
S.E. of regression 0.197971 Akaike info criterion -0.306756
Sum squared resid 1.410927 Schwarz criterion -0.137868
Log likelihood 10.13511 F-statistic 6.635247
Durbin-Watson stat 1.939261 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001105
Phillips-Perrun Unit Root on I) (UN GDP)
PP Test Statistic -5.446949 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel:3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3)
Residual variance with no correction 0.030628
Residual variance with correction 0.025935
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.796093 0.145555 -5.469371 0.0000
C 0.056571 0.030254 1.869848 0.0688
R-squared 0.427869 Mean dependent var -0.010331
Adjusted R-squared 0.413565 S.D. dependent var 0.234177
S.E. of regression 0.179330 Akaike info criterion -0.552726
Sum squared resid 1.286375 Schwarz criterion -0.469980
Log likelihood 13.60725 F-statistic 29.91402
Durbin-Watson stat 2.067722 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (UN GDPN)
PP Test Statistic -5.526079 1% Critical Value* •3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel:3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.030308
Residual variance with correction 0.025226
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDPN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDPN(-1)) -0.810847 0.146254 -5.544117 0.0000
C 0.030607 0.028538 1.072469 0.2899
R-squared 0.434527 Mean dependent var -0.011157
Adjusted R-squared 0.420390 S.D.dependent var 0.234317
S.E. of regression 0.178391 Akaike info criterion -0.563232
Sum squared resid 1.272932 Schwarz criterion -0.480485
Log likelihood 13.82787 F-statistic 30.73724
Durbin-Watson stat 2.061635 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (UN TGX)
PP Test Statistic -4.191733 1 % Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.036510
Residual variance with correction 0.037860
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGX(-1)) -0.605235 0.145550 -4.158247 0.0002
C 0.068096 0.034130 1.995188 0.0529
R-squared 0.301810 Mean dependent var 0.002071
Adjusted R-squared 0.284356 S.D.dependent var 0.231448
S.E. of regression 0.195795 Akaike info criterion -0.377045
Sum squared resid 1.533434 Schwarz criterion -0.294299
Log likelihood 9.917945 F-statistic 17.29102
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122950 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000165
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (LN TGXC)
PP Test Statistic -3.744458 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.007845
Residual variance with correction 0.007948
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXC(-1)) -0.517730 0.138743 -3.731570 0.0006
C 0.056733 0.020739 2.735517 0.0092
R-squared 0.258224 Mean dependent var -0.000350
Adjusted R-squared 0.239679 S.D.dependent var 0.104084
S.E. of regression 0.090757 Akaike info criterion -1.914811
Sum squared resid 0.329474 Schwarz criterion -1.832065
Log likelihood 42.21103 F-statistic 13.92462
Durbin-Watson stat 2.031635 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000591
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (LN TGXGDP)
PP Test Statistic -4.929359 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.016809
Residual variance with correction 0.020235
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXGDP(-1)) -0.725097 0.151886 -4.773944 0.0000
C 0.058616 0.024008 2.441539 0.0191
R-squared 0.362961 Mean dependent var -0.001043
Adjusted R-squared 0.347035 S.D.dependent var 0.164405
S.E. of regression 0.132849 Akaike info criterion -1.152752
Sum squared resid 0.705959 Schwarz criterion -1.070006
Log likelihood 26.20780 F-statistic 22.79054
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122232 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000024
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on I) (LN TGXN)
PP Test Statistic -4.261527 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value •2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 2 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.036486
Residual variance with correction 0.038367
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXN(-1)) -0.615601 0.146025 -4.215713 0.0001
C 0.048374 0.032204 1.502087 0.1409
R-squared 0.307626 Mean dependent var 0.001245
Adjusted R-squared 0.290316 S.D. dependent var 0.232340
S.E. of regression 0.195730 Akaike info criterion -0.377716
Sum squared resid 1.532405 Schwarz criterion -0.294970
Log likelihood 9.932034 F-statistic 17.77223
Durbin-Watson stat 2.125464 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000138
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Appendix (3)
The results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) Test on real total non-oil GDP
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on 1) (LN non-oil GDP)
ADF Test Statistic -3.359395 1% Critical Value*
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNNOGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:30 
Sample(adjusted): 1967 2005
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNNOGDP(-1)) -0.591028 0.175933 -3.359395 0.0019
D(LNNOGDP(-1 ),2) -0.093426 0.182934 -0.510710 0.6129
D(LNNOGDP(-2),2) 0.190061 0.175401 1.083578 0.2862
D(LNNOGDP(-3),2) 0.120781 0.136933 0.882048 0.3839
C 0.035802 0.021759 1.645387 0.1091
R-squared 0.465439 Mean dependent var -0.010680
Adjusted R-squared 0.402549 S.D.dependent var 0.134255
S.E. of regression 0.103773 Akaike info criterion -1.574021
Sum squared resid 0.366137 Schwarz criterion -1.360744
Log likelihood 35.69341 F-statistic 7.400885
Durbin-Watson stat 1.508777 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000212
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (LN non-oil GDPN)
ADF Test Statistic 3.555622 1% Critical Value* -3.6067
5% Critical Value -2.9378
10% Critical Value -2.6069
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNNOGDPN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:36
Sample(adjusted): 1967 2005
Included observations: 39 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNNOGDPN(-1)) -0.648123 0.182281 -3.555622 0.0011
D(LNNOGDPN(-1),2) -0.050589 0.184033 -0.274891 0.7851
D(LNNOGDPN(-2),2) 0.227158 0.174305 1.303221 0.2013
D(LNNOGDPN(-3),2) 0.141969 0.135715 1.046083 0.3029
C 0.018671 0.018492 1.009655 0.3198
R-squared 0.480572 Mean dependent var -0.011508
Adjusted R-squared 0.419463 S.D.dependent var 0.134134
S.E. of regression 0.102201 Akaike info criterion -1.604547
Sum squared resid 0.355130 Schwarz criterion -1.391270
Log likelihood 36.28866 F-statistic 7.864158
Durbin-Watson stat 1.502394 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000134
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (LN TGX)
ADF Test Statistic -4.158247 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
______________________________________10% Critical Value_____________ -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:37 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints______________________________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGX(-1)) -0.605235 0.145550 -4.158247 0.0002
C 0.068096 0.034130 1.995188 0.0529
R-squared 0.301810 Mean dependent var 0.002071
Adjusted R-squared 0.284356 S.D.dependent var 0.231448
S.E. of regression 0.195795 Akaike info criterion -0.377045
Sum squared resid 1.533434 Schwarz criterion -0.294299
Log likelihood 9.917945 F-statistic 17.29102
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122950 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000165
-3.6067
-2.9378
-2.6069
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (LN TGXC)
ADF Test Statistic -3.160229 1% Critical Value*
5% Critical Value
______________________________________10% Critical Value
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:38 
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXC(-1)) -0.666326 0.210848 -3.160229 0.0031
D(LNTGXC(-1),2) -0.256944 0.160331 -1.602589 0.1173
C 0.072850 0.029701 2.452813 0.0189
R-squared 0.481926 Mean dependent var -0.002265
Adjusted R-squared 0.454658 S.D. dependent var 0.163750
S.E. of regression 0.120925 Akaike info criterion -1.316938
Sum squared resid 0.555668 Schwarz criterion -1.191554
Log likelihood 29.99722 F-statistic 17.67426
Durbin-Watson stat 2.028496 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on 1) (LN TGXN)
ADF Test Statistic -4.215713 1% Critical Value*
5% Critical Value
______________________________________10% Critical Value
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:39 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXN(-1)) -0.615601 0.146025 -4.215713 0.0001
C 0.048374 0.032204 1.502087 0.1409
R-squared 0.307626 Mean dependent var 0.001245
Adjusted R-squared 0.290316 S.D.dependent var 0.232340
S.E. of regression 0.195730 Akaike info criterion -0.377716
Sum squared resid 1.532405 Schwarz criterion -0.294970
Log likelihood 9.932034 F-statistic 17.77223
Durbin-Watson stat 2.125464 Prob( F-statistic) 0.000138
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
-3.5973
-2.9339
-2.6048
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on I) (LN TGX/non-oil GDP)
ADF Test Statistic -4.102466 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/07/09 Time: 20:40 
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005 
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXNOGDP(-1)) -0.965808 0.235421 -4.102466 0.0002
D(LNTGXNOGDP(-1),2) -0.097077 0.161192 -0.602247 0.5506
C 0.033558 0.029456 1.139272 0.2617
R-squared 0.543531 Mean dependent var 0.006154
Adjusted R-squared 0.519506 S.D.dependent var 0.266254
S.E. of regression 0.184561 Akaike info criterion -0.471318
Sum squared resid 1.294385 Schwarz criterion -0.345935
Log likelihood 12.66202 F-statistic 22.62387
Durbin-Watson stat 1.854155 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on I) (LN NO GDP)
PP Test Statistic -4.929359 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3)
Residual variance with no correction 0.016809
Residual variance with correction 0.020235
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNNOGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNNOGDP(-1)) -0.725097 0.151886 -4.773944 0.0000
C 0.058616 0.024008 2.441539 0.0191
R-squared 0.362961 Mean dependent var -0.001043
Adjusted R-squared 0.347035 S.D.dependent var 0.164405
S.E. of regression 0.132849 Akaike info criterion -1.152752
Sum squared resid 0.705959 Schwarz criterion -1.070006
Log likelihood 26.20780 F-statistic 22.79054
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122232 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000024
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (LN NO GDPN)
PP Test Statistic -5.094353 1 % Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.016372
Residual variance with correction 0.019878
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNNOGDPN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNNOGDPN(-1)) -0.758510 0.153562 -4.939440 0.0000
C 0.035864 0.021625 1.658445' 0.1051
R-squared 0.378863 Mean dependent var -0.001868
Adjusted R-squared 0.363335 S.D.dependent var 0.164319
S.E. of regression 0.131112 Akaike info criterion -1.179077
Sum squared resid 0.687618 Schwarz criterion -1.096331
Log likelihood 26.76061 F-statistic 24.39807
Durbin-Watson stat 2.083485 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000014
Pliillips-Perron Unit Root on I) (LN TGX)
PP Test Statistic -4.191733 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.036510
Residual variance with correction 0.037860
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGX(-1)) -0.605235 0.145550 -4.158247 0.0002
C 0.068096 0.034130 1.995188 0.0529
R-squared 0.301810 Mean dependent var 0.002071
Adjusted R-squared 0.284356 S.D.dependent var 0.231448
S.E. of regression 0.195795 Akaike info criterion -0.377045
Sum squared resid 1.533434 Schwarz criterion -0.294299
Log likelihood 9.917945 F-statistic 17.29102
Durbin-Watson stat 2.122950 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000165
Pliillips-Perron Unit Root on I) (LN TGXC)
PP Test Statistic -5.817112 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.014189
Residual variance with correction 0.017820
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXC(-1)) -0.896192 0.157405 -5.693539 0.0000
C 0.098460 0.025611 3.844484 0.0004
R-squared 0.447639 Mean dependent var -0.000350
Adjusted R-squared 0.433830 S.D.dependent var 0.162217
S.E. of regression 0.122059 Akaike info criterion -1.322181
Sum squared resid 0.595933 Schwarz criterion -1.239435
Log likelihood 29.76581 F-statistic 32.41639
Durbin-Watson stat 2.035283 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Phillips-Pcrron Unit Root on D (LN TGXN)
PP Test Statistic -4.254418 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel : 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.036486
Residual variance with correction 0.038076
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXN(-1)) -0.615601 0.146025 -4.215713 0.0001
C 0.048374 0.032204 1.502087 0.1409
R-squared 0.307626 Mean dependent var 0.001245
Adjusted R-squared 0.290316 S.D.dependent var 0.232340
S.E of regression 0.195730 Akaike info criterion -0.377716
Sum squared resid 1.532405 Schwarz criterion -0.294970
Log likelihood 9.932034 F-statistic 17.77223
Durbin-Watson stat 2.125464 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000138
Phillips-Pcrron Unit Root on D (LN TGX NO GDP)
PP Test Statistic -6.732384 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel : 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.031835
Residual variance with correction 0.031601
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTGXNOGDP(-1)) -1.064171 0.158090 -6.731413 0.0000
C 0.031683 0.028529 1.110571 0.2734
R-squared 0.531132 Mean dependent var 0.003104
Adjusted R-squared 0.519411 S.D. dependent var 0.263729
S.E. of regression 0.182829 Akaike info criterion -0.514086
Sum squared resid 1.337054 Schwarz criterion -0.431340
Log likelihood 12.79580 F-statistic 45.31193
Durbin-Watson stat 1.971467 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Appendix (4)
The results from Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests for six
Unit Root (ADF) and 
categories
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (Ln AGR) Agriculture Sector
ADF Test Statistic -6.284926 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNAGR,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNAGR(-1)) -1.510725 0.240373 -6.284926 0.0000
D(LNAGR(-1 ),2) 0.276297 0.157301 1.756481 0.0871
C 0.174884 0.126026 1.387678 0.1733
R-squared 0.622538 Mean dependent var -0.016763
Adjusted R-squared 0.602671 S.D.dependent var 1.244816
S.E. of regression 0.784658 Akaike info criterion 2.423217
Sum squared resid 23.39613 Schwarz criterion 2.548600
Log likelihood -46.67595 F-statistic 31.33618
Durbin-Watson stat 1.883411 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on I) (Un KDU) Education Sector 
ADF l est Statistic -5.019784 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNEDU,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNEDU(-1)) -1.063511 0.211864 -5.019784 0.0000
D(LNEDU(-1 ),2) 0.196614 0.159824 1.230187 0.2262
C 0.155266 0.103321 1.502746 0.1412
R-squared 0.466168 Mean dependent var -0.017656
Adjusted R-squared 0.438071 S.D.dependent var 0.833505
S.E. of regression 0.624811 Akaike info criterion 1.967621
Sum squared resid 14.83478 Schwarz criterion 2.093004
Log likelihood -37.33622 F-statistic 16.59169
Durbin-Watson stat 1.861869 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on I) (Ln GDP)
ADF Test Statistic -4.604020 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints___________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.892805 0.193918 -4.604020 0.0000
D(LNGDP(-1 ),2) 0.048376 0.150223 0.322026 0.7492
C 0.059555 0.032137 1.853175 0.0716
R-squared 0.444122 Mean dependent var -0.007152
Adjusted R-squared 0.414865 S.D.dependent var 0.236167
S.E. of regression 0.180654 Akaike info criterion -0.514116
Sum squared resid 1.240156 Schwarz criterion -0.388733
Log likelihood 13.53938 F-statistic 15.18014
Durbin-Watson stat 2.013718 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000014
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (Ln IIEA) Health Sector
ADF Test Statistic -4.576264 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEA,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/24/09 Time: 16:12 
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints___________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNHEA(-1)) -1.154778 0.252341 -4.576264 0.0000
D(LNHEA(-1), 2) -0.047836 0.161911 -0.295445 0.7693
C 0.206548 0.121279 1.703081 0.0967
R-squared 0.610607 Mean dependent var -0.013391
Adjusted R-squared 0.590113 S.D.dependent var 1.109696
S.E. of regression 0.710454 Akaike info criterion 2.224530
Sum squared resid 19.18030 Schwarz criterion 2.349914
Log likelihood -42.60287 F-statistic 29.79395
Durbin-Watson stat 1.972814 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (Ln IIOU) Housing and Public utilities Sector
ADF Test Statistic -3.348791 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-3.5973
-2.9339
-2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNHOU,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNHOU(-1)) -0.713211 0.212976 -3.348791 0.0018
D(LNHOU(-1),2) -0.256829 0.157822 -1.627336 0.1119
C 0.058933 0.065819 0.895384 0.3762
R-squared 0.514826 Mean dependent var -0.020553
Adjusted R-squared 0.489291 S.D.dependent var 0.556260
S.E. of regression 0.397525 Akaike info criterion 1.063238
Sum squared resid 6.004992 Schwarz criterion 1.188621
Log likelihood -18.79637 F-statistic 20.16124
Durbin-Watson stat 2.034798 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D (Ln MAN) Manufacturing Sector
ADF Test Statistic -4.243202 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNMAN,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNMAN(-1)) -0.993902 0.234234 -4.243202 0.0001
D(LNMAN(-1 ),2) -0.068221 0.172489 -0.395510 0.6947
C 0.148730 0.175324 0.848313 0.4016
R-squared 0.534738 Mean dependent var -0.003104
Adjusted R-squared 0.510250 S.D.dependent var 1.552675
S.E. of regression 1.086595 Akaike info criterion 3.074330
Sum squared resid 44.86613 Schwarz criterion 3.199713
Log likelihood -60.02376 F-statistic 21.83720
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967062 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
ADF Test Statistic -3.874262 1% Critical Value* -3.5973
5% Critical Value -2.9339
10% Critical Value -2.6048
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRA,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1965 2005
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints______________________________
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on 1) (Ln TRA) Transportation and Communication
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTRA(-1)) -0.851187 0.219703 -3.874262 0.0004
D(LNTRA(-1),2) -0.080661 0.165274 -0.488043 0.6283
C 0.063145 0.080208 0.787269 0.4360
R-squared 0.464111 Mean dependent var -0.015855
Adjusted R-squared 0.435907 S.D.dependent var 0.664758
S.E. of regression 0.499274 Akaike info criterion 1.519031
Sum squared resid 9.472422 Schwarz criterion 1.644414
Log likelihood -28.14014 F-statistic 16.45513
Durbin-Watson stat 1.996924 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000007
Phillips-Pcrron Unit Root on I) (Ln AGR) Agriculture Sector 
PP Test Statistic -7.807331 1% Critical Value*
5% Critical Value
______________________________________10% Critical Value______
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3)
Residual variance with no correction
Residual variance with correction______________________________
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNAGR,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_________________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNAGR(-1)) -1.185641 0.155936 -7.603381 0.0000
C 0.143270 0.124554 1.150264 0.2569
R-squared 0.591050 Mean dependent var -0.011306
Adjusted R-squared 0.580826 S.D.dependent var 1.230051
S.E. of regression 0.796380 Akaike info criterion 2.428966
Sum squared resid 25.36882 Schwarz criterion 2.511713
Log likelihood -49.00829 F-statistic 57.81141
Durbin-Watson stat 2.094917 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Pcrron Unit Root on D (Ln EDU) Education Sector 
PP Test Statistic -5.588796 1% Critical Value*
5% Critical Value
______________________________________10% Critical Value______
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction
Residual variance with correction______________________________
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNEDU,2)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_________________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNEDU(-1)) -0.889689 0.157853 -5.636185 0.0000
C 0.136845 0.099658 1.373151 0.1774
R-squared 0.442638 Mean dependent var -0.009414
Adjusted R-squared 0.428703 S.D.dependent var 0.825008
S.E. of regression 0.623575 Akaike info criterion 1.939754
Sum squared resid 15.55385 Schwarz criterion 2.022500
Log likelihood -38.73483 F-statistic 31.76658
Durbin-Watson stat 1.940139 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
0.370330
0.317735
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
0.604019
0.473649
-3.5930
-2.9320
-2.6039
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (Ln GDP)
PP Test Statistic -5.446949 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.030628
Residual variance with correction 0.025935
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNGDP,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.796093 0.145555 -5.469371 0.0000
C 0.056571 0.030254 1.869848 0.0688
R-squared 0.427869 Mean dependent var -0.010331
Adjusted R-squared 0.413565 S.D.dependent var 0.234177
S E of regression 0.179330 Akaike info criterion -0.552726
Sum squared resid 1.286375 Schwarz criterion -0.469980
Log likelihood 13.60725 F-statistic 29.91402
Durbin-Watson stat 2.067722 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (Ln IIEA) Health Sector
PP Test Statistic -7.855105 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.462962
Residual variance with correction 0.488848
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEA,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNHEA(-1)) -1.217409 0.154200 -7.895027 0.0000
C 0.230103 0.111348 2.066520 0.0453
R-squared 0.609113 Mean dependent var 0.003431
Adjusted R-squared 0.599341 S.D. dependent var 1.101488
S.E. of regression 0.697216 Akaike info criterion 2.163004
Sum squared resid 19.44438 Schwarz criterion 2.245750
Log likelihood -43.42308 F-statistic 62.33145
Durbin-Watson stat 1.958817 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on D (Ln IIOU) Housing and Public utilities Sector
PP Test Statistic -6.049211 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.159119
Residual variance with correction 0.195445
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(LNHOU,2)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNHOU(-1)) -0.949300 0.159308 -5.958906 0.0000
C 0.093995 0.065387 1.437514 0.1583
R-squared 0.470259 Mean dependent var -0.008781
Adjusted R-squared 0.457015 S.D.dependent var 0.554705
S.E. of regression 0.408749 Akaike info criterion 1.095015
Sum squared resid 6.683017 Schwarz criterion 1.177761
Log likelihood -20.99532 F-statistic 35.50856
Durbin-Watson stat 1.972013 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on 1) (Ln MAN) Manufacturing Sector
PP Test Statistic -6.613133 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
•MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3)
Residual variance with no correction 1.134264
Residual variance with correction____________________________________1.014149
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNMAN,2)
Method' Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints______________________________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNMAN(-1)) -1.066692 0.161529 -6.603737 0.0000
C 0.202641 0.170194 1.190648 0.2408
R-squared 0.521585 Mean dependent var 0.039631
Adjusted R-squared 0.509624 S.D.dependent var 1.558429
S.E. of regression 1.091319 Akaike info criterion 3.059099
Sum squared resid 47.63907 Schwarz criterion 3.141845
Log likelihood -62.24108 F-statistic 43.60935
Durbin-Watson stat 1.890732 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root on I) (Un TRA) Transportation and Communication
PP Test Statistic -5.845619 1% Critical Value* -3.5930
5% Critical Value -2.9320
10% Critical Value -2.6039
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.228966
Residual variance with correction 0.249325
Phillips-Perron Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRA,2) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/24/09 Time: 16:27 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
D(LNTRA(-1)) -0.922161 0.158698 -5.810782 0.0000
C 0.075661 0.077082 0.981553 0.3322
R-squared 0.457739 Mean dependent var -0.010047
Adjusted R-squared 0.444182 S.D. dependent var 0.657679
S.E. of regression 0.490320 Akaike info criterion 1.458933
Sum squared resid 9.616565 Schwarz criterion 1.541679
Log likelihood -28.63759 F-statistic 33.76519
Durbin-Watson stat 1.990346 Prob( F-statistic) 0.000001
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Appendix (5)
Engle Granger two steps for testing Cointegration with total GDP 
the results without dummies and with dummies
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.620703 0.531624 -8.691675 0.0000
LNGDP 1.350530 0.058816 22.96195 0.0000
R-squared 0.926219 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.924462 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.359026 Akaike info criterion 0.833548
Sum squared resid 5.413799 Schwarz criterion 0.914647
Log likelihood -16.33805 F-statistic 527.2510
Durbin-Watson stat 0.604798 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on ResidOl
ADF Test Statistic 2.625620 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID01)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07(-1) -0.337623 0.128588 -2.625620 0.0122
D(RESID07(-1)) 0.155251 0.151415 1.025333 0.3114
R-squared 0.145376 Mean dependent var 0.011618
Adjusted R-squared 0.124011 S.D. dependent var 0.268394
S.E. of regression 0.251201 Akaike info criterion 0.121324
Sum squared resid 2.524083 Schwarz criterion 0.204070
Log likelihood -0.547794 Durbin-Watson stat 1.955279
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Pryor model)
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.010443 0.780374 -5.139129 0.0000
LNGDP 1.343771 0.086336 15.56437 0.0000
R-squared 0.852243 Mean dependent var 8.072473
Adjusted R-squared 0.848724 S.D.dependent var 1.355003
S.E. of regression 0.527017 Akaike info criterion 1.601222
Sum squared resid 11.66537 Schwarz criterion 1.682321
Log likelihood -33.22687 F-statistic 242.2496
Durbin-Watson stat 0.185728 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid02
ADF Test Statistic 1.169403 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID08)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08(-1) -0.077626 0.066381 -1.169403 0.2492
D(RESID08(-1)) 0.120344 0.145591 0.826590 0.4134
R-squared 0.038664 Mean dependent var 0.010860
Adjusted R-squared 0.014631 S.D.dependent var 0.211099
S.E. of regression 0.209549 Akaike info criterion -0.241267
Sum squared resid 1.756437 Schwarz criterion -0.158521
Log likelihood 7.066614 Durbin-Watson stat 2.066250
Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Goffman model)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.405841 1.400636 -4.573522 0.0000
LNGDPN 1.781134 0.178566 9.974651 0.0000
R-squared 0.703167 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.696099 S.D. dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.720128 Akaike info criterion 2.225614
Sum squared resid 21.78056 Schwarz criterion 2.306714
Log likelihood -46.96351 F-statistic 99.49365
Durbin-Watson stat 0.224204 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()3
ADF Test Statistic -0.879210 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID09)
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09(-1) -0.068627 0.078055 -0.879210 0.3845
D(RESID09(-1)) 0.041701 0.156919 0.265746 0.7918
R-squared 0.004234 Mean dependent var 0.039294
Adjusted R-squared -0.020660 S.D. dependent var 0.324605
S.E. of regression 0.327941 Akaike info criterion 0.654481
Sum squared resid 4.301808 Schwarz criterion 0.737227
Log likelihood -11.74410 Durbin-Watson stat 2.031699
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Musgrave model)
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.173653 1.164474 -1.866639 0.0689
LNGDPN 1.355513 0.148458 9.130623 0.0000
R-squared 0.664987 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.657011 S.D. dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.598707 Akaike info criterion 1.856300
Sum squared resid 15.05490 Schwarz criterion 1.937400
Log likelihood -38.83860 F-statistic 83.36828
Durbin-Watson stat 0.178110 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()4
ADF Test Statistic -1.071878 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
"MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID10)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10(-1) -0.071020 0.066258 -1.071878 0.2902
DfRESID 10(-1)) 0.041987 0.153801 0.272996 0.7863
R-squared 0.015969 Mean dependent var 0.026541
Adjusted R-squared -0.008631 S.D.dependent var 0.242261
S.E. of regression 0.243304 Akaike info criterion 0.057442
Sum squared resid 2.367883 Schwarz criterion 0.140188
Log likelihood 0.793724 Durbin-Watson stat 1.985082
Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Method: Least Squares 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.491932 0.825280 -5.442918 0.0000
LNGDPN 1.386578 0.105214 13.17861 0.0000
R-squared 0.805263 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.800627 S.D.dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.424312 Akaike info criterion 1.167696
Sum squared resid 7.561725 Schwarz criterion 1.248795
Log likelihood -23.68931 F-statistic 173.6757
Durbin-Watson stat 0.447575 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid05
ADF Test Statistic -1.860824 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID11)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 (-1) -0.208378 0.111982 -1.860824 0.0701
D(RESID11 (-1)) 0.109625 0.156829 0.699011 0.4886
R-squared 0.073615 Mean dependent var 0.021855
Adjusted R-squared 0.050455 S.D.dependent var 0.272549
S.E. of regression 0.265584 Akaike info criterion 0.232676
Sum squared resid 2.821393 Schwarz criterion 0.315423
Log likelihood -2.886205 Durbin-Watson stat 1.984387
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Mann model)
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.124330 0.388911 -2.890968 0.0061
LNGDP 1.062198 0.043027 24.68674 0.0000
R-squared 0.935527 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.933992 S.D.dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.262647 Akaike info criterion 0.208378
Sum squared resid 2.897305 Schwarz criterion 0.289477
Log likelihood -2.584308 F-statistic 609.4353
Durbin-Watson stat 0.615627 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid06
ADF Test Statistic -2.744518 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID12)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12(-1) -0.333276 0.121433 -2.744518 0.0090
D(RESID12(-1)) 0.115467 0.148686 0.776582 0.4420
R-squared 0.159408 Mean dependent var 0.002943
Adjusted R-squared 0.138393 S.D.dependent var 0.198863
S.E. of regression 0.184590 Akaike info criterion -0.494911
Sum squared resid 1.362940 Schwarz criterion -0.412165
Log likelihood 12.39312 Durbin-Watson stat 1.924709
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.918346 0.931568 -7.426559 0.0000
LNGDP 1.695760 0.130284 13.01592 0.0000
DUM1 -0.944403 0.317254 -2.976801 0.0049
DUM2 -0.028816 0.113292 -0.254352 0.8005
R-squared 0.939609 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.935080 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.332839 Akaike info criterion 0.724195
Sum squared resid 4.431283 Schwarz criterion 0.886394
Log likelihood -11.93229 F-statistic 207.4498
Durbin-Watson stat 0.990683 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on ResidOl with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -3.218234 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID07)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07(-1) -0.534458 0.166072 -3.218234 0.0026
D(RESID07(-1)) 0.016341 0.147493 0.110791 0.9123
R-squared 0.247060 Mean dependent var 0.008658
Adjusted R-squared 0.228237 S.D.dependent var 0.306562
S.E. of regression 0.269315 Akaike info criterion 0.260579
Sum squared resid 2.901226 Schwarz criterion 0.343325
Log likelihood -3.472157 Durbin-Watson stat 1.995544
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Pryor model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.937689 1.061078 -4.653464 0.0000
LNGDP 1.497823 0.148396 10.09342 0.0000
DUM1 -0.924348 0.361360 -2.557969 0.0144
DUM2 0.739502 0.129043 5.730671 0.0000
R-squared 0.927181 Mean dependent var 8.072473
Adjusted R-squared 0.921719 S.D.dependent var 1.355003
S.E. of regression 0.379112 Akaike info criterion 0.984537
Sum squared resid 5.749034 Schwarz criterion 1.146736
Log likelihood -17.65982 F-statistic 169.7687
Durbin-Watson stat 0.720369 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid02 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -2.051491 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID08)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08(-1) -0.361841 0.176379 -2.051491 0.0468
D(RESID08(-1)) 0.053817 0.172037 0.312820 0.7560
R-squared 0.113085 Mean dependent var 0.021513
Adjusted R-squared 0.090912 S.D.dependent var 0.300180
S.E. of regression 0.286210 Akaike info criterion 0.382264
Sum squared resid 3.276640 Schwarz criterion 0.465010
Log likelihood -6.027543 Durbin-Watson stat 2.009030
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44_______ ______________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.620703 0.531624 -8.691675 0.0000
LNGDP 1.350530 0.058816 22.96195 0.0000
R-squared 0.926219 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.924462 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.359026 Akaike info criterion 0.833548
Sum squared resid 5.413799 Schwarz criterion 0.914647
Log likelihood -16.33805 F-statistic 527.2510
Durbin-Watson stat 0.604798 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Pliillips-Pcrron Unit Root Test on ResidolPP
PP Test Statistic -3.068125 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel:3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.062968
Residual variance with correction 0.070084
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID01PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07PP(-1) -0.336059 0.113355 -2.964655 0.0050
R-squared 0.173021 Mean dependent var -0.001708
Adjusted R-squared 0.173021 S.D.dependent var 0.279205
S.E. of regression 0.253905 Akaike info criterion 0.119265
Sum squared resid 2.707636 Schwarz criterion 0.160223
Log likelihood -1.564188 Durbin-Watson stat 1.626896
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Pryor model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.010443 0.780374 -5.139129 0.0000
LNGDP 1.343771 0.086336 15.56437 0.0000
R-squared 0.852243 Mean dependent var 8.072473
Adjusted R-squared 0.848724 S.D.dependent var 1.355003
S.E. of regression 0.527017 Akaike info criterion 1.601222
Sum squared resid 11.66537 Schwarz criterion 1.682321
Log likelihood -33.22687 F-statistic 242.2496
Durbin-Watson stat 0.185728 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido2PP
PP Test Statistic -1.693745 1 % Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.047482
Residual variance with correction 0.054838
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID02PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08PP(-1) -0.105878 0.066060 -1.602761 0.1165
R-squared 0.057486 Mean dependent var -0.002844
Adjusted R-squared 0.057486 S.D.dependent var 0.227106
S.E. of regression 0.220482 Akaike info criterion -0.163023
Sum squared resid 2.041711 Schwarz criterion -0.122065
Log likelihood 4.505004 Durbin-Watson stat 1.584868
Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Coffman model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.405841 1.400636 -4.573522 0.0000
LNGDPN 1.781134 0.178566 9.974651 0.0000
R-squared 0.703167 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.696099 S.D. dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.720128 Akaike info criterion 2.225614
Sum squared resid 21.78056 Schwarz criterion 2.306714
Log likelihood -46.96351 F-statistic 99.49365
Durbin-Watson stat 0.224204 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido3PP
PP Test Statistic -0.854290 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.110742
Residual variance with correction 0.093585
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID03PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09PP(-1) -0.078347 0.075726 -1.034617 0.3068
R-squared 0.020693 Mean dependent var 0.021963
Adjusted R-squared 0.020693 S.D. dependent var 0.340257
S.E. of regression 0.336718 Akaike info criterion 0.683839
Sum squared resid 4.761917 Schwarz criterion 0.724797
Log likelihood -13.70253 Durbin-Watson stat 1.786011
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Musgrave model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.173653 1.164474 -1.866639 0.0689
LNGDPN 1.355513 0.148458 9.130623 0.0000
R-squared 0.664987 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.657011 S.D. dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.598707 Akaike info criterion 1.856300
Sum squared resid 15.05490 Schwarz criterion 1.937400
Log likelihood -38.83860 F-statistic 83.36828
Durbin-Watson stat 0.178110 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido4PP
PP Test Statistic -0.883743 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.060608
Residual variance with correction 0.046285
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID04PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10PP(-1) -0.072242 0.065579 -1.101598 0.2769
R-squared 0.024839 Mean dependent var 0.014400
Adjusted R-squared 0.024839 S.D.dependent var 0.252253
S.E. of regression 0.249100 Akaike info criterion 0.081057
Sum squared resid 2.606135 Schwarz criterion 0.122015
Log likelihood -0.742722 Durbin-Watson stat 1.816409
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Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.491932 0.825280 -5.442918 0.0000
LNGDPN 1.386578 0.105214 13.17861 0.0000
R-squared 0.805263 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.800627 S.D.dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.424312 Akaike info criterion 1.167696
Sum squared resid 7.561725 Schwarz criterion 1.248795
Log likelihood -23.68931 F-statistic 173.6757
Durbin-Watson stat 0.447575 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido5PP
PP Test Statistic -2.080203 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.071510
Residual variance with correction 0.072997
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID05PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 PP(-1) -0.212641 0.103423 -2.056023 0.0460
R-squared 0.090665 Mean dependent var 0.008216
Adjusted R-squared 0.090665 S.D.dependent var 0.283748
S.E. of regression 0.270579 Akaike info criterion 0.246477
Sum squared resid 3.074951 Schwarz criterion 0.287436
Log likelihood -4.299266 Durbin-Watson stat 1.679986
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Mann model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.124330 0.388911 -2.890968 0.0061
LNGDP 1.062198 0.043027 24.68674 0.0000
R-squared 0.935527 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.933992 S.D.dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.262647 Akaike info criterion 0.208378
Sum squared resid 2.897305 Schwarz criterion 0.289477
Log likelihood -2.584308 F-statistic 609.4353
Durbin-Watson stat 0.615627 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root l est on Rcsid«6PP
PP Test Statistic -3.082082 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.033754
Residual variance with correction 0.032950
Dependent Variable: D(RESID06PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12PP(-1) -0.340227 0.109727 -3.100677 0.0034
R-squared 0.185445 Mean dependent var -0.006482
Adjusted R-squared 0.185445 S.D.dependent var 0.205973
S.E. of regression 0.185897 Akaike info criterion -0.504272
Sum squared resid 1.451416 Schwarz criterion -0.463314
Log likelihood 11.84184 Durbin-Watson stat 1.708851
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Goffman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.417473 2.260951 -2.396104 0.0213
LNGDPN 1.593081 0.340803 4.674498 0.0000
DUM1 0.180382 0.605323 0.297993 0.7673
DUM2 0.765499 0.220125 3.477560 0.0012
R-squared 0.795529 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.780193 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.612442 Akaike info criterion 1.943782
Sum squared resid 15.00339 Schwarz criterion 2.105981
Log likelihood -38.76319 F-statistic 51.87545
Durbin-Watson stat 0.402300 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()3 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -1.113437 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID09)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09(-1) -0.137994 0.123935 -1.113437 0.2722
D(RESID09(-1)) 0.076568 0.172456 0.443983 0.6594
R-squared 0.017066 Mean dependent var 0.042587
Adjusted R-squared -0.007507 S.D.dependent var 0.368725
S.E. of regression 0.370107 Akaike info criterion 0.896396
Sum squared resid 5.479154 Schwarz criterion 0.979142
Log likelihood -16.82432 Durbin-Watson stat 1.998249
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Musgrave model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.651099 1.513148 -1.091168 0.2817
LNGDPN 1.237797 0.228083 5.426953 0.0000
DUM1 0.018791 0.405114 0.046384 0.9632
DUM2 0.885124 0.147320 6.008189 0.0000
R-squared 0.850461 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.839246 S.D.dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.409878 Akaike info criterion 1.140595
Sum squared resid 6.720009 Schwarz criterion 1.302794
Log likelihood -21.09309 F-statistic 75.82977
Durbin-Watson stat 0.592741 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()4 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -1.960862 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value •1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID10)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10(-1) -0.304462 0.155269 -1.960862 0.0569
D(RESID10(-1)) 0.153707 0.177423 0.866331 0.3915
R-squared 0.079533 Mean dependent var 0.030843
Adjusted R-squared 0.056521 S.D.dependent var 0.302336
S.E. of regression 0.293668 Akaike info criterion 0.433714
Sum squared resid 3.449634 Schwarz criterion 0.516460
Log likelihood -7.107986 Durbin-Watson stat 1.938050
Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -4.657516 1.551254 -3.002419 0.0046
LNGDPN 1.404359 0.233827 6.005973 0.0000
DUM1 -0.087673 0.415316 -0.211099 0.8339
DUM2 0.232178 0.151030 1.537299 0.1321
R-squared 0.818114 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.804472 S.D. dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.420200 Akaike info criterion 1.190338
Sum squared resid 7.062736 Schwarz criterion 1.352537
Log likelihood -22.18744 F-statistic 59.97250
Durbin-Watson stat 0.518232 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on ResidOS with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -1.871526 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID11)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 (-1) -0.237827 0.127077 -1.871526 0.0686
D(RESID11 (-1)) 0.090256 0.160888 0.560985 0.5779
R-squared 0.075886 Mean dependent var 0.023225
Adjusted R-squared 0.052783 S.D. dependent var 0.284114
S.E. of regression 0.276514 Akaike info criterion 0.313335
Sum squared resid 3.058394 Schwarz criterion 0.396082
Log likelihood -4.580044 Durbin-Watson stat 1.998242
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Mann model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.283615 0.559071 -4.084659 0.0002
LNGDP 1.242255 0.078188 15.88798 0.0000
DUM1 -0.692992 0.190397 -3.639725 0.0008
DUM2 0.284810 0.067991 4.188911 0.0001
R-squared 0.964484 Mean dependent var 8.426735
Adjusted R-squared 0.961821 S.D.dependent var 1.022290
S.E. of regression 0.199750 Akaike info criterion -0.296990
Sum squared resid 1.596006 Schwarz criterion -0.134791
Log likelihood 10.53378 F-statistic 362.0894
Durbin-Watson stat 1.434926 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid06 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -4.148922 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID12)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12(-1) -0.826317 0.199164 -4.148922 0.0002
D(RESID12(-1)) 0.074762 0.149891 0.498773 0.6207
R-squared 0.374095 Mean dependent var 0.006172
Adjusted R-squared 0.358447 S.D. dependent var 0.223492
S.E. of regression 0.179010 Akaike info criterion -0.556301
Sum squared resid 1.281784 Schwarz criterion -0.473555
Log likelihood 13.68233 Durbin-Watson stat 1.984936
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Appendix (6)
Engle Granger two steps for testing Cointegration with total non­
oil GDP the results without dummies and with dummies
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Pcacock-Wiscman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.984587 0.365716 -8.160945 0.0000
LNNOGDP 1.246933 0.043091 28.93741 0.0000
R-squared 0.952239 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.951102 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.288863 Akaike info c r i t e r i o n 0.398659
Sum squared resid 3.504552 Schwarz criterion 0.479759
Log likelihood -6.770504 F-statistic 837.3735
Durbin-Watson stat 0.418698 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test with total non-oil GDP on ResidOl
ADF Test Statistic 1.673694 1 % Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
"MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID07)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07(-1) -0.180720 0.107977 ■1.673694 0.1020
D(RESID07(-1)) -0.047528 0.162423 ■0.292618 0.7713
R-squared 0.082483 Mean dependent var 0.009867
Adjusted R-squared 0.059545 S.D.dependent var 0.188774
S.E. of regression 0.183067 Akaike info criterion -0.511476
Sum squared resid 1.340548 Schwarz criterion -0.428730
Log likelihood 12.74100 Durbin-Watson stat 1.935967
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Prvor model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.867149 0.405484 7.070926 0.0000
LNNOGDP 1.299286 0.047776 27.19514 0.0000
R-squared 0.946262 Mean dependent var 8.081594
Adjusted R-squared 0.944983 S.D. dependent var 1.365441
S.E. of regression 0.320274 Akaike info criterion 0.605110
Sum squared resid 4.308170 Schwarz criterion 0.686209
Log likelihood -11.31241 F-statistic 739.5755
Durbin-Watson stat 0.266711 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test with total non-oil GDP on Rcsid02
ADF Test Statistic 1.329134 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
"MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID08)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/20/09 Time: 18:21 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08(-1) -0.114760 0.086342 1.329134 0.1913
D(RESID08(-1)) -0.076242 0.160202 0.475913 0.6367
R-squared 0.060412 Mean dependent var 0.004358
Adjusted R-squared 0.036922 S.D.dependent var 0.166956
S.E. of regression 0.163845 Akaike info criterion -0.733345
Sum squared resid 1.073806 Schwarz criterion -0.650599
Log likelihood 17.40025 Durbin-Watson stat 1.908390
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Coffman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.427813 0.684496 -9.390573 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.922885 0.093981 20.46032 0.0000
R-squared 0.908819 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.906648 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.399121 Akaike info criterion 1.045286
Sum squared resid 6.690503 Schwarz criterion 1.126385
Log likelihood -20.99628 F-statistic 418.6246
Durbin-Watson stat 0.329100 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test with total non-oil GDF on Resid()3
ADF Test Statistic -0.628931 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID09)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09(-1) -0.065147 0.103584 -0.628931 0.5330
D(RESID09(-1)) -0.192240 0.167540 -1.147425 0.2580
R-squared 0.056489 Mean dependent var 0.019099
Adjusted R-squared 0.032902 S.D.dependent var 0.230773
S.E. of regression 0.226945 Akaike info criterion -0.081771
Sum squared resid 2.060160 Schwarz criterion 0.000976
Log likelihood 3.717182 Durbin-Watson stat 1.861958
Dependent Variable: LNTGXNOGDP (Musgrave model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.832980 0.481026 -7.968348 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 0.403716 0.066045 6.112768 0.0000
R-squared 0.470806 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.458206 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.280480 Akaike info criterion 0.339760
Sum squared resid 3.304099 Schwarz criterion 0.420860
Log likelihood -5.474730 F-statistic 37.36593
Durbin-Watson stat 0.478112 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test with total non-oil GDP on Resid()4
ADF Test Statistic -1.611402 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID10)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10(-1) -0.192237 0.119298 -1.611402 0.1150
D(RESID10(-1)) -0.082567 0.164723 -0.501247 0.6189
R-squared 0.091466 Mean dependent var 0.010631
Adjusted R-squared 0.068752 S.D.dependent var 0.195841
S.E. of regression 0.188989 Akaike info criterion -0.447806
Sum squared resid 1.428676 Schwarz criterion -0.365060
Log likelihood 11.40393 Durbin-Watson stat 1.905045
Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.830337 0.481455 -7.955753 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.403381 0.066104 21.23001 0.0000
R-squared 0.914758 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.912728 S.D.dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.280730 Akaike info criterion 0.341544
Sum squared resid 3.309998 Schwarz criterion 0.422644
Log likelihood -5.513970 F-statistic 450.7134
Durbin-Watson stat 0.477238 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test with total non-oil GDP on Resid05
ADF Test Statistic -1.617105 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID11)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 (-1) -0.192749 0.119194 -1.617105 0.1137
D(RESID11 (-1)) -0.079603 0.164735 -0.483217 0.6316
R-squared 0.090924 Mean dependent var 0.010612
Adjusted R-squared 0.068197 S.D.dependent var 0.195834
S.E. of regression 0.189039 Akaike info criterion -0.447280
Sum squared resid 1.429429 Schwarz criterion -0.364534
Log likelihood 11.39287 Durbin-Watson stat 1.906133
Dependent Variable: LNTGXNOGDP (Mann model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.986356 0.365447 -8.171795 0.0000
LNNOGDP 0.247117 0.043059 5.739041 0.0000
R-squared 0.439526 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.426182 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.288650 Akaike info criterion 0.397187
Sum squared resid 3.499398 Schwarz criterion 0.478287
Log likelihood -6.738122 F-statistic 32.93659
Durbin-Watson stat 0.419305 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root l est with total non-oil GDP on Resid06
ADF Test Statistic -1.668536 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID12)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/20/09 Time: 18:28
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12(-1) -0.180282 0.108048 -1.668536 0.1030
D(RESID12(-1)) -0.050488 0.162413 -0.310864 0.7575
R-squared 0.082849 Mean dependent var 0.009885
Adjusted R-squared 0.059920 S.D.dependent var 0.188774
S.E. of regression 0.183031 Akaike info criterion -0.511873
Sum squared resid 1.340016 Schwarz criterion -0.429127
Log likelihood 12.74933 Durbin-Watson stat 1.934808
Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.984587 0.365716 -8.160945 0.0000
LNNOGDP 1.246933 0.043091 28.93741 0.0000
R-squared 0.952239 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.951102 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. ot regression 0.288863 Akaike info criterion 0.398659
Sum squared resid 3.504552 Schwarz criterion 0.479759
Log likelihood -6.770504 F-statistic 837.3735
Durbin-Watson stat 0.418698 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on ResidolPP
PP Test Statistic -1.996475 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.031266
Residual variance with correction 0.032315
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID01PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07PP(-1) -0.192818 0.098399 -1.959551 0.0567
R-squared 0.081801 Mean dependent var 0.008547
Adjusted R-squared 0.081801 S.D.dependent var 0.186714
S.E. of regression 0.178914 Akaike info criterion -0.580838
Sum squared resid 1.344434 Schwarz criterion -0.539880
Log likelihood 13.48802 Durbin-Watson stat 2.050716
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Pryor model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.867149 0.405484 -7.070926 0.0000
LNNOGDP 1.299286 0.047776 27.19514 0.0000
R-squared 0.946262 Mean dependent var 8.081594
Adjusted R-squared 0.944983 S.D.dependent var 1.365441
S.E. of regression 0.320274 Akaike info criterion 0.605110
Sum squared resid 4.308170 Schwarz criterion 0.686209
Log likelihood -11.31241 F-statistic 739.5755
Durbin-Watson stat 0.266711 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Pliillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido2PP
PP Test Statistic -1.617531 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.025130
Residual variance with correction 0.024747
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID02PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08PP(-1) -0.129438 0.079368 -1.630867 0.1104
R-squared 0.059327 Mean dependent var 0.002549
Adjusted R-squared 0.059327 S.D.dependent var 0.165382
S.E. of regression 0.160402 Akaike info criterion -0.799290
Sum squared resid 1.080606 Schwarz criterion -0.758332
Log likelihood 18.18473 Durbin-Watson stat 2.121998
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Golfman model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44 ___
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -6.427813 0.684496 -9.390573 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.922885 0.093981 20.46032 0.0000
R-squared 0.908819 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.906648 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.399121 Akaike info criterion 1.045286
Sum squared resid 6.690503 Schwarz criterion 1.126385
Log likelihood -20.99628 F-statistic 418.6246
Durbin-Watson stat 0.329100 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido3PP
PP Test Statistic -0.626607 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.048895
Residual variance with correction 0.054087
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID03PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09PP(-1) -0.028957 0.053875 -0.537479 0.5938
R-squared -0.000673 Mean dependent var 0.019214
Adjusted R-squared -0.000673 S.D. dependent var 0.223663
S.E. of regression 0.223738 Akaike info criterion -0.133697
Sum squared resid 2.102474 Schwarz criterion -0.092739
Log likelihood 3.874480 Durbin-Watson stat 2.016400
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Musgrave model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.832980 0.481026 -7.968348 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 0.403716 0.066045 6.112768 0.0000
R-squared 0.470806 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.458206 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.280480 Akaike info criterion 0.339760
Sum squared resid 3.304099 Schwarz criterion 0.420860
Log likelihood -5.474730 F-statistic 37.36593
Durbin-Watson stat 0.478112 Prob( F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido4PP
PP Test Statistic -2.043257 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.033441
Residual variance with correction 0.033669
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID04PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID010PP(-1) -0.217041 0.106666 -2.034772 0.0482
R-squared 0.087619 Mean dependent var 0.009226
Adjusted R-squared 0.087619 S.D.dependent var 0.193715
S.E. of regression 0.185034 Akaike info criterion -0.513574
Sum squared resid 1.437977 Schwarz criterion -0.472616
Log likelihood 12.04185 Durbin-Watson stat 2.087062
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Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44 _______
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.830337 0.481455 -7.955753 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.403381 0.066104 21.23001 0.0000
R-squared 0.914758 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.912728 S.D.dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.280730 Akaike info criterion 0.341544
Sum squared resid 3.309998 Schwarz criterion 0.422644
Log likelihood -5.513970 F-statistic 450.7134
Durbin-Watson stat 0.477238 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Rcsido5PP
PP Test Statistic -2.043764 1% Critical Value* -2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel: 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3)
Residual variance with no correction 0.033444
Residual variance with correction 0.033729
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID05PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID011 PP(-1) -0.216669 0.106566 -2.033189 0.0484
R-squared 0.087505 Mean dependent var 0.009196
Adjusted R-squared 0.087505 S.D.dependent var 0.193712
S.E. of regression 0.185043 Akaike info criterion -0.513481
Sum squared resid 1.438111 Schwarz criterion -0.472523
Log likelihood 12.03985 Durbin-Watson stat 2.082937
Dependent Variable: LNTGXGDP (Mann model)
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.986356 0.365447 -8.171795 0.0000
LNNOGDP 0.247117 0.043059 5.739041 0.0000
R-squared 0.439526 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.426182 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.288650 Akaike info criterion 0.397187
Sum squared resid 3.499398 Schwarz criterion 0.478287
Log likelihood -6.738122 F-statistic 32.93659
Durbin-Watson stat 0.419305 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test on Resido6PP
PP Test Statistic -1.995753 1% Critical Value* •2.6168
5% Critical Value -1.9486
10% Critical Value -1.6198
Lag truncation for Bartlett kernel : 3 ( Newey-West suggests: 3 )
Residual variance with no correction 0.031262
Residual variance with correction 0.032251
Phillips-Perron Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID06PP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID012PP(-1) -0.193085 0.098469 -1.960883 0.0565
R-squared 0.081891 Mean dependent var 0.008578
Adjusted R-squared 0.081891 S.D.dependent var 0.186710
S.E. of regression 0.178902 Akaike info criterion -0.580975
Sum squared resid 1.344250 Schwarz criterion -0.540017
Log likelihood 13.49097 Durbin-Watson stat 2.055198
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Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.638249 0.460888 -7.893997 0.0000
LNNOGDP 1.340085 0.069367 19.31871 0.0000
DUM1 0.051074 0.173293 0.294726 0.7697
DUM2 -0.403541 0.087167 -4.629499 0.0000
R-squared 0.969394 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.967099 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.236947 Akaike info criterion 0.044546
Sum squared resid 2.245753 Schwarz criterion 0.206746
Log likelihood 3.019977 F-statistic 422.3123
Durbin-Watson stat 0.724503 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickev-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on ResidOl with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -2.850826 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
’MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID07)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07(-1) -0.387272 0.135846 -2.850826 0.0069
D(RESID07(-1)) 0.051292 0.157788 0.325069 0.7468
R-squared 0.184909 Mean dependent var 0.001084
Adjusted R-squared 0.164532 S.D.dependent var 0.199001
S.E. of regression 0.181895 Akaike info criterion -0.524332
Sum squared resid 1.323425 Schwarz criterion -0.441585
Log likelihood 13.01096 Durbin-Watson stat 1.952547
Dependent Variable: LNTGXC (Pryor model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.383774 0.531706 -4.483253 0.0001
LNNOGDP 1.236340 0.080026 15.44924 0.0000
DUM1 -0.149439 0.199921 -0.747490 0.4591
DUM2 0.399993 0.100561 3.977612 0.0003
R-squared 0.962718 Mean dependent var 8.081594
Adjusted R-squared 0.959922 S.D.dependent var 1.365441
S.E. of regression 0.273355 Akaike info criterion 0.330419
Sum squared resid 2.988924 Schwarz criterion 0.492618
Log likelihood -3.269219 F-statistic 344.3003
Durbin-Watson stat 0.513928 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on Resid()2 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -1.456730 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
’MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID08)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08(-1) -0.210373 0.144414 -1.456730 0.1530
D(RESID08(-1)) -0.011691 0.180069 -0.064922 0.9486
R-squared 0.068061 Mean dependent var 0.013029
Adjusted R-squared 0.044763 S.D.dependent var 0.192836
S.E. of regression 0.188470 Akaike info criterion -0.453306
Sum squared resid 1.420841 Schwarz criterion -0.370559
Log likelihood 11.51942 Durbin-Watson stat 1.935598
Dependent Variable: LNTGX (Coffman model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.507737 1.014991 •5.426392 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.757867 0.166470 10.55964 0.0000
DUM1 0.220484 0.292915 0.752724 0.4560
DUM2 0.212457 0.129373 1.642206 0.1084
R-squared 0.916526 Mean dependent var 7.522987
Adjusted R-squared 0.910266 S.D.dependent var 1.306303
S.E. of regression 0.391312 Akaike info criterion 1.047883
Sum squared resid 6.124992 Schwarz criterion 1.210082
Log likelihood -19.05343 F-statistic 146.3979
Durbin-Watson stat 0.342353 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on Resid03 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -0.197039 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID09)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09(-1) -0.022112 0.112222 -0.197039 0.8448
D(RESID09(-1)) -0.246571 0.172243 -1.431525 0.1600
R-squared 0.059513 Mean dependent var 0.021750
Adjusted R-squared 0.036000 S.D.dependent var 0.224983
S.E. of regression 0.220896 Akaike info criterion -0.135801
Sum squared resid 1.951803 Schwarz criterion -0.053055
Log likelihood 4.851822 Durbin-Watson stat 1.846512
Dependent Variable: LNTGXNOGDP (Musgrave model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.779122 0.680048 -5.557139 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 0.390737 0.111536 3.503239 0.0011
DUM1 0.172519 0.196254 0.879056 0.3846
DUM2 -0.242613 0.086681 -2.798933 0.0079
R-squared 0.559625 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.526597 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.262181 Akaike info criterion 0.246941
Sum squared resid 2.749545 Schwarz criterion 0.409140
Log likelihood -1.432704 F-statistic 16.94388
Durbin-Watson stat 0.559699 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on Resid04 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -1.984387 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID10)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10(-1) -0.249026 0.125493 -1.984387 0.0541
D(RESID10(-1)) -0.067364 0.162195 -0.415330 0.6801
R-squared 0.123561 Mean dependent var 0.007145
Adjusted R-squared 0.101650 S.D. dependent var 0.193454
S.E. of regression 0.183358 Akaike info criterion -0.508302
Sum squared resid 1.344809 Schwarz criterion -0.425556
Log likelihood 12.67435 Durbin-Watson stat 1.924296
Dependent Variable: LNTGXN (Gupta model)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.774890 0.680642 -5.546075 0.0000
LNNOGDPN 1.390110 0.111633 12.45247 0.0000
DUM1 0.173250 0.196426 0.882015 0.3830
DUM2 -0.242808 0.086756 -2.798742 0.0079
R-squared 0.929067 Mean dependent var 6.351390
Adjusted R-squared 0.923747 S.D.dependent var 0.950281
S.E. of regression 0.262409 Akaike info criterion 0.248686
Sum squared resid 2.754347 Schwarz criterion 0.410885
Log likelihood -1.471096 F-statistic 174.6385
Durbin-Watson stat 0.558358 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on Rcsid05 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic 1.988533 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID11)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 (-1) -0.249252 0.125344 -1.988533 0.0536
D(RESID11 (-1)) -0.064817 0.162196 -0.399620 0.6916
R-squared 0.123025 Mean dependent var 0.007123
Adjusted R-squared 0.101101 S.D. dependent var 0.193388
S.E. of regression 0.183352 Akaike info criterion -0.508371
Sum squared resid 1.344717 Schwarz criterion -0.425625
Log likelihood 12.67579 Durbin-Watson stat 1.924668
Dependent Variable: LNTGXNOGDP (Mann model)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.640552 0.460442 -7.906654 0.0000
LNNOGDP 0.340370 0.069300 4.911543 0.0000
DUM1 0.050658 0.173125 0.292609 0.7713
DUM2 -0.403454 0.087083 -4.632990 0.0000
R-squared 0.641010 Mean dependent var -0.903964
Adjusted R-squared 0.614086 S.D.dependent var 0.381052
S.E. of regression 0.236717 Akaike info criterion 0.042608
Sum squared resid 2.241404 Schwarz criterion 0.204807
Log likelihood 3.062624 F-statistic 23.80792
Durbin-Watson stat 0.726513 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test for total non-oil GDP on Rcsid06 with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -2.847854 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID12)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12(-1) -0.387451 0.136050 -2.847854 0.0069
D(RESID12(-1)) 0.049110 0.157823 0.311171 0.7573
R-squared 0.185163 Mean dependent var 0.001104
Adjusted R-squared 0.164792 S.D.dependent var 0.199087
S E of regression 0181945 Akaike info criterion -0.523772
Sum squared resid 1.324166 Schwarz criterion -0.441025
Log likelihood 12.99920 Durbin-Watson stat 1.952616
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Appendix (7)
Engle Granger two steps for testing Cointegration for six 
categories with dummies and without dummies
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Dependent Variable: LNAGR (Agriculture Sector )
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -11.09853 1.977370 ■5.612774 0.0000
LNGDP 1.784376 0.276543 6.452431 0.0000
DUM1 -0.273346 0.673412 ■0.405911 0.6870
DUM2 -0.943692 0.240477 ■3.924242 0.0003
R-squared 0.813662 Mean dependent var 4.308854
Adjusted R-squared 0.799687 S.D.dependent var 1.578532
S.E. of regression 0.706493 Akaike info criterion 2.229502
Sum squared resid 19.96532 Schwarz criterion 2.391702
Log likelihood -45.04905 F-statistic 58.22132
Durbin-Watson stat 1.352675 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on ResidOl (Agriculture Sector) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -4.207712 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID07)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID07(-1) -0.783177 0.186129 -4.207712 0.0001
D(RESID07(-1)) 0.147773 0.157598 0.937659 0.3540
R-squared 0.349390 Mean dependent var -0.005945
Adjusted R-squared 0.333125 S.D.dependent var 0.804030
S.E. of regression 0.656590 Akaike info criterion 2.042934
Sum squared resid 17.24442 Schwarz criterion 2.125680
Log likelihood -40.90161 Durbin-Watson stat 1.947465
Dependent Variable: LNEDU (Education Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -15.17381 2.191484 •6.923990 0.0000
LNGDP 2.294801 0.306488 7.487412 0.0000
DUM1 -1.733700 0.746330 ■2.322965 0.0254
DUM2 -0.274143 0.266517 •1.028613 0.3098
R-squared 0.803311 Mean dependent var 3.884309
Adjusted R-squared 0.788560 S.D.dependent var 1.702804
S.E. of regression 0.782994 Akaike info criterion 2.435125
Sum squared resid 24.52319 Schwarz criterion 2.597324
Log likelihood -49.57274 F-statistic 54.45570
Durbin-Watson stat 0.773084 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()2 (Education Sector) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -3.346658 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID08)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID08(-1) -0.451997 0.135059 -3.346658 0.0018
D(RESID08(-1)) 0.183804 0.153334 1.198714 0.2377
R-squared 0.219347 Mean dependent var 0.027115
Adjusted R-squared 0.199831 S.D. dependent var 0.663330
S.E. of regression 0.593363 Akaike info criterion 1.840426
Sum squared resid 14.08317 Schwarz criterion 1.923172
Log likelihood -36.64895 Durbin-Watson stat 2.006877
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Dependent Variable: LNHEA (Health Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -18.46567 2.199780 -8.394325 0.0000
LNGDP 2.557943 0.307648 8.314509 0.0000
DUM1 -1.668382 0.749156 -2.227017 0.0316
DUM2 -0.167498 0.267526 -0.626100 0.5348
R-squared 0.850527 Mean dependent var 3.059550
Adjusted R-squared 0.839317 S.D.dependent var 1.960715
S.E. of regression 0.785958 Akaike info criterion 2.442682
Sum squared resid 24.70921 Schwarz criterion 2.604881
Log likelihood -49.73900 F-statistic 75.86922
Durbin-Watson stat 1.097985 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-P uller Unit Root Test on Rcsid()3 (Health Sector) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic 3.136609 1% Critical Value* 
5% Critical Value 
10% Critical Value
-2.6182
-1.9488
-1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID09)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID09(-1) -0.516926 0.164804 -3.136609 0.0032
D(RESID09(-1)) -0.038424 0.155268 -0.247467 0.8058
R-squared 0.272783 Mean dependent var 0.040808
Adjusted R-squared 0.254602 S.D.dependent var 0.788481
S.E. of regression 0.680746 Akaike info criterion 2.115194
Sum squared resid 18.53663 Schwarz criterion 2.197941
Log likelihood -42.41908 Durbin-Watson stat 2.051630
Dependent Variable: LNHOU (Housing and Public utilities Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -7.247599 1.647669 -4.398699 0.0001
LNGDP 1.377959 0.230433 5.979864 0.0000
DUM1 -0.098479 0.561129 -0.175501 0.8616
DUM2 -0.665779 0.200381 -3.322568 0.0019
R-squared 0.801559 Mean dependent var 4.772419
Adjusted R-squared 0.786676 S.D.dependent var 1.274589
S.E. of regression 0.588695 Akaike info criterion 1.864689
Sum squared resid 13.86245 Schwarz criterion 2.026888
Log likelihood -37.02317 F-statistic 53.85714
Durbin-Watson stat 0.562536 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on ResidtM (Housing and Public utilities Sector) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -2.826980 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID10)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID10(-1) -0.328236 0.116108 -2.826980 0.0073
D(RESID10(-1)) 0.177792 0.154021 1.154340 0.2552
R-squared 0.166656 Mean dependent var 0.000263
Adjusted R-squared 0.145822 S.D.dependent var 0.427729
S.E. of regression 0.395315 Akaike info criterion 1.028178
Sum squared resid 6.250943 Schwarz criterion 1.110924
Log likelihood -19.59174 Durbin-Watson stat 2.023777
Dependent Variable: LNMAN (Manufacturing Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -15.47182 3.431358 ■4.508948 0.0001
LNGDP 2.206538 0.479889 4.598015 0.0000
DUM1 -0.093746 1.168581 ■0.080222 0.9365
DUM2 -1.287031 0.417304 ■3.084157 0.0037
R-squared 0.705286 Mean dependent var 3.734333
Adjusted R-squared 0.683182 S.D.dependent var 2.178118
S.E of regression 1.225988 Akaike info criterion 3.331879
Sum squared resid 60.12185 Schwarz criterion 3.494078
Log likelihood -69.30134 F-statistic 31.90821
Durbin-Watson stat 1.005432 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Rcsid05 (Manufacturing Sector) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic -3.726233 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID12)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID12(-1) -0.581716 0.156114 -3.726233 0.0006
D(RESID12(-1)) 0.126546 0.158374 0.799034 0.4290
R-squared 0.280522 Mean dependent var 0.032044
Adjusted R-squared 0.262535 S.D. dependent var 1.201997
S.E. of regression 1.032224 Akaike info criterion 2.947757
Sum squared resid 42.61946 Schwarz criterion 3.030503
Log likelihood -59.90289 Durbin-Watson stat 2.016539
Dependent Variable: LNTRA (Transportation and Communication)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -10.22009 1.953957 -5.230458 0.0000
LNGDP 1.758843 0.273269 6.436312 0.0000
DUM1 -1.271038 0.665438 -1.910075 0.0633
DUM2 -0.810909 0.237630 -3.412483 0.0015
R-squared 0.730975 Mean dependent var 4.176079
Adjusted R-squared 0.710798 S.D.dependent var 1.298180
S.E. of regression 0.698128 Akaike info criterion 2.205680
Sum squared resid 19.49532 Schwarz criterion 2.367879
Log likelihood -44.52496 F-statistic 36.22838
Durbin-Watson stat 0.567914 Prob(F-statistic) 0 .000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid06 (Transportation and Communication) with dummies
ADF Test Statistic 2.444971 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID11)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID11 (-1) -0.293463 0.120027 -2.444971 0.0190
D(RESID11 (-1)) 0.082931 0.156122 0.531191 0.5982
R-squared 0.132380 Mean dependent var -0.016481
Adjusted R-squared 0.110690 S.D.dependent var 0.507237
S.E. of regression 0.478341 Akaike info criterion 1.409462
Sum squared resid 9.152403 Schwarz criterion 1.492208
Log likelihood -27.59870 Durbin-Watson stat 2.023020
Dependent Variable: LNAGR (Agriculture Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -8.823302 1.201849 -7.341440 0.0000
LNGDP 1.460459 0.132966 10.98370 0.0000
R-squared 0.741764 Mean dependent var 4.308854
Adjusted R-squared 0.735615 S.D.dependent var 1.578532
S.E. of regression 0.811656 Akaike info criterion 2.464908
Sum squared resid 27.66896 Schwarz criterion 2.546007
Log likelihood -52.22797 F-statistic 120.6417
Durbin-Watson stat 0.959647 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on RcsidOl (agriculture Sector)
ADF Test Statistic -3.082238 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
’MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID13)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID13(-1) -0.473134 0.153503 -3.082238 0.0037
D(RESID13(-1)) -0.021789 0.156948 -0.138830 0.8903
R-squared 0.246034 Mean dependent var 0.011422
Adjusted R-squared 0.227185 S.D.dependent var 0.800093
S.E. of regression 0.703361 Akaike info criterion 2.180555
Sum squared resid 19.78867 Schwarz criterion 2.263301
Log likelihood -43.79166 Durbin-Watson stat 2.026610
Dependent Variable: LNEDU (Education Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -10.57502 1.216063 -8.696108 0.0000
LNGDP 1.608057 0.134539 11.95238 0.0000
R-squared 0.772800 Mean dependent var 3.884309
Adjusted R-squared 0.767391 S.D.dependent var 1.702804
S.E. of regression 0.821255 Akaike info criterion 2.488423
Sum squared resid 28.32730 Schwarz criterion 2.569522
Log likelihood -52.74530 F-statistic 142.8595
Durbin-Watson stat 0.636810 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Rcsid02 (Education Sector)
ADF Test Statistic -3.315757 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID14)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/28/09 Time: 19:27
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID14(-1) -0.410923 0.123930 -3.315757 0.0020
D(RESID14(-1)) 0.271726 0.153797 1.766784 0.0849
R-squared 0.215263 Mean dependent var 0.036455
Adjusted R-squared 0.195644 S.D.dependent var 0.655495
S.E. of regression 0.587886 Akaike info criterion 1.821882
Sum squared resid 13.82442 Schwarz criterion 1.904628
Log likelihood -36.25952 Durbin-Watson stat 1.934562
Dependent Variable: LNHEA (Health Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -14.20594 1.207468 -11.76506 0.0000
LNGDP 1.920138 0.133588 14.37361 0.0000
R-squared 0.831054 Mean dependent var 3.059550
Adjusted R-squared 0.827032 S.D.dependent var 1.960715
S E of regression 0.815451 Akaike info criterion 2.474237
Sum squared resid 27.92831 Schwarz criterion 2.555337
Log likelihood -52.43322 F-statistic 206.6005
Durbin-Watson stat 0.911362 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Resid()3 (Health Sector)
ADF Test Statistic 2.979662 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID15)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID15(-1) -0.460607 0.154584 -2.979662 0.0049
D(RESID15(-1)) 0.012338 0.158638 0.077771 0.9384
R-squared 0.222424 Mean dependent var 0.048095
Adjusted R-squared 0.202985 S.D.dependent var 0.772558
S.E. of regression 0.689706 Akaike info criterion 2.141346
Sum squared resid 19.02779 Schwarz criterion 2.224092
Log likelihood -42.96827 Durbin-Watson stat 2.019427
Dependent Variable: LNHOU (Housing and Public utilities Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.867044 0.960942 -6.105515 0.0000
LNGDP 1.183241 0.106313 11.12975 0.0000
R-squared 0.746792 Mean dependent var 4.772419
Adjusted R-squared 0.740763 S.D.dependent var 1.274589
S.E. of regression 0.648962 Akaike info criterion 2.017502
Sum squared resid 17.68834 Schwarz criterion 2.098602
Log likelihood -42.38505 F-statistic 123.8712
Durbin-Watson stat 0.409582 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Rcsid04 (Housing and Public utilities Sector)
ADF Test Statistic -2.174292 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
'MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID16)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/28/09 Time: 19:36 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID16(-1) -0.215945 0.099317 -2.174292 0.0357
D(RESID16(-1)) 0.023665 0.155939 0.151755 0.8801
R-squared 0.111330 Mean dependent var 0.012271
Adjusted R-squared 0.089114 S.D.dependent var 0.414267
S.E of regression 0.395378 Akaike info criterion 1.028500
Sum squared resid 6.252959 Schwarz criterion 1.111246
Log likelihood -19.59851 Durbin-Watson stat 1.983602
Dependent Variable: LNMAN (Manufacturing Sector)
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -13.03304 1.971212 -6.611690 0.0000
LNGDP 1.864741 0.218084 8.550557 0.0000
R-squared 0.635138 Mean dependent var 3.734333
Adjusted R-squared 0.626451 S.D.dependent var 2.178118
S.E. of regression 1.331236 Akaike info criterion 3.454483
Sum squared resid 74.43200 Schwarz criterion 3.535582
Log likelihood -73.99862 F-statistic 73.11202
Durbin-Watson stat 0.676676 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on Rcsid()5 (Manufacturing Sector )
ADF Test Statistic 2.877770 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation
Dependent Variable: D(RESID17)
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID17(-1) -0.368328 0.127991 -2.877770 0.0064
D(RESID17(-1)) 0.036174 0.158397 0.228378 0.8205
R-squared 0.187278 Mean dependent var 0.055005
Adjusted R-squared 0.166960 S.D.dependent var 1.097721
S.E. of regression 1.001901 Akaike info criterion 2.888123
Sum squared resid 40.15222 Schwarz criterion 2.970869
Log likelihood -58.65059 Durbin-Watson stat 1.930394
Dependent Variable: LNTRA (Transportation and Communication)
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 44
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5.798562 1.178716 -4.919389 0.0000
LNGDP 1.109304 0.130407 8.506498 0.0000
R-squared 0.632740 Mean dependent var 4.176079
Adjusted R-squared 0.623996 S.D.dependent var 1.298180
S.E. of regression 0.796033 Akaike info criterion 2.426036
Sum squared resid 26.61406 Schwarz criterion 2.507136
Log likelihood -51.37280 F-statistic 72.36050
Durbin-Watson stat 0.392718 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root l est on Kcsid06 (Transportation and Communication)
ADF Test Statistic -2.210824 1% Critical Value* -2.6182
5% Critical Value -1.9488
10% Critical Value -1.6199
‘ MacKinnon critical values for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
Dependent Variable: D(RESID18)
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/28/09 Time: 19:43 
Sample(adjusted): 1964 2005
Included observations: 42 after adjusting endpoints_____________
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
RESID18(-1) -0.216285 0.097830 -2.210824 0.0328
D(RESID18(-1)) 0.113748 0.156758 0.725624 0.4723
R-squared 0.108912 Mean dependent var 0.001132
Adjusted R-squared 0.086635 S.D.dependent var 0.501078
S.E. of regression 0.478881 Akaike info criterion 1.411720
Sum squared resid 9.173088 Schwarz criterion 1.494466
Log likelihood -27.64611 Durbin-Watson stat 1.994034
Appendix (8)
Results from testing the Error correction model for total GDP
without dummies and with dummies
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Version one (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.074119 0.031102 2.383066 0.0220
D(LNGDP) 0.398409 0.152752 2.608204 0.0127
RESID01 (-1) -0.243595 0.084119 -2.895836 0.0061
R-squared 0.243991 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.206190 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.185241 Akaike info criterion -0.467100
Sum squared resid 1.372574 Schwarz criterion -0.344226
Log likelihood 13.04265 F-statistic 6.454709
Durbin-Watson stat 1.332114 Prob(F-statistic) 0.003720
Version two (Pryor model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.086211 0.013398 6.434687 0 .0000
D(LNGDP) 0.258587 0.065167 3.968039 0.0003
RESID02(-1) -0.085090 0.024075 •3.534333 0.0010
R-squared 0.401517 Mean dependent var 0.109209
Adjusted R-squared 0.371592 S.D.dependent var 0.101168
S.E. of regression 0.080198 Akaike info criterion -2.141411
Sum squared resid 0.257272 Schwarz criterion -2.018536
Log likelihood 49.04033 F-statistic 13.41780
Durbin-Watson stat 1.391653 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000035
Version three (Coffman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX) 
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.092974 0.029945 3.104830 0.0035
D(LNGDPN) 0.288059 0.155643 1.850769 0.0716
RESID03(-1) -0.107682 0.042809 2.515410 0.0160
R-squared 0.208048 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.168451 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.189594 Akaike info criterion -0.420653
Sum squared resid 1.437830 Schwarz criterion -0.297779
Log likelihood 12.04404 F-statistic 5.254069
Durbin-Watson stat 1.402505 Prob(F-statistic) 0.009418
Version lour (Musgravc model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP)
Date: 07/21/09 Time: 20:04
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.072245 0.017218 4.196010 0.0001
D(LNGDPN) 0.150539 0.090183 1.669267 0.1029
RESID04(-1) -0.126475 0.029017 -4.358705 0.0001
R-squared 0.378265 Mean dependent var 0.082091
Adjusted R-squared 0.347179 S.D.dependent var 0.134969
S.E. of regression 0.109051 Akaike info criterion -1.526781
Sum squared resid 0.475688 Schwarz criterion -1.403907
Log likelihood 35.82580 F-statistic 12.16806
Durbin-Watson stat 1.990680 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000074
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Version five (Gupta model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.057598 0.029225 1.970839 0.0557
D(LNGDPN) 0.316828 0.151349 2.093363 0.0427
RESID05(-1) -0.205087 0.070753 -2.898619 0.0061
R-squared 0.239767 Mean dependent var 0.077459
Adjusted R-squared 0.201756 S.D.dependent var 0.206910
S E of regression 0.184863 Akaike info criterion -0.471192
Sum squared resid 1.366969 Schwarz criterion -0.348318
Log likelihood 13.13064 F-statistic 6.307741
Durbin-Watson stat 1.347412 Prob(F-statistic) 0.004158
Version six (Mann model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.061025 0.017131 3.562329 0.0010
D(LNGDP) 0.238461 0.083385 2.859766 0.0067
RESID06(-1) -0.308914 0.060661 -5.092419 0.0000
R-squared 0.449484 Mean dependent var 0.082091
Adjusted R-squared 0.421958 S.D.dependent var 0.134969
S.E. of regression 0.102616 Akaike info criterion -1.648438
Sum squared resid 0.421199 Schwarz criterion -1.525564
Log likelihood 38.44143 F-statistic 16.32954
Durbin-Watson stat 1.887467 Prob( F-statistic) 0.000007
Version one (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.146503 0.081758 1.791910 0.0811
D(LNGDP) 0.385448 0.166464 2.315499 0.0261
DUM1 -0.042720 0.085759 •0.498142 0.6213
DUM2 -0.078040 0.060541 •1.289052 0.2052
RESIDDUM1 (-1) -0.307494 0.091810 •3.349251 0.0018
R-squared 0.343362 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.274242 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.177123 Akaike info criterion -0.514997
Sum squared resid 1.192161 Schwarz criterion -0.310207
Log likelihood 16.07244 F-statistic 4.967637
Durbin-Watson stat 1.239554 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002545
Version two (Prvor model
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.130339 0.032582 4.000313 0.0003
D(LNGDP) 0.236992 0.066112 3.584698 0.0009
DUM1 -0.015492 0.034242 ■0.452433 0.6535
DUM2 -0.069755 0.024629 ■2.832251 0.0074
RESIDDUM2(-1) -0.131277 0.035164 ■3.733247 0.0006
R-squared 0.557859 Mean dependent var 0.109209
Adjusted R-squared 0.511318 S.D.dependent var 0.101168
S.E. of regression 0.070723 Akaike info criterion -2.351157
Sum squared resid 0.190064 Schwarz criterion -2.146366
Log likelihood 55.54988 F-statistic 11.98635
Durbin-Watson stat 1.552821 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
Version three (Goffnian model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.183095 0.082897 2.208698 0.0333
D(LNGDPN) 0.226011 0.164993 1.369825 0.1788
DUM1 -0.057567 0.090755 •0.634307 0.5297
DUM2 -0.088982 0.063071 ■1.410824 0.1664
RESIDDUM3(-1) -0.132114 0.054494 ■2.424379 0.0202
R-squared 0.266002 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.188739 S.D. dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.187267 Akaike info criterion -0.403624
Sum squared resid 1.332612 Schwarz criterion -0.198833
Log likelihood 13.67791 F-statistic 3.442813
Durbin-Watson stat 1.366763 Prob(F-statistic) 0.016992
Version four (Musgrave model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.154828 0.046545 3.326415 0.0020
D(LNGDPN) 0.111195 0.092620 1.200552 0.2374
DUM1 -0.053789 0.051139 ■1.051823 0.2995
DUM2 -0.083370 0.035734 ■2.333099 0.0250
RESIDDUM4(-1) -0.174553 0.046349 -3.766066 0.0006
R-squared 0.450508 Mean dependent var 0.082091
Adjusted R-squared 0.392667 S.D. dependent var 0.134969
S.E. of regression 0.105183 Akaike info criterion -1.557278
Sum squared resid 0.420415 Schwarz criterion -1.352487
Log likelihood 38.48147 F-statistic 7.788702
Durbin-Watson stat 2.206774 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000110
Version five (Gupta model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.137646 0.081408 1.690819 0.0991
D(LNGDPN) 0.258883 0.162409 1.594014 0.1192
DUM1 -0.054222 0.089045 -0.608929 0.5462
DUM2 -0.070755 0.061820 -1.144539 0.2596
RESIDDUM5(-1) -0.215653 0.074567 -2.892070 0.0063
R-squared 0.286055 Mean dependent var 0.077459
Adjusted R-squared 0.210903 S.D.dependent var 0.206910
S.E. of regression 0.183800 Akaike info criterion -0.440988
Sum squared resid 1.283739 Schwarz criterion -0.236197
Log likelihood 14.48124 F-statistic 3.806353
Durbin-Watson stat 1.305537 Prob(F-statistic) 0.010670
Version six (Mann model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.134267 0.046653 2.877980 0.0065
D(LNGDP) 0.228242 0.094933 2.404236 0.0212
DUM1 -0.050772 0.049231 -1.031305 0.3089
DUM2 -0.067246 0.035493 -1.894628 0.0658
RESIDDUM6(-1) -0.372334 0.087665 -4.247247 0.0001
R-squared 0.487590 Mean dependent var 0.082091
Adjusted R-squared 0.433652 S.D.dependent var 0.134969
S.E. of regression 0.101572 Akaike info criterion -1.627146
Sum squared resid 0.392044 Schwarz criterion -1.422355
Log likelihood 39.98364 F-statistic 9.039836
Durbin-Watson stat 1.869239 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000031
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Version one (Peacock-Wiseman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.036298 0.032223 1.126473 0.2667
D(LNNOGDP) 0.890636 0.210552 4.230010 0.0001
RESID01 (-1) -0.144482 0.101360 1.425434 0.1618
R-squared 0.309911 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.275406 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E of regression 0.176981 Akaike info criterion -0.558332
Sum squared resid 1.252894 Schwarz criterion -0.435458
Log likelihood 15.00414 F-statistic 8.981751
Durbin-Watson stat 1.807400 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000600
Version two (Pryor model
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.076585 0.018710 4.093213 0.0002
D(LNNOGDP) 0.381211 0.119382 3.193213 0.0027
RESID02(-1) -0.120866 0.051702 •2.337733 0.0245
R-squared 0.277346 Mean dependent var 0.109209
Adjusted R-squared 0.241213 S.D. dependent var 0.119850
S.E of regression 0.104399 Akaike info criterion -1.613972
Sum squared resid 0.435969 Schwarz criterion -1.491097
Log likelihood 37.70039 F-statistic 7.675764
Durbin-Watson stat 2.234178 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001509
Version three (Goffman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.067954 0.029259 2.322508 0.0254
D(LNNOGDPN) 0.848037 0.210258 4.033316 0.0002
RESID03(-1) -0.074709 0.075272 •0.992525 0.3269
R-squared 0.293953 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.258651 S.D. dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.179016 Akaike info criterion -0.535472
Sum squared resid 1.281865 Schwarz criterion -0.412598
Log likelihood 14.51265 F-statistic 8.326744
Durbin-Watson stat 1.824757 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000948
Version four (Musgrave model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.032430 0.029080 1.115203 0.2714
D(LNNOGDPN) -0.112765 0.213850 -0.527310 0.6009
RESID04(-1) -0.151939 0.105534 -1.439715 0.1577
R-squared 0.067926 Mean dependent var 0.028864
Adjusted R-squared 0.021322 S.D. dependent var 0.178934
S.E. of regression 0.177016 Akaike info criterion -0.557938
Sum squared resid 1.253388 Schwarz criterion -0.435063
Log likelihood 14.99566 F-statistic 1.457526
Durbin-Watson stat 1.777331 Prob(F-statistic) 0.244910
Version five (Gupta model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.032398 0.029081 1.114051 0.2719
D(LNNOGDPN) 0.886983 0.213843 4.147828 0.0002
RESID05(-1) -0.151742 0.105427 -1.439318 0.1578
R-squared 0.302840 Mean dependent var 0.077459
Adjusted R-squared 0.267982 S.D.dependent var 0.206910
S.E. of regression 0.177028 Akaike info criterion -0.557802
Sum squared resid 1.253559 Schwarz criterion -0.434927
Log likelihood 14.99273 F-statistic 8.687813
Durbin-Watson stat 1.773130 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000736
Version six (Mann model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.036320 0.032223 1.127160 0.2664
D(LNNOGDP) -0.109085 0.210560 -0.518069 0.6073
RESID06(-1) -0.144666 0.101443 -1.426085 0.1616
R-squared 0.068395 Mean dependent var 0.028864
Adjusted R-squared 0.021815 S.D.dependent var 0.178934
S.E. of regression 0.176972 Akaike info criterion -0.558441
Sum squared resid 1.252758 Schwarz criterion -0.435566
Log likelihood 15.00647 F-statistic 1.468322
Durbin-Watson stat 1.811809 Prob(F-statistic) 0.242459
Version one (Peacock-'Wiseman model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.089327 0.084923 1.051863 0.2995
D(LNNOGDP) 0.776209 0.238625 3.252847 0.0024
DUM1 -0.028015 0.086422 •0.324169 0.7476
DUM2 -0.042294 0.064932 ■0.651363 0.5187
RESIDDUM1 (-1) -0.167618 0.125014 ■1.340800 0.1879
R-squared 0.320259 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.248708 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.180212 Akaike info criterion -0.480419
Sum squared resid 1.234105 Schwarz criterion -0.275628
Log likelihood 15.32901 F-statistic 4.475920
Durbin-Watson stat 1.651133 Prob(F-statistic) 0.004622
Version two (Pryor model
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXC)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.129846 0.047180 2.752138 0.0090
D(LNNOGDP) 0.288910 0.133412 2.165549 0.0367
DUM1 -0.018690 0.047748 ■0.391433 0.6977
DUM2 -0.069819 0.036296 •1.923628 0.0619
RESIDDUM2(-1) -0.151121 0.065748 ■2.298481 0.0271
R-squared 0.366189 Mean dependent var 0.109209
Adjusted R-squared 0.299472 S.D. dependent var 0.119850
S.E. of regression 0.100312 Akaike info criterion -1.652128
Sum squared resid 0.382371 Schwarz criterion -1.447338
Log likelihood 40.52076 F-statistic 5.488697
Durbin-Watson stat 2.239759 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001374
Version three (Goffnian model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGX)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.125398 0.080611 1.555592 0.1281
D(LNNOGDPN) 0.748406 0.234268 3.194660 0.0028
DUM1 -0.035724 0.086387 -0.413534 0.6815
DUM2 -0.050215 0.063170 -0.794925 0.4316
RESIDDUM3(-1) -0.079481 0.082422 -0.964318 0.3410
R-squared 0.313349 Mean dependent var 0.110909
Adjusted R-squared 0.241070 S.D.dependent var 0.207912
S.E. of regression 0.181126 Akaike info criterion -0.470304
Sum squared resid 1.246651 Schwarz criterion -0.265513
Log likelihood 15.11153 F-statistic 4.335266
Durbin-Watson stat 1.737926 Prob(F-statistic) 0.005498
Version four (Musj'ravc model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.080760 0.080721 1.000472 0.3234
D(LNNOGDPN) -0.224352 0.234898 ■0.955105 0.3456
DUM1 -0.031792 0.086682 ■0.366769 0.7158
DUM2 -0.034035 0.063341 ■0.537330 0.5942
RESIDDUM4(-1) -0.146034 0.114751 ■1.272616 0.2109
R-squared 0.073729 Mean dependent var 0.028864
Adjusted R-squared -0.023774 S.D.dependent var 0.178934
S.E. of regression 0.181049 Akaike info criterion -0.471159
Sum squared resid 1.245586 Schwarz criterion -0.266368
Log likelihood 15.12992 F-statistic 0.756173
Durbin-Watson stat 1.681153 Prob(F-statistic) 0.560262
Version five (Gupta model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXN)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.080626 0.080734 0.998652 0.3243
D(LNNOGDPN) 0.775467 0.234920 3.300982 0.0021
DUM1 -0.031707 0.086697 •0.365720 0.7166
DUM2 -0.033975 0.063352 ■0.536284 0.5949
RESIDDUM5(-1) -0.145641 0.114654 ■1.270269 0.2117
R-squared 0.307047 Mean dependent var 0.077459
Adjusted R-squared 0.234105 S.D.dependent var 0.206910
S.E. of regression 0.181078 Akaike info criterion -0.470832
Sum squared resid 1.245993 Schwarz criterion -0.266041
Log likelihood 15.12289 F-statistic 4.209453
Durbin-Watson stat 1.677340 Prob(F-statistic) 0.006427
Version six (Mann model)
Dependent Variable: D(LNTGXNOGDP)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.089432 0.084909 1.053278 0.2989
D(LNNOGDP) -0.223520 0.238606 ■0.936777 0.3548
DUM1 -0.028080 0.086406 •0.324977 0.7470
DUM2 -0.042357 0.064920 ■0.652455 0.5180
RESIDDUM6(-1) -0.168166 0.125126 ■1.343977 0.1869
R-squared 0.082585 Mean dependent var 0.028864
Adjusted R-squared -0.013985 S.D.dependent var 0.178934
S.E. of regression 0.180181 Akaike info criterion -0.480767
Sum squared resid 1.233676 Schwarz criterion -0.275976
Log likelihood 15.33648 F-statistic 0.855183
Durbin-Watson stat 1.654811 Prob(F-statistic) 0.499498
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Dependent Variable: D(LNAGR) (Agriculture Sector )
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.304656 0.296002 1.029237 0.3099
D(LNGDP) 0.438262 0.573788 0.763805 0.4497
DUM1 -0.133928 0.313120 -0.427721 0.6713
DUM2 -0.208918 0.220284 -0.948402 0.3489
RESID01 AGR(-1) -0.687187 0.147575 -4.656522 0.0000
R-squared 0.395235 Mean dependent var 0.120184
Adjusted R-squared 0.331576 S.D.dependent var 0.790870
S.E. of regression 0.646593 Akaike info criterion 2.074744
Sum squared resid 15.88712 Schwarz criterion 2.279535
Log likelihood -39.60700 F-statistic 6.208593
Durbin-Watson stat 1.984433 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000603
Dependent Variable: D(LNEDU) (Kducation Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.466594 0.263444 1.771129 0.0846
D(LNGDP) 0.288992 0.517807 0.558107 0.5800
DUM1 -0.353205 0.277643 •1.272153 0.2110
DUM2 -0.077403 0.194746 •0.397455 0.6933
RESID02EDU(-1) -0.305504 0.118494 ■2.578233 0.0139
R-squared 0.211030 Mean dependent var 0.155615
Adjusted R-squared 0.127980 S.D.dependent var 0.612265
S.E. of regression 0.571745 Akaike info criterion 1.828698
Sum squared resid 12.42192 Schwarz criterion 2.033489
Log likelihood -34.31701 F-statistic 2.541011
Durbin-Watson stat 1.621281 Prob(F-statistic) 0.055456
Dependent Variable: D(LNMAN) (Manufacturing Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.640717 0.422492 1.516518 0.1377
D(LNGDP) 0.096512 0.818520 0.117911 0.9068
DUM1 -0.406802 0.447329 •0.909402 0.3689
DUM2 -0.244007 0.314946 •0.774759 0.4433
RESID03MAN(-1) -0.473070 0.119495 •3.958912 0.0003
R-squared 0.324593 Mean dependent var 0.187974
Adjusted R-squared 0.253498 S.D.dependent var 1.067689
S.E. of regression 0.922487 Akaike info criterion 2.785457
Sum squared resid 32.33730 Schwarz criterion 2.990247
Log likelihood -54.88732 F-statistic 4.565600
Durbin-Watson stat 1.868109 Prob(F-statistic) 0.004141
Dependent Variable: D(LNHEA) (Health Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.563842 0.284384 1.982676 0.0547
D(LNGDP) 0.173942 0.560915 0.310103 0.7582
DUM1 -0.419495 0.299386 •1.401182 0.1693
DUM2 -0.090224 0.209141 •0.431400 0.6686
RESID04HEA(-1) -0.446397 0.129217 •3.454624 0.0014
R-squared 0.299510 Mean dependent var 0.185213
Adjusted R-squared 0.225774 S.D. dependent var 0.697715
S.E. of regression 0.613920 Akaike info criterion 1.971039
Sum squared resid 14.32210 Schwarz criterion 2.175829
Log likelihood -37.37733 F-statistic 4.061940
Durbin-Watson stat 2.215215 Prob(F-statistic) 0.007729
Dependent Variable: D(LNHOU) (Housing and Public utilities Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.316665 0.161829 1.956788 0.0577
D(LNGDP) 0.190042 0.313580 0.606041 0.5481
DUM1 -0.176160 0.171162 -1.029200 0.3099
DUM2 -0.174414 0.120341 -1.449329 0.1554
RESID05HOU(-1) -0.281155 0.096159 -2.923871 0.0058
R-squared 0.292131 Mean dependent var 0.100195
Adjusted R-squared 0.217619 S.D. dependent var 0.399430
S.E of regression 0.353305 Akaike info criterion 0.865973
Sum squared resid 4.743324 Schwarz criterion 1.070764
Log likelihood -13.61843 F-statistic 3.920566
Durbin-Watson stat 1.997780 Prob(F-statistic) 0.009234
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRA) (Transportation and Communication)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.287034 0.198742 1.444257 0.1569
D(LNGDP) 0.088908 0.385520 0.230618 0.8188
DUM1 -0.132167 0.210090 -0.629098 0.5330
DUM2 -0.205840 0.147965 -1.391140 0.1723
RESID06TRA(-1) -0.299968 0.100032 -2.998724 0.0048
R-squared 0.259827 Mean dependent var 0.084377
Adjusted R-squared 0.181915 S.D.dependent var 0.480039
S.E. of regression 0.434186 Akaike info criterion 1.278256
Sum squared resid 7.163661 Schwarz criterion 1.483047
Log likelihood -22.48251 F-statistic 3.334846
Durbin-Watson stat 1.840353 Prob(F-statistic) 0.019538
Dependent Variable: D(LNAGR) (Agriculture Sector )
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.060263 0.116231 0.518472 0.6070
D(LNGDP) 0.747436 0.565746 1.321150 0.1940
RESID13(-1) -0.473505 0.132662 ■3.569268 0.0009
R-squared 0.261040 Mean dependent var 0.120184
Adjusted R-squared 0.224092 S.D.dependent var 0.790870
S.E. of regression 0.696643 Akaike info criterion 2.182126
Sum squared resid 19.41244 Schwarz criterion 2.305000
Log likelihood -43.91571 F-statistic 7.065048
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967706 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002357
Dependent Variable: D(LNEDU) (Education Sector
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.111879 0.096432 1.160183 0.2529
D(LNGDP) 0.458594 0.470400 0.974903 0.3355
RESID14(-1) -0.287237 0.110275 2.604736 0.0128
R-squared 0.154458 Mean dependent var 0.155615
Adjusted R-squared 0112181 S.D.dependent var 0.612265
S.E. of regression 0.576902 Akaike info criterion 1.804924
Sum squared resid 13.31261 Schwarz criterion 1.927798
Log likelihood -35.80586 F-statistic 3.653470
Durbin-Watson stat 1.588527 Prob(F-statistic) 0.034890
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.147828 0.106357 1.389927 0.1722
D(LNGDP) 0.329054 0.520057 0.632727 0.5305
RESID15(-1) -0.403437 0.123850 -3.257467 0.0023
R-squared 0.210322 Mean dependent var 0.185213
Adjusted R-squared 0.170838 S.D.dependent var 0.697715
S.E. of regression 0.635327 Akaike info criterion 1.997861
Sum squared resid 16.14563 Schwarz criterion 2.120736
Log likelihood -39.95402 F-statistic 5.326771
Durbin-Watson stat 2.018194 Prob(F-statistic) 0.008892
Dependent Variable: D(LNHOU) (Housing and Public utilities Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.061718 0.063115 0.977864 0.3340
D(LNGDP) 0.468741 0.307227 1.525715 0.1349
RESID16(-1) -0.196751 0.090069 -2.184442 0.0349
R-squared 0.145834 Mean dependent var 0.100195
Adjusted R-squared 0.103125 S.D.dependent var 0.399430
S.E. of regression 0.378274 Akaike info criterion 0.960817
Sum squared resid 5.723642 Schwarz criterion 1.083692
Log likelihood -17.65757 F-statistic 3.414642
Durbin-Watson stat 1.830807 Prob(F-statistic) 0.042741
Dependent Variable: D(LNMAN) (Manufacturing Sector)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.132578 0.165356 0.801776 0.4274
D(LNGDP) 0.613269 0.804860 0.761958 0.4506
RESID17(-1) -0.333706 0.115207 -2.896588 0.0061
R-squared 0.179971 Mean dependent var 0.187974
Adjusted R-squared 0.138969 S.D.dependent var 1.067689
S.E. of regression 0.990727 Akaike info criterion 2.886459
Sum squared resid 39.26160 Schwarz criterion 3.009333
Log likelihood -59.05886 F-statistic 4.389367
Durbin-Watson stat 1.843403 Prob(F-statistic) 0.018906
Dependent Variable: D(LNTRA) (Transportation and Communication)
Sample(adjusted): 1963 2005
Included observations: 43 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.058324 0.076740 0.760029 0.4517
D(LNGDP) 0.318184 0.373252 0.852464 0.3990
RESID18(-1) -0.199100 0.089181 -2.232537 0.0312
R-squared 0.125623 Mean dependent var 0.084377
Adjusted R-squared 0.081904 S.D.dependent var 0.480039
S.E. of regression 0.459960 Akaike info criterion 1.351862
Sum squared resid 8.462544 Schwarz criterion 1.474736
Log likelihood -26.06503 F-statistic 2.873422
Durbin-Watson stat 1.731604 Prob(F-statistic) 0.068230
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Results w ithout dummies
Version one Peacock-Wiseman model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43 __________ ___
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 3.451302 1 0.0632
All 3.451302 1 0.0632
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 1.538605 1 0.2148
AM 1.538605 1 0.2148
Version two Pryor model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGXC
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 3.519794 1 0.0606
All 3.519794 1 0.0606
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXC 0.076171 1 0.7826
All 0.076171 1 0.7826
Version three (>oilman model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 2.239502 1 0.1345
All 2.239502 1 0.1345
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 0.396819 1 0.5287
AH 0.396819 1 0.5287
Version four Musgrave model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 40
Dependent variable: LNTGXGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 27.48833 4 0.0000
All 27.48833 4 0.0000
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXGDP 6.193774 4 0.1851
All 6.193774 4 0.1851
Version five Gupta model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGXN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 3.761420 1 0.0524
All 3.761420 1 0.0524
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXN 0.002427 1 0.9607
All 0.002427 1 0.9607
Version six Mann model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 40
Dependent variable: LNTGXGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 32.33900 4 0.0000
All 32.33900 4 0.0000
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXGDP 5.010209 4 0.2863
All 5.010209 4 0.2863
Granger causality test fro total GDP with dummies 
Version one Peacock-Wiseman model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 4.393035 1 0.0361
All 4.393035 1 0.0361
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 6.642029 1 0.0100
All 6.642029 1 0.0100
Version two Pryor model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations : 43
Dependent variable: LNTGXC
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 0.717789 1 0.3969
All 0.717789 1 0.3969
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXC 4.316523 1 0.0377
All 4.316523 1 0.0377
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Version three GofTnian model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 0.606571 1 0.4361
All 0.606571 1 0.4361
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 0.015537 1 0.9008
All _ 0.015537 1 0.9008
Version four Musgrave model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 40
Dependent variable: LNTGXGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 21.77216 4 0.0002
All 21.77216 4 0.0002
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXGDP 11.05671 4 0.0259
All 11.05671 4 0.0259
Version five Gupta model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGXN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDPN 2.011996 1 0.1561
All 2.011996 1 0.1561
Dependent variable: LNGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXN 0.290552 1 0.5899
All 0.290552 1 0.5899-------------------------- a  ■ s ----- a
Version six Mann model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43 ________  __________
Dependent variable: LNTGXGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 12.65020 1 0.0004
All 12.65020 1 0.0004
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXGDP 7.432086 1 0.0064
All 7.432086 1 0.0064
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Granger causality test fro total non-oil GDP without dummies 
Version one (Peacock-Wiseman model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 0.046537 1 0.8292
All 0.046537 1 0.8292
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 4.035765 1 0.0445
All 4.035765 _1 0.0445
Version two (Pryor model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 40
Dependent variable: LNTGXC
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 23.10766 4 0.0001
All 23.10766 4 0.0001
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXC 1.184879 4 0.8806
All 1.184879 4 0.8806
Version three (Goffman model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations : 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 0.004139 1 0.9487
All 0.004139 1 0.9487
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 0.292460 1 0.5886
All 0.292460 1 0.5886
Version four (Musgrave model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations : 42
Dependent variable: LNTGXNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 8.881847 2 0.0118
All 8.881847 2 0.0118
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXNOGDP 4.069764 2 0.1307
All 4.069764 2 0.1307
Version five Gupta model (Gupta model)
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VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43 ______________________
Dependent variable: LNTGXN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 0.060673 1 0.8054
All 0.060673 1 0.8054
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXN 3.191004 1 0.0740
AH 3.191004 1 0.0740
Version six Mann model
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 42_______________________________
Dependent variable: LNTGXNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 10.10758 2 0.0064
All 10.10758 2 0.0064
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXNOGDP 4.516416 2 0.1045
All 4.516416 2 0.1045
Granger causality test fro total non-oil GDP with dummies 
Version one (Peacock-Wiseman model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 0.802005 1 0.3705
All 0.802005 1 0.3705
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 1.373914 1 0.2411
All _ 1.373914 1 0.2411
Version two (Pryor model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 40 _____  ______________
Dependent variable: LNTGXC
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 21.80117 4 0.0002
All 21.80117 4 0.0002
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXC 5.171041 4 0.2702
All 5.171041 4 0.2702
Version three (Goffman model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 42
Dependent variable: LNTGX
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 4.001768 2 0.1352
All 4.001768 2 0.1352
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGX 1.793111 2 0.4080
AM 1.793111 2 0.4080
Version four (Musgravc model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations : 42
Dependent variable: LNTGXNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 7.943575 2 0.0188
All 7.943575 2 0.0188
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXNOGDP 1.836172 2 0.3993
AM 1.836172 2 0.3993
Version five (Gupta model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 42
Dependent variable: LNTGXN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDPN 3.448440 2 0.1783
All 3.448440 2 0.1783
Dependent variable: LNNOGDPN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXN 1.815158 2 0.4035
All 1.815158 2 0.4035
Version six (Mann model)
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 42
Dependent variable: LNTGXNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNNOGDP 10.50559 2 0.0052
All 10.50559 2 0.0052
Dependent variable: LNNOGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTGXNOGDP 2.221041 2 0.3294
All 2.221041 2 0.3294s;
Appendix (13)
The results from Granger causality results for six categories with
dummies and without dummies
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Cranger causality test with dummies
Agriculture Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNAGR
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 9.350323 1 0.0022
All 9.350323 1 0.0022
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNAGR 0.003666 1 0.9517
All 0.003666 1 0.9517
Kducation Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNEDU
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 4.985984 1 0.0256
All 4.985984 1 0.0256
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNEDU 1.291136 1 0.2558
AM 1.291136 1 0.2558
Health Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43 _______
Dependent variable: LNHEA
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 9.243847 1 0.0024
All 9.243847 1 0.0024
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNHEA 1.527801 1 0.2164
All _ 1.527801 1 0.2164
Housing and Public utilities Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNHOU
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 2.920315 1 0.0875
All 2.920315 1 0.0875
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNHOU 0.001938 1 0.9649
All 0.001938 1 0.9649
Manufacturing Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNMAN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 3.443607 1 0.0635
All 3.443607 1 0.0635
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNMAN 0.027750 1 0.8677
All _ 0.027750 1 0.8677
t ransportation and Communication
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTRA
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 8.089283 1 0.0045
All 8.089283 1 0.0045
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTRA 0.028959 1 0.8649
All 0.028959 1 0.8649
Granger causality test without dummies 
Agriculture Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNAGR
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 5.260079 1 0.0218
All 5.260079 1 0.0218
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNAGR 0.115528 1 0.7339
All 0.115528 1 0.7339
Education Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Date: 07/29/09 Time: 17:45 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNEDU
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 2.349109 1 0.1254
All 2.349109 1 0.1254
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNEDU 0.454537 1 0.5002
All 0.454537 1 0.5002
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Health Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations: 43 _________  ____
Dependent variable: LNHEA
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 5.816402 1 0.0159
All 5.816402 1 0.0159
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNHEA 0.829564 1 0.3624
All 0.829564 1 0.3624
Housing and Public utilities Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNHOU
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 0.560792 1 0.4539
All 0.560792 1 0.4539
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNHOU 0.124012 1 0.7247
All 0.124012 1 0.7247
Manufacturing Sector
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005
Included observations : 43
Dependent variable: LNMAN
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 2.060174 1 0.1512
All 2.060174 1 0.1512
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNMAN 0.113666 1 0.7360
All 0.113666 1 0.7360
Transportation and Communication
VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Sample: 1962 2005 
Included observations: 43
Dependent variable: LNTRA
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNGDP 1.263054 1 0.2611
All 1.263054 1 0.2611
Dependent variable: LNGDP
Exclude Chi-sq df Prob.
LNTRA 0.003631 1 0.9519
All 0.003631 1 0.9519
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